scholarly journals Firm Performance, Corporate Governance Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: Evidence from Nigeria

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 66
Author(s):  
Yahya Uthman Abdullahi ◽  
Magajiya Tanko

This paper examines the influence of firm performance and internal governance mechanisms on CEO turnover decision. The sample of the study is all Nigerian non-financial firms listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) from year 2011 to 2015 consisting of 72 cases of CEO turnover. Using logistic regression analysis, this study provides evidences that poor accounting-based performance (ROA) and low engagement of female directors in corporate boards do increase the probability of CEO turnover. Furthermore, firms dominated with foreign ownership and those with independent board nominating committee are swifter in removing their CEOs. However, this study fails to support the argument that firms with large board size and those that are dominated by managerial ownership, help to enhance the monitoring practices, which ought to sanction underperformed CEOs with dismissal. Consequently, this study recommends that the Nigerian government should enact a legislation on gender quota to ensure that more female directors are appointed to the boards and as well encourage more foreign ownership in the Nigerian corporate landscape by attracting foreign investment into the economy via favourable policies. This paper contributes to the literature concerning CEO succession in developing markets with poor corporate governance structure such as Nigeria.

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Rubeena Tashfeen ◽  
Saud Hayat ◽  
Afreen Mallik

This study examines the effectiveness of the corporate governance structure when coping with any potentially unexpected events. For the purpose of this research, an event study has been conducted in order to investigate the market responses of various firms through the Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) of the stocks listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX). The stocks data under consideration is that which was presented after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007. The overall results indicate that firms that are governed conventionally do not perform well in the markets during a crisis situation. In our comparison of conventionally, and non-conventionally governed firms, the overall pooled results show that the former record a lower CAAR. This, in short, indicates that conventional corporate governance structures may not be equipped to take timely and dynamic actions that are deemed necessary in the face of a crisis. Moreover, our results suggest that firms which have less diversified ownership, and governance mechanisms are less vulnerable to such unanticipated events. There are two reasons that support our hypotheses: first, strict governance mechanisms, and a resultant cautious/conservative approach may not allow firms to take timely and proactive decisions during these situations and second, there is a lower chance of existing agency problems, as family owners would be working for the protection of their own wealth during these events. Therefore, our findings ultimately reveal that the conventional corporate governance structures that work during normal time period, may become ineffective during a crisis. This study, aims to fill a gap in the literature in order to provide fresh insights into the stock market dynamic, and corporate governance risk management. Furthermore, it also highlights the benefits of family owned structures, and unconventional corporate governance systems, that may outperform conventional governance structure in some situations. This, however, raises the question whether one governance framework could be the correct fit in all the situations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-61
Author(s):  
Tirthankar Nag ◽  
Chanchal Chatterjee

This study explores the influence of corporate governance practices in corporate boards on firm performance and draws insights on the relative importance for companies for fostering the development of governance mechanisms in business. The study examines 50 firms belonging to the benchmark index of the National Stock Exchange of India (NIFTY 50) and tracks them for over a five-year period. The study uses fixed and random effect econometric models to explore the relationship between corporate governance variables, and firm performance using both accounting returns (EVA, ROA and ROE) and market returns (MVA). The study finds that corporate governance variables significantly improve firm performance or value creation. Especially, multiple directorships, involvement of foreign institutional investors and increase in promoter holdings may significantly affect returns of the firm. The study suggests that it may be useful to foster better corporate governance practices and monitor linkages with firm performance as the effect is influenced by other control variables also.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 57-82
Author(s):  
Bobek Suklev ◽  
◽  
Stojan Debarliev ◽  
Ljubomir Drakulevsk ◽  
◽  
...  

Purpose: Knowing the factors that might affect board structure is an important step in understanding boards and their role in corporate governance. This research aims to examine the effect of firm characteristics closely related to corporate governance mechanisms, such as the model of corporate governance, shareholder capital concentration, and stock exchange listing on board structure variables (size, independence, and gender diversity). Methodology: The sample of this study stems from large Macedonian joint-stock companies. We run a hierarchical linear regression of board characteristics on common demographic firm characteristics as control variables and contextual firm characteristics related to corporate governance mechanisms as independent variables. Findings: Joint-stock companies in the Republic of North Macedonia have relatively small boards, which provide no positive effects that would originate from the larger number of board members. Moreover, the number of outside independent members is small, insufficient to influence the boards with greater objectivity, independence, and quality. Larger companies with a one-tier model have statistically significant larger corporate boards and a larger number of independent directors. Implications: The best corporate governance practices worldwide must be used as a basis for future improvements of corporate governance in joint-stock companies in developing economies.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-67
Author(s):  
Dian Ramadhani ◽  
Raja Adri Satriawan Surya ◽  
Arumega Zarefar

This study aims to examine the influence of corporate governance mechanisms to transparency. Corporate governance mechanisms examined in this study include internal mechanism consisting of: commissioners, managerial ownership, foreign ownership, debt financing, and audit quality. The population in this study is a registered company in Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2015 - 2018. The sample in this research determined by purposive sampling method with a total sample of 103 annual reports. Statistical tests showed that the board of directors, managerial ownership, foreign ownership, debt financing has no effect on the performance of the company while the quality of the audit have an impact on transparency.


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 313-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming-Tien Tsai ◽  
Wen-Hui Tung

Purpose – This study aims to explore the effects of corporate governance structure and resources on foreign direct investment (FDI) commitment and firm performance. Design/methodology/approach – The data are collected from high-tech firms listed by the Taiwan Stock Exchange. All selected 137 firms have complete FDI and other required data during 2007-2009. The mean values of the variables during the three-year period were used for analysis. Findings – The results indicate that both chief executive officer (CEO) duality and government shareholding affect a firm’s FDI; and the higher the management shareholding ratio, the lower the return on equity. Moreover, a large ownership of substantial shareholders can enhance a firm’s performance; and higher institutional ownership can lead to higher firm performance. Research limitations/implications – This study analyses the limited data from 137 high-tech firms in Taiwan during the three-year period of 2007-2009. Further analyses of other industries, countries and time periods are needed to generalize the conclusions. Practical implications – A firm with CEO duality should increase the ratio of government holding to mitigate the influence of CEO on FDI decisions. When a firm’s performance is poor, the ratio of managerial holdings should be reduced; conversely, the firm could attract more holdings from domestic securities and funds to improve performance. Originality/value – This study provides guidelines for shareholders to analyze governance structure and formulate their investment strategies. Corporate policymakers may use these as the principles for designing a corporate governance structure that could engender optimal firm performance.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-36
Author(s):  
Abdul Rafay Abdul Rafay ◽  
Ramla Sadiq ◽  
Mobeen Ajmal

IAS-24 of the International Financial Reporting Standards focuses on the concept and disclosures of related party transactions (RPTs) for a reporting entity. This study examines the interrelationship between RPTs (as disclosed under IAS-24), agency theory, ownership structures and firm performance. Our sample includes nonfinancial companies indexed by the KSE-100 of the Pakistan Stock Exchange during 2006–15. To run the regression models, we determine the regression assumptions, normality, heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation and multicollinearity. We investigate the impact of different RPTs, including cash inflows and outflows, whereas other studies generally look at the impact of RPTs on firm performance in totality. The empirical analysis suggests that institutional ownership has a positive, significant impact on firm performance. Related party purchases have a significant, negative impact on performance, resulting in the expropriation of institutional ownership. RPTs that generate revenues have a significant, positive impact on performance, such that institutional ownership has a propping-up effect with respect to the related parties. In practice, institutional ownership leads to strong corporate governance and contributes to firm performance. While other studies find family ownership responsible for the expropriation effect, we argue that institutional ownership has a propping-up and expropriation effect on related parties. Our study also suggests that certain ownership structures lead to weaker corporate governance mechanisms, resulting in greater agency problems. This, in turn, badly affects company performance and leads to the exploitation of minority shareholders.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hyejeong Shin ◽  
Su-In Kim

This study investigates whether corporate governance mechanisms are associated with earnings quality, especially accurate earnings reporting, and whether investors react differently to inaccurate earnings according to governance strength. Earnings accuracy is one of the key factors affecting a firm’s sustainability in the sense that reported earnings provide information about a firm’s long-term sustainability and further are directly associated with a firm’s cost of capital. In this paper, we employ the independence of the board of directors (BOD) and foreign ownership as governance mechanisms associated with the earnings gap between audited and unaudited earnings. Using 1976 non-financial firm-year observations listed on the Korea Stock Exchange from 2013 to 2016, we find that the gap between unaudited earnings and actual earnings is smaller for firms with independent BODs and foreign ownership, suggesting that earnings accuracy is higher for firms with effective corporate governance. This study also examines how investors react to the earnings gap. Stock returns to the earnings gap are less negative for firms with independent BODs and are more negative as foreign ownership increases, implying that each mechanism of corporate governance has different effects.


2011 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qaiser Rafique Yasser

The aim of this study is to scrutinise the impact of corporate governance mechanism on on the performance of family and non-family controlled firms in Pakistan. It has been found that a corporate governance structure influences the performance of both family and non-family controlled companies significantly. However all corporate governance mechanisms are not significant as the significant variables differ between family and non-family controlled companies. Thus, regulators need to be cautious in setting codes for different companies. JEL classification: G34, L21, L25 Keywords: Corporate Governance, Firm Performance


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (9) ◽  
pp. 1134-1154
Author(s):  
Kuntara Pukthuanthong ◽  
Saif Ullah ◽  
Thomas J. Walker ◽  
Jing Zhang

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine operational and stock performance changes around forced CEO turnovers caused by conflicts between corporate boards and CEOs over the strategic direction of the firm. In addition, the authors investigate whether changes in performance can be explained by board, CEO, or firm characteristics. Design/methodology/approach The authors apply propensity score matching to choose matching firms that do not forced CEO turnover but have similar characteristics with the sample firms. The authors compare their operating and stock performances. The authors apply both univariate analysis and multivariate regression analyses. Findings The authors find that the CEO turnovers caused by conflicts between corporate boards and CEOs over the strategic direction of the firms tend to be preceded by significant declines in a firm’s operating and stock performance and that corporate performance improves after turnovers. In addition, the authors find that an increase in long-term incentives and firm size and a decrease in turnover improve firm performance. Originality/value While the existing corporate governance literature emphasizes oversight as the main role of the board of directors and identifies the CEO as the leader who sets the strategic direction of the firm, in cases of conflict-induced forced CEO turnover, it is the board that sets the strategic direction. This paper is the first to provide evidence regarding the implications of conflict-induced forced CEO turnovers.


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