Moral Virtue and the Limits of the Political Community in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics

2004 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61
Author(s):  
Susan D. Collins
2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 343-358
Author(s):  
Leszek Skowroński

At the beginning of Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that “the good is the same for an individual as for a city”. The good in question is εὐδαιμονία – the highest good achievable for human beings. In Book X, we learn that contemplative activity (θεωρητική) meets best the requirements set for eudaimonia. Even if we agree that contemplative activity is the good for an individual, how should we understand the claim that contemplation is also the good for a city? I start by reminding readers that for Aristotle the Nicomachean Ethics is essentially a political enquiry and should be read together with his Politics. I focus on the teleological character of his political philosophy and the interlinking of the concepts of the good (τἀγαθόν), nature (φύσις), form (τὸ εἶδος, τὸ τί ἐστι, ἡ μορφή), end (τέλος, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) and function (ἔργον). Then, I look at Aristotle’s two closely-connected statements that polis exists by nature and that men are political animals. Having taken into account Aristotle’s opinion regarding the imperfection of this world, which is exemplified by the vulnerability of human lives to fortune, luck and accidents, I conclude that Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of the political community as a common project explains well how contemplation could be the end of polis. Only very few individuals can achieve the highest good and they can do it only if they have the support of the political community. But all the inhabitants of a polis structured towards achieving the highest good benefit from living in a well-ordered community whose constitution reflects the objective hierarchy of goods.


2017 ◽  
pp. 343-358
Author(s):  
Leszek Skowroński

At the beginning of Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says that “the good is the same for an individual as for a city”. The good in question is εὐδαιμονία – the highest good achievable for human beings. In Book X, we learn that contemplative activity (θεωρητική) meets best the requirements set for eudaimonia. Even if we agree that contemplative activity is the good for an individual, how should we understand the claim that contemplation is also the good for a city? I start by reminding readers that for Aristotle the Nicomachean Ethics is essentially a political enquiry and should be read together with his Politics. I focus on the teleological character of his political philosophy and the interlinking of the concepts of the good (τἀγαθόν), nature (φύσις), form (τὸ εἶδος, τὸ τί ἐστι, ἡ μορφή), end (τέλος, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) and function (ἔργον). Then, I look at Aristotle’s two closely-connected statements that polis exists by nature and that men are political animals. Having taken into account Aristotle’s opinion regarding the imperfection of this world, which is exemplified by the vulnerability of human lives to fortune, luck and accidents, I conclude that Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of the political community as a common project explains well how contemplation could be the end of polis. Only very few individuals can achieve the highest good and they can do it only if they have the support of the political community. But all the inhabitants of a polis structured towards achieving the highest good benefit from living in a well-ordered community whose constitution reflects the objective hierarchy of goods.


2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lee Ward

In the current debate over the status of moral virtue in ethical and political theory, Aristotle is an imposing and controversial figure. Both champions and critics of the ancient conception of virtue identify Aristotle as its most important proponent, but commentators often obscure the complexity of his treatment of moral virtue. His account of courage reveals this complexity. Aristotle believes that courage, and indeed virtue generally, must be understood as both an end in itself and a means to a more comprehensive good. In this way Aristotle’s political science offers a middle course that corrects and embraces the claims of nobility and necessity in political life. Honor is central to this political science. It acts as a bridge between the desires of the individual and the needs of the political community and reduces the dangers posed by the excessive pursuit of nobility and the complete acquiescence to necessity.


2021 ◽  
Vol XVIII (44) ◽  
pp. 173-187
Author(s):  
JELENA BOŽILOVIĆ

Aristotle’s understanding of political community is strongly linked with the view on political naturalism and the concept of a man as a moral being. According to Aristotle, man (by nature) achieves his human potential by living in a community, however, the political community on its own, as the largest and the most significant among all communities, enables citizens to fully develop their virtue through their participation in political life. For this reason, a man and the community are joined in a relationship resulting in mutual creation of ethics: by living in a polis, an individual develops virtue, and conversely, his virtuous actions in the community enable a polis to endure on ethical principles. This conception is found in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, and is encompassed in the theory of virtue, theory of citizenship and a detailed consideration of the forms of political systems. Although elitist and exclusivist, Aristotle’s ethical and political views remain intact in terms of the value ascribed to the “the philosophy of human life”, as his legacy continues to inspire modern social thought. The aim of this paper is to show the connection Aristotle makes between a political community and ethical principles while pointing to their universal importance through the analysis of Nicomachean Ethics and Politics.


eTopia ◽  
2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew James Austin

At least since Aristotle, the Western philosophical tradition has accepted the linking of the categories of the “human” and the “political.” As such, these categories have enjoyed a long history of mutual implication. Such an implication, however, constrains the semantic field by which one comes to imagine the human, the political and ultimately the political community. A clear line of distinction has been upheld between what is human and naturally belongs in a political community and what is inhuman and destined to be marginalized to the isolated fringe. In the last century or so, theory, broadly defined, has challenged the essentialism of the human as a category. A diffusion of novel conceptual formations has taken place. Such concepts as the“inhuman,” the “posthuman,” the “antihuman,” the “transhuman,” etc., have been developed forthe explicit purpose of undermining the clear and distinct category of the human. However, it remains essential, this paper argues, that theorists maintain one foot in the canonical trust bywhich the category of the human has come to be defined. Or, it is essential for theorists to recall what it is that the prefixes “in,” “post,” “anti,” “trans,” etc., are in fact opposing, overcoming,denying, sublating and/or transcending. In order to recall the human, this paper returns to Aristotle in whom one finds perhaps the definitive canonical expression of the human as political. For, in Aristotle’s Politics one reads “humans are by nature political animals” (1.2.1253a2),1 and “a social instinct is implanted in all humans by nature” (ibid, a29-30). And, in Nicomachean Ethics one reads “humanity is born for citizenship” (1.7.1097b12-13). Essential to humanity, then, is the necessity of composition, or political constitution. The human, for Aristotle, however, is hardly a clear-cut matter. In fact, Aristotle also claims for humanity a part that is divine, eternal and separable from composition/constitution. This part is nous, or “mind.” The divinity of mind stands apart from the necessity that forces political community. As such, this paper argues that mind is something inhuman. The human, for Aristotle, therefore, is something of a paradox. In order to lay bare this paradox, this paper unpacks the key Aristotelian themes of essence, humanity, community and wisdom. It focuses primarily upon Aristotle’s De Anima , Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, and Politics.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-113
Author(s):  
Francesco Rotiroti

This article seeks to define a theoretical framework for the study of the relation between religion and the political community in the Roman world and to analyze a particular case in point. The first part reviews two prominent theories of religion developed in the last fifty years through the combined efforts of anthropologists and classicists, arguing for their complementary contribution to the understanding of religion's political dimension. It also provides an overview of the approaches of recent scholarship to the relation between religion and the Roman polity, contextualizing the efforts of this article toward a theoretical reframing of the political and institutional elements of ancient Christianity. The second part focuses on the religious legislation of the Theodosian Code, with particular emphasis on the laws against the heretics and their performance in the construction of the political community. With their characteristic language of exclusion, these laws signal the persisting overlap between the borders of the political community and the borders of religion, in a manner that one would expect from pre-Christian civic religions. Nevertheless, the political essence of religion did also adapt to the ecumenical dimension of the empire. Indeed, the religious norms of the Code appear to structure a community whose borders tend to be identical to the borders of the whole inhabited world, within which there is no longer room for alternative affiliations; the only possible identity outside this community is that of the insane, not belonging to any political entity and thus unable to possess any right.


Author(s):  
András Sajó ◽  
Renáta Uitz

This book examines the implications of constitutionalism for the constitutional legal order and the political community which is meant to live by it. The book demonstrates what is at stake in the debate on constitutionalism through numerous examples of political anomalies and abuse of power. It presents stories of constitutional success and failure to give a sense of the current threats, arguing that constitutions are not mere practical applications of political philosophies or opportunistic political deals. The book considers foundational issues related to constitutions and constitutionalism as reflected in influential ideas, political practices, and social dynamics behind the scenes.


Author(s):  
Piero Ignazi

Chapter 1 introduces the long and difficult process of the theoretical legitimation of the political party as such. The analysis of the meaning and acceptance of ‘parties’ as tools of expressing contrasting visions moves forward from ancient Greece and Rome where (democratic) politics had first become a matter of speculation and practice, and ends up with the first cautious acceptance of parties by eighteenth-century British thinkers. The chapter explores how parties or factions have been constantly considered tools of division of the ‘common wealth’ and the ‘good society’. The holist and monist vision of a harmonious and compounded society, stigmatized parties and factions as an ultimate danger for the political community. Only when a new way of thinking, that is liberalism, emerged, was room for the acceptance of parties set.


Author(s):  
Matthew Clayton ◽  
Andres Moles

Is the political community morally permitted to use neurointerventions to improve the moral conduct of children? Putting aside difficult questions concerning the institutionalization of moral enhancement, the authors address this question, first, by arguing that is not, in itself, always morally impermissible for the community to impose neurointerventions on adults. Although certain ideals, such as the ideal of individual autonomy, limit the permissible employment of neurointerventions, they do not generate a moral constraint that always forbids their use. Thereafter, they argue that because young children lack certain moral capacities that adults possess, the moral limits that pertain to the use of neurointerventions to improve their moral behaviour are, in principle, less restrictive than they are for adults.


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