HOBBES AND GAME THEORY REVISITED: ZERO-SUM GAMES IN THE STATE OF NATURE

2011 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 193-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
DANIEL EGGERS
2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-508 ◽  
Author(s):  
HUN CHUNG

ABSTRACT:Hobbes's own justification for the existence of governments relies on the assumption that without a government our lives in the state of nature would result in a state of war of every man against every man. Many contemporary scholars have tried to explain why universal war is unavoidable in Hobbes's state of nature by utilizing modern game theory. However, most game-theoretic models that have been presented so far do not accurately capture what Hobbes deems to be the primary cause of conflict in the state of nature—namely, uncertainty, rather than people's egoistic psychology. Therefore, I claim that any game-theoretic model that does not incorporate uncertainty into the picture is the wrong model. In this paper, I use Bayesian game theory to show how universal conflict can break out in the state of nature—even when the majority of the population would strictly prefer to cooperate and seek peace with other people—due to uncertainty about what type of person the other player is. Along the way, I show that the valuation of one's own life is one of the central mechanisms that drives Hobbes's pessimistic conclusion.


Utilitas ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 297-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL MOEHLER

In this article, I argue that if one closely follows Hobbes' line of reasoning in Leviathan, in particular his distinction between the second and the third law of nature, and the logic of his contractarian theory, then Hobbes' state of nature is best translated into the language of game theory by an assurance game, and not by a one-shot or iterated prisoner's dilemma game, nor by an assurance dilemma game. Further, I support Hobbes' conclusion that the sovereign must always punish the Foole, and even exclude her from the cooperative framework or take her life, if she defects once society is established, which is best expressed in the language of game theory by a grim strategy. That is, compared to existing game-theoretic interpretations of Hobbes, I argue that the sovereign plays a grim strategy with the citizens once society is established, and not the individuals with one another in the state of nature.


2011 ◽  
Vol 50-51 ◽  
pp. 262-265 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Mei Yang ◽  
Yan Guo ◽  
Li Chao Feng ◽  
Jian Yong Di

In this article we present an overview on two-person zero-sum games, which play a central role in the development of the theory of games. Two-person zero-sum games is a special class of game theory in which one player wins what the other player loses with only two players. It is difficult to solve 2-person matrix game with the order m×n(m≥3,n≥3). The aim of the article is to determine the method on how to solve a 2-person matrix game by linear programming function linprog() in matlab. With linear programming techniques in the Matlab software, we present effective method for solving large zero-sum games problems.


Episteme ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-204 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmanuel J. Genot ◽  
Justine Jacot

AbstractWe examine a special case of inquiry games and give an account of the informational import of asking questions. We focus on yes-or-no questions, which always carry information about the questioner's strategy, but never about the state of Nature, and show how strategic information reduces uncertainty through inferences about other players' goals and strategies. This uncertainty cannot always be captured by information structures of classical game theory. We conclude by discussing the connection with Gricean pragmatics and contextual constraints on interpretation.


2004 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferenc Forgó

The paper gives a brief account of von Neumann's contribution to the foundation of game theory: definition of abstract games, the minimax theorem for two-person zero-sum games and the stable set solution for cooperative games with side payments. The presentation is self-contained, uses very little mathematical formalism and caters to the nonspecialist. Basic concepts and their implications are in focus. It is also indicated how von Neumann's groundbreaking work initiated further research, and a few unsolved problems are also mentioned.


2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 173
Author(s):  
AHMAD SAIFUDDIN ◽  
NI KETUT TARI TASTRAWATI ◽  
KARTIKA SARI

In Game Theory, generally discusses the zero sum games and non-zero sum games. Both of these studies applied in solving problems predicting the chosen decision based capabilities (pay off). In a case study of the preparation and delivery of the election in Jakarta through the application of the concept of the non-zero sum game obtained by the conclutions that AHY – SM and AB – SU has five same optimum strategies: capture East Jakarta voters, women voters, 20 -29 years old voters, graduated from high school voters, and the Javaness community. While BTP – DSH only different in maximizing strategy of capturing men voters and West Jakarta voters.


1981 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain McLean

The familiar problem of whether Hobbesian men in the state of nature would ever abide by an agreement to obey a Sovereign is a version of the puzzle now known as ‘Prisoner's Dilemma’. The present paper has the following aims: (1) To establish that the game-theory approach is a legitimate way to study Hobbes. (2) To see whether a proposed ‘solution’ to the paradox of Prisoner's Dilemma applies to this example. The paradox is that individually rational self-interested calculations sum to an outcome that is suboptimal not only for society but also for every single member of it. The solution is the Supergame which consists of indefinitely repeated plays of the simple Prisoner's Dilemma game. (3) To compare the results of the above with the similar conclusions reached by a different route by recent arguments in sociobiology.


2004 ◽  
Vol 02 (01) ◽  
pp. 79-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUNICHI SHIMAMURA ◽  
ŞAHIN KAYA ÖZDEMIR ◽  
FUMIAKI MORIKOSHI ◽  
NOBUYUKI IMOTO

Effects of quantum and classical correlations on game theory are studied to clarify the new aspects brought into game theory by the quantum mechanical toolbox. In this study, we compare quantum correlation represented by a maximally entangled state and classical correlation that is generated through phase damping processes on the maximally entangled state. Thus, this also sheds light on the behavior of games under the influence of noisy sources. It is observed that the quantum correlation can always resolve the dilemmas in non-zero sum games and attain the maximum sum of both players' payoffs, while the classical correlation cannot necessarily resolve the dilemmas.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-354
Author(s):  
Jacob Barrett

AbstractHobbes believed that the state of nature would be a war of all against all. Locke denied this, but acknowledged that in the absence of government, peace is insecure. In this paper, I analyse both accounts of the state of nature through the lens of classical and experimental game theory, drawing especially on evidence concerning the effects of punishment in public goods games. My analysis suggests that we need government not to keep wicked or relentlessly self-interested individuals in line, but rather to maintain peace among those who disagree about morality.


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