scholarly journals Military, University, and Police Agency Command and Staff Colleges in the United States

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 215
Author(s):  
Richard H. Martin

This article discusses three models of command and staff colleges (CSC). Five university models, five United States Military models, and one police agency model are discussed. The 11 CSCs provide leadership development in various training and education programs all leading to the increased capabilities of leaders and potential leaders for public safety and branches of the military. The police agency CSC model was developed within a Montgomery, Alabama Police Department, the only one of its kind among public safety agencies in the country. The concept of a CSC for leadership development among police agencies in the U.S. is a rare entity. Other command and staff colleges were found to be connected to the various branches of the U.S. Military and higher education institutions. The article also discusses the municipal police agency CSC model historical development as it expanded within the department and throughout the state of Alabama.

2021 ◽  
pp. 088740342110383
Author(s):  
Scott M. Mourtgos ◽  
Ian T. Adams ◽  
Samuel R. Baty

Most use-of-force policies utilized by U.S. police agencies make fundamental ordinal assumptions about officers’ force responses to subject resistance. These policies consist of varying levels of force and resistance along an ordinally ranked continuum of severity. We empirically tested the ordinal assumptions that are ubiquitous to police use-of-force continua within the United States using 1 year’s use-of-force data from a municipal police department. Applying a quantitative technique known as categorical regression with optimal scaling, we found the assumptions of ordinality within the studied department’s use-of-force continuum (which is similar to many police use-of-force continua within the United States) are not met. Specifying physical force as a “lower” force option than less-lethal tools is associated with increased officer injury and decreased subject injury. Our findings call into question use-of-force continua featuring ordinal rankings for varying categories of less-lethal force.


2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 279-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven G. Brandl ◽  
Meghan S. Stroshine

In the last few decades, several less lethal forms of force have been introduced, adopted, and deployed by police agencies. Oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray is now used in nearly every department across the United States; the Thomas A. Swift Electric Rifle (TASER) is used in the majority of police departments. Despite their widespread use, we still know relatively little about the factors associated with the use of OC spray and TASERs and the effectiveness of these weapons in incapacitating subjects. Knowing when these weapons are used and whether they are effective would provide for a more complete understanding of their strengths and limitations and inform the debate about where less lethal weapons should be placed on use of force continua. This article contributes to the discussion by analyzing 504 use-of-force incidents where the police used OC spray or TASERs during the event. Data were obtained from a large municipal police department on incidents that occurred in 2010 and 2011. Policy considerations and directions for further research are discussed.


Author(s):  
Le Thi Nhuong

President M. Richard Nixon took office in the context that the United States was being crisis and deeply divided by the Vietnam war. Ending the war became the new administration's top priority. The top priority of the new government was to get the American out of the war. But if the American got out of the war and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) fell, the honor and and prestige of the U.S will be effected. Nixon government wanted to conclude American involvement honorably. It means that the U.S forces could be returned to the U.S, but still maintaining the RVN government in South Vietnam. To accomplish this goal, Nixon government implemented linkage diplomacy, negotiated with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in Paris and implemented "Vietnamization" strategy. The aim of the Vietnamization was to train and provide equipments for the RVN's military forces that gradually replace the U.S. troops, take responsibility in self-guarantee for their own security. By analyzing the military cooperation between the United States and the RVN in the implementation of "Vietnamization", the paper aims to clarify the nature of the "allied relationship" between the U.S and the RVN. It also proves that the goal of Nixon's Vietnamization was not to help the RVN "reach to a strong government with a wealthy economy, a powerful internal security and military forces", served the policy of withdrawing American troops from the war that the U.S could not win militarily, solving internal problems but still preserving the honor of the United States.


2022 ◽  
Vol 91 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-65
Author(s):  
Symbol Lai

In 1951, six years after the United States defeated Japan and commenced the Occupation of Okinawa, the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyus (USCAR) issued an ordinance in support of agricultural cooperatives. Despite the appearance of altruism, the move marked the emergence of the U.S. anticolonial empire, a form that advocated racial and ethnic self-determination even as it expanded the U.S. military presence. This article shows how U.S. policymakers in Okinawa borrowed from modernization theory to implement models to foster ethnic identification through economic development. Their plans sought to render the United States an ally to Okinawa freedom despite the devastating effects militarism had on the local landscape. Specifically, military plans posited frameworks like the Okinawan economy, which strategically turned the military into a partner without whom Okinawa could not modernize. The article further focuses on agriculture, an arena where the contradictions of the U.S. Occupation was most acute. It argues that rehabilitating the local cooperative network drew Okinawans into the military project, not only to paper over the U.S. colonial presence, but also to further the reach of military discipline.


Author(s):  
Andrew Goodhart ◽  
Jami K. Taylor

For most of its history, the U.S. military has maintained a policy of exclusion toward lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people serving in uniform. The justifications for these exclusions have included the view that being homosexual or transgender is a psychological disorder, that it undermines military morale and effectiveness, and a fear that LGBT people would be vulnerable to foreign espionage. Explicit policies banning consensual homosexual sex—and excluding from service those who engage in it—date to the period between World Wars I and II, but de facto efforts at exclusion have existed since the early days of the republic. Regulations governing homosexuals in the military came under pressure in the 1970s and 1980s as societal views toward lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) people changed, and those LGB service members discharged under the policy increasingly challenged their treatment in court. (Public pressure to change regulations governing transgender people in the military arose mostly in the 2000s, though litigation efforts date to the 1970s.) In addition to general shifts in public and legal opinion, the debate over LGB people serving in the U.S. military was affected by the experience of foreign militaries that allow LGB people to serve. United States law began to loosen formal restrictions on LBG people serving in uniform with the passage of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) in 1994, but it still required LGB people to serve in secret. Changing public perceptions of LGB people and problems implementing the ban galvanized support for eliminating such restrictions. In 2010, President Obama signed legislation repealing DADT and removing all restrictions on LGB people serving in the military. However, transgender people do not enjoy the same rights. The Trump administration has revised Obama-era rules on transgender service members to enable greater exclusion. The issue is being contested in the courts and appears ripe for further political and legal dispute.


Author(s):  
Richard J. Kilroy Jr.

The United States military has taken a number of steps to confront the threat of cyber warfare. These include organizational, operational, and personnel changes by all the armed services, as well as the joint commands, which conduct operational warfare. Many of these changes began before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 as military planners recognized the vulnerabilities the nation faced to asymmetrical warfare conducted in cyberspace, as well as the military’s dependency on key critical infrastructures within the United States that were vulnerable to cyber warfare. Although many changes have taken place, to include training new classes of military officers and enlisted specialists in career fields and military doctrine related to cyber warfare (both offensive and defensive), the military continues to remain vulnerable to an adversary’s ability to control the informational battlefield. Thus, a key strategic goal of the U.S. military leadership is to achieve information superiority over its current and potential adversaries.


2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack M. Beard

Over five years have passed since President George W. Bush issued the much-criticized order making an obscure device, military commissions, the primary tool for the United States to bring accused Qaeda terrorists to justice. Some legal scholars suggested in the wake of the issuance of that order that military commissions were the only practicable method available to address many of the problems presented by the trial of accused terrorists in civilian U.S. courts. True or not, it is clear that the decision to approach the problem of terrorists primarily in terms of war rather than crime continues to have far-reaching legal consequences. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, which found that the military commissions designed by the Bush administration were inconsistent with the requirements of both the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) and the law of war as incorporated in that statute, the U.S. Congress attempted to fashion a compliant charter for these commissions through the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).


2016 ◽  
Vol 02 (04) ◽  
pp. 465-484
Author(s):  
Chung Kyung-Young

The nuclear program is arguably Kim Jong-un’s strategic fantasy and core asset for breaking the status quo in order to achieve a unified Korea. To cope with North Korea’s grave nuclear and missile threats, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system needs to be deployed in South Korea for deterrence by denial. In the meantime, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) should not exclude the military option in the event of any further nuclear test and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launch experiment by North Korea. The U.S. government should consider redeploying tactical nuclear warheads to South Korea in order to make the extended deterrence more effective. The South Korean government should make it clear that the Republic of Korea (ROK) does not seek to join, nor will it be incorporated into, the U.S.-led missile defense system. The United States and China should cooperate with South Korea to take the lead in achieving a norm-oriented, nuclear-free, and unified Korea. In particular, ROK-U.S.-China strategic cooperation is essential to preventing any potential nuclear warfare and maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea, the United States and China should propose restructured negotiations on important issues that provide genuine incentives for Pyongyang, culminating in complete and verifiable denuclearization and a treaty that will end the tensions on the Peninsula. In addition, the trilateral cooperation needs to adopt a more proactive engagement policy to facilitate North Korea’s lasting transformation.


2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Byers

It is unlikely that George W. Bush feels constrained by international law when deciding whether to use military force abroad. Nevertheless, many of the United States' allies are reluctant to cooperate with and participate in military actions that cannot reasonably be justified under international law. And supportive allies, while perhaps not strictly necessary to the United States in its recent and foreseeable military campaigns, do make the military option easier to pursue. A war against Iraq would be difficult without access to bases and airspace in countries as diverse as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Canada. For this reason, at least, it would seem to be worth the president's while to adhere to international law where possible and, where this is not possible, to seek to change the rules.International lawyers in the Department of State, together with lawyers in other parts of the U.S. government, have excelled in shaping the law to accommodate the interests of the United States. One example, though by no means the only one, concerns the response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.


Author(s):  
Thomas L. Tate

The chapter provides an overview of the practice of leadership development at the United States Military Academy, the United States Air Force Academy, and the United States Naval Academy. The service-specific mission and core values provide a foundation for a theoretical review of leader, leadership, and human development theories currently implemented at selected service academies. The practical application of these models is then illustrated in an overview of leader and leadership education and training throughout the 47-month academy experience. The chapter concludes with some final thoughts concerning the influence of the military model in traditional colleges, universities, and preparatory schools.


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