On the Historicity of Scientific Knowledge: Ludwik Fleck, Gaston Bachelard, Edmund Husserl

Author(s):  
Hans-jörg Rheinberger
2001 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 277-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Roy Weintraub

While most scientists and philosophers of science privilege scientific knowledge, and have sought demarcations of science from non-science to justify the privilege, sociologists of science, small numbers of philosophers of science, anthropologists, and some scientists themselves have been attracted to a new way of talking about science. Prefigured by Ludwik Fleck (1935/1979) and Gaston Bachelard (1934/1984), nurtured by the controversies over Thomas Kuhn's work, and instantiated in the Edinburgh School's Strong Program, the naturalistic turn portrays science as a human activity, part of the woof and warp of culture itself. Yet curiously historians of science have been less involved in this recent reconceptualization of both science and scientific knowledge.


2019 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-44
Author(s):  
Martyn Hammersley

This paper examines the “methodology,” or philosophy of social science, developed by Felix Kaufmann in the second quarter of the 20th century, with the aim of determining its influence on the early work of the sociologist Harold Garfinkel. Kaufmann’s two methodology books are discussed, one written before, the other after, his migration from Austria to the United States. It is argued that Garfinkel took over Kaufmann’s conception of scientific practice: as a set of procedural rules or methods that determine whether or not new propositions will be accepted into the corpus of scientific knowledge, and whether previously accepted propositions should be retained or abandoned. However, Garfinkel deployed this methodology not so much as a model for sociological inquiry, but rather for the processes by which the lifeworld is constituted—an area of investigation that is epistemologically prior to the focus of most social science, and one which had been opened up in the writings of Edmund Husserl and (especially) Alfred Schutz. It is suggested that Kaufmann’s “methodology” was an important complement to the work of these other two philosophers in their influence on Garfinkel.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-19
Author(s):  
Ilana Löwy

Ludwik Fleck is known today primarily as pioneer in the social study of scientific knowledge. However, during World War II he was a prisoner in Buchenwald, where he and other prisoners produced a typhus vaccine for the Nazis, and where he witnessed murderous experiments on human beings. After WW2, Fleck was accused by one of the prisoners who had participated in the vaccine production at Buchenwald of collaborating, either deliberately or due to lack of imagination, with the Nazi experiments. This article critically examines this accusation and its well-documented rebuttal by Fleck. It argues that while sometimes, especially when dealing with emotionally fraught issues, it may be difficult to establish what precisely took place at a given time and site, it is important to restore the original complexity and messiness of past events – in order to open spaces for understanding, reflexivity and compassion.


Human Studies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hub Zwart

Abstract Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962) occupies a unique position in the history of European thinking. As a philosopher of science, he developed a profound interest in genres of the imagination, notably poetry and novels. While emphatically acknowledging the strength, precision and reliability of scientific knowledge compared to every-day experience, he saw literary phantasies as important supplementary sources of insight. Although he significantly influenced authors such as Lacan, Althusser, Foucault and others, while some of his key concepts (“epistemological rupture,” “epistemological obstacle,” “technoscience”) are still widely used, his oeuvre tends to be overlooked. And yet, as I will argue, Bachelard’s extended series of books opens up an intriguing perspective on contemporary science. First, I will point to a remarkable duality that runs through Bachelard’s oeuvre. His philosophy of science consists of two sub-oeuvres: a psychoanalysis of technoscience, complemented by a poetics of elementary imagination. I will point out how these two branches deal with complementary themes: technoscientific artefacts and literary fictions, two realms of human experience separated by an epistemological rupture. Whereas Bachelard’s work initially entails a panegyric in praise of scientific practice, he becomes increasingly intrigued by the imaginary and its basic images (“archetypes”), such as the Mother Earth archetype.


2018 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-158 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nina Kalwa

AbstractThe process of scientific knowledge generation is accompanied by an on-going transformation of the corresponding scientific discipline. Scientists develop new theories and methods and discard old ones. Thus, scientific disciplines can be considered as a result of negotiations within the scientific community. The paper focuses on the following questions: Which theories, methods and sub-disciplines do scientists regard as part of a scientific discipline? How do scientists label and define these theories, methods and sub-disciplines? Which linguistic practices do scientists apply to authorize new scientific approaches? With recourse to “The Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact” by Ludwik Fleck as well as “Epistemic cultures” and “The manufacture of knowledge” by Karin Knorr-Cetina, the paper shows why it is reasonable to see science as a social practice. It also discusses the role language plays when linguists try to establish new approaches and focuses on the linguistic practices of labeling, locating and defininig.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (22) ◽  
pp. 80-95
Author(s):  
David Velanes

This article aims to clarify the theme of continuity and epistemological discontinuity from Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) and Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), both French thinkers. The first author has a continuum view on the development of sciences, in which the progress of scientific knowledge would occur from continuous repairs on a theoretical system that evolves gradually. Gaston Bachelard, on the other hand, defends the thesis of the epistemological rupture, according to which he thinks the evolution of the sciences through his interregnums and reorganizations. Knowledge moves through rectifications of knowledge that are updated in the light of new experiences, without a cumulative process of ideas occurring. It is intended in this work to clarify the Bachelardian view on epistemological discontinuity as opposed to Duhemian thought.   Keywords: Continuity. Discontinuity. Epistemology. Duhem. Bachelard.


Author(s):  
Enrico Castelli Gattinara

The article shows the strategic analogies, but also the differences between Bachelard and Canguilhem on the use of the history of science for epistemology. It emphasizes the importance of the ideology for Canguilhem, and the conceptual essence he recognizes in the history of science, which is read in its internal specific differences and in its complex articulations with life and reality. No concept, in fact, comes from nothing. The link between history and epistemology is not however of subjection, but of mutual influence. Canguilhem radicalizes the thought of Bachelard, and recognizes the historicity of every aspect of scientific knowledge, even of its less valued features and above all of errors. All aspects of Science are historical. The object of the history of science is not the object of the sciences, because it is always a discourse. This is why the history of science is inevitably linked to other forms of history. This opens up a pluralist conception of History and of Time, thinking of the sciences in their real body and no longer ideal or legal. Thus Canguilhem opens the way to the researches of Foucault and Serres.


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