Impact of Undetected Fabrication Flaws on LBB Risk

Author(s):  
Robert Kurth ◽  
Cédric Sallaberry ◽  
Elizabeth Kurth ◽  
Frederick Brust

On-going assessments of the impact of active degradation mechanisms in US nuclear power plants previously approved for leak before break (LBB) relief are being performed with, among other methods, the extremely low probability of rupture (xLPR) code being developed under a memorandum of understanding between the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC) and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) [1]. This code finished with internal acceptance testing in July of 2016 and is undergoing sensitivity and understanding analyses and studies in preparation for its general release. One of the key components of the analysis tool is the integration of inspection methods for damage and the impact of leak detection on the risk of a pipe rupture before the pipe is detected to be leaking. While it is not impossible to detect a crack or defect that is less than 10% of the pipe wall thickness current ASME code does not give credit for inspections identifying a crack of this size. This study investigates the impact of combining the probabilistic analysis results from xLPR with a pre-existing flaw to determine the change, if any, to the risk. Fabrication flaws were found to have a statistically significant impact on the risk of rupture before leak detection.

Author(s):  
J. G. Merkle ◽  
K. K. Yoon ◽  
W. A. VanDerSluys ◽  
W. Server

ASME Code Cases N-629/N-631, published in 1999, provided an important new approach to allow material specific, measured fracture toughness curves for ferritic steels in the code applications. This has enabled some of the nuclear power plants whose reactor pressure vessel materials reached a certain threshold level based on overly conservative rules to use an alternative RTNDT to justify continued operation of their plants. These code cases have been approved by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission and these have been proposed to be codified in Appendix A and Appendix G of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. This paper summarizes the basis of this approach for the record.


Author(s):  
Steven R. Doctor ◽  
Michael T. Anderson

A major thrust in the past 20 years has been to upgrade nondestructive examinations (NDE) for use in inservice inspection (ISI) programs to more effectively manage degradation at operating nuclear power plants. Risk-informed ISI (RI-ISI) is one of the outcomes of this work, and this approach relies heavily on the reliability of NDE, when properly applied, to detect sources of expected degradation. There have been a number of improvements in the reliability of NDE, specifically in ultrasonic testing (UT), through training of examiners, and improved equipment and procedure development. However, the most significant improvements in UT were derived by moving from prescriptive requirements to performance based requirements. Even with these substantial improvements, NDE contains significant uncertainties and RI-ISI programs need to address and accommodate this factor. As part of the work that PNNL is conducting for the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, we are examining the impact of these uncertainties on the effectiveness of RI-ISI programs. One of the primary objectives of in-service inspection, including a RI-ISI program, is to manage potential degradation that may occur, but that had not been foreseen through previous operating experience. However, RI-ISI programs in the U.S are primarily based on history, looking back at past failures in the operating fleet. Therefore, RI-ISI may not adequately manage degradation events that are yet to occur, such as those that may have a long incubation (initiation) time, but a potentially fast growth rate. For this reason, RI-ISI will always be reactive to such failure events. Successful ISI needs to determine what NDE is required, when and how frequently it needs to be applied, how effective the NDE must be and where the NDE needs to be applied. Both flaw detection and accurate characterization need to be addressed. This paper will examine the reliability and uncertainties of NDE, and how these may impact RI-ISI.


Author(s):  
Mansoor H. Sanwarwalla

Since the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) published its landmark “Reactor Safety Study — An Assessment of Accident Risks in U. S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants” in late 1975, commercial nuclear power industry, encouraged by the USNRC, have since then been applying Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRAs) in their nuclear power units in areas of in-service testing, in-service inspection, quality assurance, technical specifications, maintenance, etc. To guide and regulate the industry in use of PRAs, Regulatory Guides and Standards have been written and are being revised continuously by the USNRC, American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and American Nuclear Society (ANS). The current use of PRA takes credit for single failure criterion based on applicability of codes and standards. The proposed new USNRC regulation 10 CFR Part 53 applicable for all reactor technologies is silent on the applicability of current standards endorsed by the regulatory body. The impact of the proposed new rule to both new and the current application needs to be studied. This paper will review the application of the various guidance documents for their use in commercial nuclear power plants with emphasis on the new generation nuclear power plants.


Author(s):  
Caleb J. Frederick

Today, commercial nuclear power plants are installing High-Density Polyethylene (HDPE) piping in non-safety-related and safety-related systems. HDPE has been chosen in limited quantity to replace carbon steel piping as it does not support rust, rot, or biological growth. However, due to its relatively short nuclear service history, developing a way to accurately evaluate joint integrity in HDPE is crucial to utilities and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC). This paper will investigate using ultrasonic Phased Array to quantify detection of flaws and detrimental conditions in butt-fusion joints throughout the full spectrum of applicable HDPE pipe diameters and wall-thicknesses. Currently the most concerning joint condition is that of “Cold Fusion”. A cold-fused joint is created when molecules along the fusion line do not fully entangle or co-crystallize. Once the fusion process is complete, there is the appearance of a good, quality joint. However, the fabricated joint does not have the required strength as the co-crystallization along the pipe faces has not occurred. Therefore, performing a visual examination of the bead, as required by the current revision of ASME Code Case N-755, does not provide adequate assurance of joint integrity. As a potential solution, volumetric examination is being considered by the USNRC to safeguard against this and other types of detrimental conditions. Factors addressed will include pipe diameter, wall-thickness, fusing temperature, interfacial pressure, dwell (open/close) time, and destructive correlation with ultrasonic data.


1998 ◽  
Vol 120 (4) ◽  
pp. 438-440
Author(s):  
O. F. Hedden

ASME Code Section XI Cases N-577 and N-578, for application of risk-informed technology to examination of piping systems in nuclear power plants, are proceeding, with review and acceptance by ASME Board on Nuclear Codes and Standards and by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission remaining before implementation. Sources of support for a favorable reaction by NRC will be reviewed, starting with developmental research sponsored by NRC in the late 1980s. Extensive discussion in the engineering community as exemplified by forums presented by ASME PVP in 1994 and 1995 will be cited. Recent academic and NRC managerial support for risk-informed performance-based regulation will also be cited. The expressed need for risk neutrality will then be addressed.


Author(s):  
John O’Hara ◽  
Stephen Fleger

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) evaluates the human factors engineering (HFE) of nuclear power plant design and operations to protect public health and safety. The HFE safety reviews encompass both the design process and its products. The NRC staff performs the reviews using the detailed guidance contained in two key documents: the HFE Program Review Model (NUREG-0711) and the Human-System Interface Design Review Guidelines (NUREG-0700). This paper will describe these two documents and the method used to develop them. As the NRC is committed to the periodic update and improvement of the guidance to ensure that they remain state-of-the-art design evaluation tools, we will discuss the topics being addressed in support of future updates as well.


Author(s):  
Ronald C. Lippy

The nuclear industry is preparing for the licensing and construction of new nuclear power plants in the United States. Several new designs have been developed and approved, including the “traditional” reactor designs, the passive safe shutdown designs and the small modular reactors (SMRs). The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) provides specific Codes used to perform preservice inspection/testing and inservice inspection/testing for many of the components used in the new reactor designs. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reviews information provided by applicants related to inservice testing (IST) programs for Design Certifications and Combined Licenses (COLs) under Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 52) (Reference 1). The 2012 Edition of the ASME OM Code defines a post-2000 plant as a nuclear power plant that was issued (or will be issued) its construction permit, or combined license for construction and operation, by the applicable regulatory authority on or following January 1, 2000. The New Reactors OM Code (NROMC) Task Group (TG) of the ASME Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (NROMC TG) is assigned the task of ensuring that the preservice testing (PST) and IST provisions in the ASME OM Code to address pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints (snubbers) in post-2000 nuclear power plants are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the components will operate as needed when called upon. Currently, the NROMC TG is preparing proposed guidance for the treatment of active pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints with high safety significance in non-safety systems in passive post-2000 reactors including SMRs.


Author(s):  
Thomas G. Scarbrough

In a series of Commission papers, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) described its policy for inservice testing (IST) programs to be developed and implemented at nuclear power plants licensed under 10 CFR Part 52. This paper discusses the expectations for IST programs based on those Commission policy papers as applied in the NRC staff review of combined license (COL) applications for new reactors. For example, the design and qualification of pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints through implementation of American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Standard QME-1-2007, “Qualification of Active Mechanical Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Plants,” as accepted in NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.100 (Revision 3), “Seismic Qualification of Electrical and Active Mechanical Equipment and Functional Qualification of Active Mechanical Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants,” will enable IST activities to assess the operational readiness of those components to perform their intended functions. ASME has updated the Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code) to improve the IST provisions for pumps, valves, and dynamic restraints that are incorporated by reference in the NRC regulations with applicable conditions. In addition, lessons learned from performance experience and testing of motor-operated valves (MOVs) will be implemented as part of the IST programs together with application of those lessons learned to other power-operated valves (POVs). Licensee programs for the Regulatory Treatment of Non-Safety Systems (RTNSS) will be implemented for components in active nonsafety-related systems that are the first line of defense in new reactors that rely on passive systems to provide reactor core and containment cooling in the event of a plant transient. This paper also discusses the overlapping testing provisions specified in ASME Standard QME-1-2007; plant-specific inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria; the applicable ASME OM Code as incorporated by reference in the NRC regulations; specific license conditions; and Initial Test Programs as described in the final safety analysis report and applicable RGs. Paper published with permission.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Jinghan Zhang ◽  
Jun Zhao ◽  
Jiejuan Tong

Nuclear safety goal is the basic standard for limiting the operational risks of nuclear power plants. The statistics of societal risks are the basis for nuclear safety goals. Core damage frequency (CDF) and large early release frequency (LERF) are typical probabilistic safety goals that are used in the regulation of water-cooled reactors currently. In fact, Chinese current probabilistic safety goals refer to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and they are not based on Chinese societal risks. And the CDF and LERF proposed for water reactor are not suitable for high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGR), because the design of HTGR is very different from that of water reactor. And current nuclear safety goals are established for single reactor rather than unit or site. Therefore, in this paper, the development of the safety goal of NRC was investigated firstly; then, the societal risks in China were investigated in order to establish the correlation between the probabilistic safety goal of multimodule HTGR and Chinese societal risks. In the end, some other matters about multireactor site were discussed in detail.


1980 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-123
Author(s):  
Linda O. Hecht

Due to the concern for safety the nuclear power industry in the United States has fostered the use of reliability analysis to assess system performance and the impact of system failure on overall plant safety. The need for system and component failure rate data has been recognized and has spurred such efforts as NPRDS (Nuclear Power Research Data System) and IEEE's Std 500 (The Reliability Data Manual). Reliability modeling techniques have been developed for application to nuclear systems and are presently being considered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for licensing purposes.


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