A Mutual Subsidy Mechanism for a Seasonal Product Supply Chain Channel Under Double Price Regulation

2018 ◽  
Vol 35 (06) ◽  
pp. 1850047 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongjun Peng ◽  
Tao Pang ◽  
Fuliang Cao ◽  
Juan Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Regulation ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Raw Material ◽  
Price Cap Regulation ◽  
Numerical Example ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
High Season ◽  
Theoretical Results

In this paper, we consider the decision-making and coordination mechanism of a seasonal product supply chain channel over a period consisting of a low season and a high season, where the price of the final product is strictly regulated, and the raw material is subject to a price cap regulation during the high season. The optimal decisions and profits under decentralized and centralized cases are derived for the low season and the high season. Our research indicates that, under the double price regulation, the manufacturer’s raw material order in the channel usually is not completely fulfilled during the high season and the order during the low season is usually small. Based on the results, we propose a mutual subsidy mechanism, in order to encourage the supplier to supply more raw material during the high season and to encourage the manufacturer to order more raw material during the low season.The theoretical results indicate that the mutual subsidy mechanism can effectively coordinate the seasonal product supply chain channel under the double price regulation, which is further verified by a numerical example. Moreover, the negotiation skills of the supplier and the manufacturer are also considered under the mutual subsidy mechanism, so that the spillover profit can be allocated on a win–win basis for both sides.

scholarly journals Self-Operated Store or Franchised Store? Optimal Decisions for Online-to-Offline Supply Chain with a Demand Shift

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Feng Wei ◽  
Yan Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Selling Price ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
Demand Shifts

Mutual shifts in offline and online demand have become the norm in supply chain operations. The online-to-offline (O2O) supply chain system consists of a platform vendor, a physical store, and a product. The platform vendor sells the product directly online and governs either the centralized decision-making of a self-operated store or the decentralized decision-making of a franchised store offline. In this study, supply chain decision models with and without demand shifts are constructed to obtain optimal wholesale and selling prices and to maximize profit. The coordination mechanism under decentralized decision-making is designed to optimize the O2O supply chain, and the validity and applicability of the model are verified by numerical simulation. Results show that, regardless of whether a store is self-operated or franchised, the total profit of the system increases, and online and offline prices depend on a range of demand shifts. With an increased proportion of online demand shifts, the offline selling price and total profit of the system increase, whereas the online selling price and profit of the platform vendor decrease under decentralized decision-making. When the fixed transfer payment fee is within a certain range, a two-part-tariff contract can effectively coordinate the supply chain. This study not only contributes to the theoretical literature on O2O supply chain systems but also provides practical decision-making support for managers.

scholarly journals Research on Quality Decisions and Coordination with Reference Effect in Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2296 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhou Xideng ◽  
Xu Bing ◽  
Xie Fei ◽  
Li Yu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Service Quality ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Reference Quality ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

Although supply quality management has been studied extensively, one important marketing phenomenon, that is, reference effect has been rarely considered in dual-channel supply chain quality management literatures. In fact, the quality reference effect is also an important factor which influences consumer purchasing behavior. We aim to explore the influence of the reference effect on the optimal decisions and performance of a dual-channel supply. Thus, we formulate dynamic models that include the product quality reference effect and the service quality reference effect in a dual-channel supply chain system consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under the different decision-making scenarios. Utilizing differential game theory, optimal decisions are obtained for the product quality and service quality decision under the different decision-making scenarios. In addition, the optimal decisions and profits are compared, then a service cost-sharing coordinating mechanism is proposed and proven to be effective in the supply chain system. The main results show when the initial reference service quality is low, the consumer service quality reference effect is beneficial to the manufacturer. The spillover effect of service quality is not conducive to the retailer and the manufacturer. When the initial reference product quality is low, both online and offline product quality reference effects are beneficial to the retailer and the manufacturer. The stable (or final) reference quality will not be affected by the initial reference quality. The sum of the two members’ profits under decentralized decision making is less than the total profit of the supply chain under centralized decision making. We design a cost-sharing coordinating mechanism to eliminate the double marginal effect.

scholarly journals Decision Optimization and Interest Coordination of Dual-Channel Supply Chain Embedded by Two-Echelon Logistics Service Providers under the Dominance of Retailer

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Jianjun Zhang ◽  
Daning Xing
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Sensitivity Coefficient ◽  
Service Level ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Decentralized Decision Making

Taking the dual-channel supply chain embedded by two-echelon logistics service providers as the research object, this paper studies the optimal decisions of each decision maker under the centralized and decentralized decision-making mode led by the retailer. Based on the decentralized decision-making mode, an improved coordination mechanism of residual profit sharing is designed to realize the interest coordination, in which the bargaining power of all participants is fully considered. The results show that, under the decentralized decision-making mode, the profit of FLSP increases first and then decreases as the sensitivity coefficient of cross-service level increases, while the profits of other decision makers and the supply chain system decrease with the increase of sensitivity coefficient of cross-service level. The relative size of the price sensitivity coefficient of online and offline channel has an inconsistent impact on the profit of FLSP, while it has a consistent impact on the profits of other decision makers. The profit of FLSP fluctuates greatly with changes in the sensitivity coefficient, and it is difficult to be guaranteed in the entire supply chain system. On this basis, an improved coordination mechanism of residual profit sharing is designed. The results show that, after the introduction of bargaining power coefficient of the Nash negotiation model, the variation coefficient of the profits of all decision makers is smaller after coordination, and the profit growth rates are more uniform.

Price and Carbon Emissions Level Decisions in a Two-Echelon Supply Chain: Insights from Carbon Labelling

2013 ◽  
Vol 572 ◽  
pp. 668-671
Author(s):  
Yong Hong Cheng ◽  
Zhong Kai Xiong ◽  
Yu Xiong
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Environmental Awareness ◽  
Supply Chain Performance ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Purchasing Behavior ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Initial Carbon

To analyze the effects of carbon labelling on firms production and marketing decisions, as well as consumers purchasing behavior, we consider a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer and assume the market demand is both price-and carbon emissions level-sensitive, then the optimal decisions policies for pricing and carbon emissions level are discussed under decentralized and centralized decision-making. Interestingly, our results show that only when the initial carbon emissions level of the product is less than a certain threshold, as consumers environmental awareness increasing, the amount of carbon emissions per unit of output produced will decrease. On the contrary, the carbon emissions level will increase. Moreover, we found that when consumers environmental awareness maintains the same level, the centralized decision-making is more conducive to reduce carbon emissions and improve whole supply chain performance. Finally, some numerical examples are given to verify the research results.

scholarly journals Customer Knowledge Enabled Innovation: Analyzing Pricing-Promotion Coordination Mechanism

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Guanbing Zhao ◽  
Yangyang Qiu ◽  
Muhammad Imran ◽  
Fazal Manan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Consumer Electronics ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Consumer Electronic ◽  
Market Launch ◽  
Optimal Decision Making ◽  
New Consumer

Pricing and promotion are two important decisions during the market launch of new consumer electronics products. Nowadays, the pricing and promotion of consumer electronic products are often not made separately but at the same time. This study focuses on the pricing-promotion coordination mechanism of a secondary supply chain of new consumer electronics products (which consists of a manufacturer and a seller). Price and the degree of promotion together affect the demand for products. Manufacturers give sellers a sales target. Manufacturers and sellers set prices and promotions separately, introduce repurchase penalty joint contracts, and establish supply chain profit models to compare and analyze optimal pricing, promotion efforts, and maximum profit of supply chains under different decision-making situations. We prove that the repurchase penalty joint contract can coordinate the supply chain under the assumptions of a single-period game and a multiperiod repeated game. The results show that under the repurchase penalty joint contract, when manufacturers and sellers choose high prices and high promotions at the same time, the supply chain of new consumer electronics products has the largest profit. Finally, numerical experiments are conducted to study the influence of parameters on optimal decision-making and supply chain profits.

scholarly journals Pricing and Coordination Strategy in a Green Supply Chain with a Risk-Averse Retailer

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Liyan Wang ◽  
Minghai Ye ◽  
Shanshan Ma ◽  
Yipeng Sha
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Analysis ◽  
Random Variable ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Product ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Coordination Strategy ◽  
Optimal Decisions

This paper addresses the pricing and coordination strategy in a green supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a green product and sells it to a risk-averse retailer. The product’s demand is a random variable influenced by the green level and the retail price. The problem is modeled in three different structures, a centralized and two decentralized models, in which the upstream manufacturer and the downstream retailer act as the channel leader, respectively. This paper presents the optimal decisions for all supply chain members, analyzes the effects of green degree and risk-averse coefficient on the supply chain members’ decision-making and their profits, and performs the numerical analysis. The results show that the green degree and the whole supply chain’s expected profits are highest in the centralized scenario, followed by the retailer-led scenario, and lowest under the manufacturer-led scenario; the green degree and the manufacturer’s expected profit increase with the risk-averse coefficient, no matter who dominates the channel; however, the risk-averse coefficient’s effects on the retailer’s expected utility and the retail price depends on who dominates the channel and on the greening investment parameter.

scholarly journals Supply chain coordination with flow networks

2009 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 27-34
Author(s):  
K. Fayazbakhsh ◽  
M. Sepehri ◽  
M. Razzazi
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Coordination Mechanisms ◽  
Flow Networks ◽  
Customer Demand ◽  
State Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Product Flow ◽  
Multiple Stages

A mechanism for supply chain coordination models the entire supply chain with multiple members in four stages to satisfy customer demand with minimum total costs. Previous coordination mechanisms research applied restrictive assumptions on the number in the supply chain stages and members in each stage, disallowing a case of multi-product. Flow networks concept is proposes as a coordination mechanism for supply chains with multiple members, multiple stages and multi-products, where each product is composed of several basic components. A supply chain optimizer (SCO), actually an e-hub, gathers supply chain state information. After necessary computations, it informs members of the supply chain of optimal decisions for their orders. Results from sample cases using the mechanism show above 20% reduction in total costs of the supply chain.

scholarly journals Differential Pricing and Emission Reduction in Remanufacturing Supply Chains with Dual-Sale Channels under CCT-Mechanism

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 8150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaifu Yuan ◽  
Guangqiang Wu ◽  
Hui Dong ◽  
Bo He ◽  
Dafei Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Carbon Emissions ◽  
Emission Reduction ◽  
Emission Control ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Control Coefficient ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government

In order to make optimal decisions for pricing and emission reduction, a remanufacturing supply chain system with dual-sale channels is investigated. With regard to the preferences of consumers for different channels and carbon cap-and-trade mechanisms, profit-maximization models are developed on supply chain members and systems in decentralized and centralized cases. Based on a backward induction, the corresponding formulae for decision variables are obtained. Then the effect of the industry emission control coefficient is analyzed and the optimal decisions of two cases are compared. Finally, the coordination mechanism and numerical analysis are presented. The result indicates that: (1) As the free carbon allowances granted by the government to the manufacturer increases, the investment in carbon reduction from the manufacturer will increase. As the industry emission control coefficient increases, the carbon emissions per product and the prices of new and remanufactured products will decrease, while the demands of the new and remanufactured products and the profits of supply chain members and systems will increase. (2) As the direct sale channel preference coefficient increases, the profits of the manufacturer and the system will increase while the retailer’s profit will decrease. Correspondingly, the carbon emissions of unit product will decrease, and the sales of the direct sale channel will increase while the sales of the retail channel will decrease. (3) The decision in the coordinated case not only ensures emission reduction and system profit to reach the level of the centralized case, but also raises the profits of supply chain members in the decentralized case. Therefore, it is preferable to other decisions. (4) As the carbon trading price increases, the emission reduction investment from the manufacturer will increase while the profits of the supply chain and its members will increase.

Price Decisions of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with and without Competition

2011 ◽  
Vol 204-210 ◽  
pp. 1710-1715
Author(s):  
Qiao Lun Gu ◽  
Tie Gang Gao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Example ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
The Difference

In this paper, we focus on the price decisions of the wholesale price, the retail price and the collecting price for the closed-loop supply chain with and without competition. We obtain the optimal decisions based on two models: Model I without competition and Model II with competition. By the analysis of a numerical example, we find that the competition between the manufacturers in model II will affect their prices decisions and their profits; in model II, the two manufacturers would like to halve the market while the retailer hope to increase the difference of their market shares, and the two manufacturers would not like to increase the substitute ratio of their products while the retailer can benefit from that. So, from the manufacturers’ point of view, they should avoid the competition risk by choosing the independent retailers.

Konkurrenz zwischen stofflicher und energetischer Holznutzung – auch eine Frage der Allokation

2013 ◽  
Vol 164 (12) ◽  
pp. 382-388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gero Becker ◽  
Martin Brunsmeier
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
International Competition ◽  
Raw Material ◽  
Decision Making Process ◽  
Economic Aspects ◽  
Energy Wood ◽  
Price Increases ◽  
Harvesting Techniques ◽  
Political Structures

Competition between material and energetic use of wood – also a question of allocation The amount of wood used for energy purposes has recently strongly increased in Germany. This has resulted in a competition for some wood assortments between raw material and energy uses. This has led to price increases and supply bottlenecks in wood industries facing international competition. An easing of this tension can be achieved by an increase in the volume of wood harvested, changes in the allocation of the assortments, alternative silvicultural concepts and optimized harvesting techniques. Moreover, an improvement in efficiency of the supply and conversion of energy wood increases the potential of wood. Whether wood is to be used for material or energy purposes is not only determined by economic aspects: the risks which have been taken into account, the investment which has been made, but also the obligation to deliver because of regional political structures can be decisive reasons for the allocation of wood. More research is needed to clarify the question of whether and in what way stakeholders within the supply chain influence the decision making process.

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