scholarly journals Behavioral Economics of Accounting: A Review of Archival Research on Individual Decision Makers†

Author(s):  
Michelle Hanlon ◽  
Kelvin Yeung ◽  
Luo Zuo
Author(s):  
Keren Yarhi-Milo

This chapter examines the indicators used by U.S. President Jimmy Carter and two key decision makers in his administration, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to assess the intentions of the Soviet Union during the period 1977–1980. Using evidence from U.S. archives and interviews with former U.S. decision makers, it compares the predictions of the selective attention thesis, capabilities thesis, strategic military doctrine thesis, and behavior thesis. After discussing the U.S. decision makers’ stated beliefs about Soviet intentions, the chapter considers the reasoning they employed to justify their intentions assessments. It then describes the policies that individual decision makers advocated and those that the administration collectively adopted. It also explores whether decision makers advocated policies that were congruent with their stated beliefs about intentions and evaluate sthe impact of beliefs about intentions on U.S. foreign policy at the time.


Author(s):  
Paul Adams

The COVID-19 pandemic created a profound challenge for universities and colleges. In the USA, the response to the viral outbreak within institutions of higher education was largely driven by individual decision-makers, including professors, department chairs, and deans. As a professor of geography, the author undertook auto-ethnography as both process and product, a way to learn about his competencies and coping strategies, his social interactions and responses, and his engagements with social power relations from a particular positionality. As a scholar with longstanding interest in communication media, the author focused on a trajectory from the campus to the home office, from place-based scholarship to the online contexts of «distance learning», from in-place communications to dependence on digital technologies. The study reveals resilience and adaptation but also incompleteness and fragility.


2019 ◽  
Vol 65 (8) ◽  
pp. 3904-3927 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucas C. Coffman ◽  
Alexander Gotthard-Real

Can an organization avoid blame for an unpopular action when an adviser advises it to do it? We present experimental evidence suggesting this is the case—advice to be selfish substantially decreases punishment of being selfish. Further, this result is true despite advisers’ misaligned incentives, known to all: Through a relational contract incentive, advisers are motivated to tell the decision makers what they want to hear. Through incentivized elicitations, we find suggestive evidence that advice moves punishment by affecting beliefs of how necessary the selfish action was. In follow-up treatments, however, we show advice does not decrease punishment solely through a beliefs channel. Advice not only changes beliefs about what happened, but also the perceived morality of it. Finally, in treatments in which advisers are available, the data suggest selfish decision makers act more selfishly. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics.


1999 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 503 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. A. Barwick ◽  
A. L. Henzell

A method of assessing the economic value of improved marbling for use in deriving beef breeding objectives for individual decision-makers is described and illustrated. Correlations between breeding objectives that account for marbling score were examined for 6 cases that differed in their breeding role, market-addressed (Domestic Australian, high quality Japanese), and other production system characteristics. Under the assumptions considered, the economic value of improved marbling varied with mean marbling score (i.e. was non-linear) in objectives for the Japanese market. Marbling improvement was a more important aim in populations with a greater propensity to marble. Differences between some breeding objectives were large (genetic correlations ≤0.65), with marked differences (genetic correlations <0.40) between an objective that targeted only feedlot finishing performance for the Japanese market and objectives that targeted complete pasture-fed production for the Domestic Australian market. Varying individual assumptions had only small effects on results. A procedure is described for including marbling evaluations in selection indices where marbling contributes non-linearly to the breeding objective.


2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 295-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Herbert Hax

Abstract In a normative theory of decision making in the firm, limited cognitive capabilities of decision makers can be taken into account in different ways. If individual decision making alone is being considered, the concept of rationality must be defined in such a way that it is acceptable from the viewpoint of potential users of the theory. In an organizational context, normative theory deals primarily with the design of contracts; as far as the anticipation of the actual behaviour of contract partners is concerned an empirically valid descriptive decision theory is needed. A major problem which arises if one applies contract theory to problems of corporate governance is the definition of an adequate standard to evaluate the firm’s outcome periodically. Accounting profit and market value are two possible measures, but both have grave shortcomings.


2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 36-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoshio Iida ◽  
Christiane Schwieren

Abstract Many real-world decisions are made by individuals as representatives of groups. Most research, however, studies either individuals or groups as decision-makers. This paper explores whether there is a general difference between a decision made as an individual and as a representative of a group in the context of a public good game. We conducted a series of experiments to test this question and to understand mechanisms contributing to potential differences. We found that representatives contributed less than individuals when they could not communicate with their constituency. However, when they could discuss their strategy before playing, they contributed at least as much as individual decision-makers. Furthermore, when they could justify their decision after playing, they contributed even more than individual decision-makers. We discuss potential reasons for this and directions for future research.


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