Forensic Science

2005 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 535-544 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul C. Giannelli

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the value of scientific evidence - especially when compared to other types of evidence such as eyewitness identifications, confessions, and informant testimony. For example, in Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court observed: “We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the ‘confession’ will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.” Similarly, in Davis v. Mississippi, the Court commented:Detention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of police searches and detentions. Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search. Nor can fingerprint detention be employed repeatedly to harass any individual, since the police need only one set of each person's prints. Furthermore, fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and effective crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifications or confessions and is not subject to such abuses as the improper line-up and the “third degree.”

2006 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul C. Giannelli

The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the value of scientific evidence – especially when compared to other types of evidence such as eyewitness identifications, confessions, and informant testimony. For example, in Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court observed: “We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the –confession— will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation.” Similarly, in Davis v. Mississippi, the Court commented:Detention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less serious intrusion upon personal security than other types of police searches and detentions. Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search. Nor can fingerprint detention be employed repeatedly to harass any individual, since the police need only one set of each person's prints. Furthermore, fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and effective crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifications or confessions and is not subject to such abuses as the improper line-up and the “third degree.”


1997 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael S. Vaughn ◽  
Rolando V. del Carmen

This article applies the concept of actuarial justice to the “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause requirements. According to the United States Supreme Court, the “special needs” exception should only apply when the routine interests of law enforcement are not implicated. Lower courts, however, have been instrumental in extending the administrative search doctrine of “special needs” into the realm of criminal law enforcement. The article concludes that as part of the broader movement in criminal justice toward managerial efficiency, the “special needs” exception serves as a tool of actuarial justice by diminishing Fourth Amendment rights.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Kevin D. Benish

On May 18, 2020, the United States Supreme Court denied a request by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and its state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), to review the merits of Crystallex Int'l Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In Crystallex, the Third Circuit affirmed a trial court's determination that PDVSA is the “alter ego” of Venezuela itself, thus permitting Crystallex to enforce a $1.4 billion judgment against Venezuela by attaching property held in PDVSA's name. Given the Supreme Court's decision to leave the Third Circuit's opinion undisturbed, Crystallex is a significant decision that may affect parties involved in transnational litigation for years to come—especially those pursuing or defending against U.S. enforcement proceedings involving the property of foreign states.


1980 ◽  
Vol 1 (8) ◽  
pp. 3-6
Author(s):  
George J. Annas

In an extraordinary and highly controversial 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court decided on June 30, 1980, that the United States Constitution does not require either the federal government or the individual states to fund medically necessary abortions for poor women who qualify for Medicaid.At issue in this case is the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment. The applicable 1980 version provides:|N]one of the funds provided by this joint resolution shall be used to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health service, (emphasis supplied)


PEDIATRICS ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 934-936 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary N. McAbee

Many medical and legal commentators have expressed concern about the validity of scientific evidence that is proffered by expert witnesses at depositions and in courts of law.1,2 The sparse research that is available on the testimony of medical expert witnesses suggests that it is frequently flawed and erroneous.3 On June 28, 1993, the United States (US) Supreme Court ruled on the proper standard for admissibility of scientific evidence in the courtroom.4 Although the ruling establishes guidelines that are binding only in federal courts, it is expected that many state courts will follow the Court's ruling. This commentary reviews the Court's guidelines for admissibility of expert testimony, and expresses concern about their applicability in future cases involving scientific testimony.


2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 133-171 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce P. Smith

When it is said that a defendant to a criminal charge is presumed to be innocent, what is really meant is that the burden of proving his guilt is upon the prosecution. This golden thread…runs through the web of the English criminal law. Unhappily Parliament regards the principle with indifference—one might almost say with contempt. The statute book contains many offences in which the burden of proving his innocence is cast on the accused.No principle in Anglo-American criminal law is more vaunted than the so-called “presumption of innocence”: the doctrine that the prosecution must bothproduceevidence of guilt andpersuadethe fact-finder “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The claim that “every man is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty” has been described as “dear to the hearts of Englishmen” and as an omnipresent feature of English criminal law. In 1895, the United States Supreme Court declared the “presumption of innocence in favor of the accused” to be “the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary”—a protection that “lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.” Befitting its lofty stature in Anglo-American legal culture, the presumption has become associated, over time, with that most famous of Blackstonean maxims: “[I]t is better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 217
Author(s):  
Andri Winjaya Laksana

Cybercrime has been become a major portion for law enforcement agencies and intelligence services to both national and international matter, development of information and technology’s crime resulted in every country have a different policy of criminalization. The emphasis on cross-country has made a crime on the internet is not just a national issue, but has become an International problem. therefore it is important to have uniformity in the prevention of cybercrime that this crime can be solved. Based on the comparison of cybercrime that included the rules from various countries including the United States, Singapore, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Myanmar as a reference in the application of criminal law enforcement regulations regarding cybercrime seal the document.


Author(s):  
Vincent Chiao

In Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court announced that it would not tolerate a capital sentencing regime that imposed death sentences in a seriously arbitrary fashion. The question I ask in this paper is whether we should in fact object to arbitrariness in punishment. The answer I propose is that under plausibly adverse conditions, we might not object to arbitrary penal outcomes, because under those conditions a fair distribution of punishment would be one that equalizes chances across a class of similarly situated criminals. In particular, fairness may require no more than a rough equalization of ex ante chances under conditions of resource scarcity, an inability to rank claims reliably by comparative desert, and a pressing need for punishment to be imposed. I call this an ex ante theory of fairness. The central virtue of ex ante fairness is that it is capable of reconciling parsimony in punishment with equity in its distribution, even when claims about who deserves what are deeply contested. Adopting an ex ante standard of fairness means that a concern for fair treatment of the guilty need not blind us to the realities of the severe resource constraints faced by American criminal justice, and vice versa. After laying out the argument for ex ante fairness in general terms, I proceed to show how several prominent features of American criminal law and procedure—the Supreme Court’s capital jurisprudence, prosecutorial discretion, judicial sentencing discretion, and “strict” criminal liability—all exhibit an implicit commitment to an equalization of chances rather than of outcomes.


Worldview ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 18 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 15-18
Author(s):  
O. Edmund Clubb

Speaking before the U.N. General Assembly in September, 1973, Chancellor Willy Brandt said: “Where hunger prevails, there can be no peace in the long run. Where bitter poverty prevails, there can be no justice.” He called upon the Assembly members to adopt a position on the moral aspects of international coexistence. And he said something else, that there is a limit to the expansion of power—“a limit where power becomes transformed into impotence.”His words had direct relevance to the relationship between the United States and the Third World. In the postwar period, in pursuit of its power aims, the United States concerned itself with ex-colonial countries primarily with the view of “saving” them, as political entities, from a dreaded “Communist conquest.”


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