scholarly journals Understanding the Other Through Social Roles

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (01) ◽  
pp. 1540005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mamoru Kaneko ◽  
J. Jude Kline
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Roles ◽  
The Other ◽  
Strategic Game ◽  
Game Situation ◽  
Inductive Game Theory ◽  
Coordination Equilibrium

Inductive game theory has been developed to explore the origin of beliefs of a person from his accumulated experiences of a game situation. It has been restricted to a person's view of the structure not including another person's thoughts. In this paper, we explore the experiential origin of one's view of the other's beliefs about the game situation, especially about the other's payoffs. We restrict our exploration to a 2-role (strategic) game, which has been recurrently played by two people with occasional role-switching. Each person accumulates experiences of both roles, and these experiences become the source for his transpersonal view about the other. Reciprocity in the sense of role-switching is crucial for deriving his own and the other's beliefs. We also consider how a person can use these views for his behavior revision, and we define an equilibrium called an intrapersonal coordination equilibrium. Based on this, we show that cooperation will emerge as the degree of reciprocity increases.

The Prisoner's Dilemma Game and Cooperation in the Rat

1984 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 687-696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rick M. Gardner ◽  
Terry L. Corbin ◽  
Janelle S. Beltramo ◽  
Gary S. Nickell
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Visual Communication ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Human Subjects ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Cooperative Behaviors

Cooperation in pairs of rats playing the prisoner's dilemma game was investigated. Six pairs of animals were taught to make either cooperative or uncooperative responses by running to one or the other end of a T-maze. Two T-mazes were joined together such that animals could respond simultaneously. Animals were run under conditions in which visual communication was present and absent. Mutually uncooperative responses were the most common and mutually cooperative behaviors the least preferred. Introduction of a barrier between the mazes, which removed visual communication between pairs, sharply accentuated uncooperative behavior. Similarities of the present findings to results with human subjects and the implications of using game theory for studying cooperative behavior in animals are discussed.

INTERPERSONAL COORDINATION AND EPISTEMIC SUPPORT FOR INTENTIONS WITH WE-CONTENT

2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Roy
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
The Other ◽  
Interpersonal Coordination ◽  
Epistemic Game Theory ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Alternative Set

In this paper I study intentions of the form ‘I intend that we . . .’, that is, intentions with a we-content, and their role in interpersonal coordination. I focus on the notion of epistemic support for such intentions. Using tools from epistemic game theory and epistemic logic, I cast doubt on whether such support guarantees the other agents' conditional mediation in the achievement of such intentions, something that appears important if intentions with a we-content are to count as genuine intentions. I then formulate a stronger version of epistemic support, one that does indeed ensure the required mediation, but I then argue that it rests on excessively strong informational conditions. In view of this I provide an alternative set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for coordination in games, and I argue that these conditions constitute a plausible alternative to the proposed notion of epistemic support.

Stability Analysis of Supply Chain Cooperation Contract under Asymmetric Information

2010 ◽  
Vol 44-47 ◽  
pp. 794-798 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Ma
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Repeated Games ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Transition Period ◽  
Information Economics ◽  
Real Life ◽  
The Other ◽  
Game Equilibrium ◽  
The Stability

The stability of cooperation contract is the result of abandon opportunistic behavior in the process of repeated games among the enterprise and the other subjects in the supply chain from long-term interests, and is also the foundation of healthy development for the whole supply chain. But in real life cooperation contract instability everywhere for a variety of reasons, such as ethical considerations, institutional factors, cultural factors and special reasons during the transition period and so on. From the perspective of information economics and game theory, the main game process of cooperation between enterprise and the other subjects in supply chain is not only the game of information, but also the game of interests. Information structure and the interesting structure are the important factors for the subjects of the game of the implementation of decisions and the basic contractual constraints for cooperative game equilibrium. Cooperation behaviors among the enterprise and the other subjects in the supply chain were studied on the basis of game theory, and the stability of cooperation contract is also being discussed in this paper.

scholarly journals Military Operations

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Harald Høiback
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Military Power ◽  
Military Operations ◽  
Historical Method ◽  
Military Commanders ◽  
Operational Art ◽  
History Of ◽  
Systematic Thinking

AbstractMilitary operations can be a complex and cumbersome undertaking, involving millions of soldiers and tonnes of equipment. Even though war has been part of human experience for time immemorial, systematic thinking about how to prepare, conduct, and use military operations is nonetheless a rather new undertaking. This chapter explores the history of thinking about military operations, broadly defined, and narrows down on operations as the concept is used today.After the historical exploration, the chapter investigates how military operations can be studied. In principle, there are four different ways to approach operations as a field of study. The most common methods are the historical method and operations research, i.e., making heuristic models of reality. Game theory and axiomatic foundationalism are the other two but are far less used than the former two.The development of modern military thinking notwithstanding, it is still difficult to convert military power to strategic gains, and the latter part of the chapter explains why. Military commanders and planning groups do not always get the what and why from the political level, making it difficult to find the how. Military operations are also intrinsically difficult because your opponent will try to make it difficult for you. The concept of an operational level of command is also problematic, since it tends to do the opposite of what is intended. Instead of pulling tactics and strategy closer together, it tends to push them apart. And finally, the word “art” in “operational art” is perhaps also an unfortunate misnomer?

Assessing the Utilization of Automata in Representing Players' Behaviors in Game Theory

Game Theory ◽  
2017 ◽  
pp. 106-119
Author(s):  
Khaled Suwais
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cellular Automata ◽  
Finite Automata ◽  
The State ◽  
The Other ◽  
Direct Impact ◽  
Complex Environments ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Different Types ◽  
State Of Art

Representing players' strategies in game theory has a direct impact on the players' performance. The state of art shows that automata are one of the primary techniques used for representing players' strategies and behaviors. In this paper, the author will identify different types of automata and assess their utilization in the field of game theory. Is has been found that finite automata, adaptive automata, and cellular automata are widely adopted in game theory. The utilization of finite automata is found to be limited to represent simpler players' behavior. On the other hand, adaptive automata and cellular automata are intensively applied in complex environments, where the number of interacted players is large and therefore, representing complex behaviors are needed.

Political Economy Inside the Strategy of Line Game

2022 ◽  
pp. 832-845
Author(s):  
Annesha Biswas ◽  
Tinanjali Dam ◽  
Joseph Varghese Kureethara ◽  
Sankar Varma
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Political Economy ◽  
21St Century ◽  
Behavioural Economics ◽  
Pareto Efficiency ◽  
The Other ◽  
New Methods ◽  
Simple Rules ◽  
Winning Strategies ◽  
Person Game

In today's world, the concept of the game and game theory is turned into new methods of knowing and understanding some of the human behaviours followed by society. In the 21st century, behavioural economics plays a major role in understanding the concept of the `line' game and hence the strategies followed by it. It is a country game played in many parts of India. It is a two-person game with very simple rules and moves. It can be played indoors. Students play the game during the break-outs. The game keenly and minutely determines the objectivity of the game and the behaviour of the players involved inside the game and the way one starts moving helps the other players to understand what one is trying to portray through the game whether it is winning or losing. The strategies involved can be put forth and looked upon from different perspectives. Referring to one such perspective, it can be looked at from a concept of Pareto efficiency, a microeconomic concept. It helps develop logical skills and learn winning strategies.

scholarly journals Note historique sur les effets externes

2009 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 420-433 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Jacques Laffont
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Historical Note ◽  
Second Best ◽  
Economic Agents ◽  
Pecuniary Externalities ◽  
Artificial Markets ◽  
Technological Externalities ◽  
The Creation

Abstract This historical note describes from Sidgwick on the evolution of the concepts related to the interdependencies of economic agents outside markets. In a first section, we show how the concept of externality introduced by some precursors had later to reemerge from the confuse discussion of "empty boxes". The second sector clarifies the distinction between two avenues of research, the first one associated with pecuniary externalities, the other one associated with technological externalities. Coase's criticisms of Pigouvian policy are developed in section 3. In a last section we gather the main results obtained recently by economic theory in this field. In particular we discuss the difficulties of the creation of artificial markets, the second best approaches often needed in a Pigouvian policy, results of game theory in models with externalities, planning with externalities.

scholarly journals Decision based Cognitive Learning using Strategic Game Theory

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (39) ◽  
Author(s):  
Uttam Singh Bist ◽  
Manish Kumar ◽  
Anupam Baliyan ◽  
Vishal Jain
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cognitive Learning ◽  
Strategic Game

scholarly journals OPINION FORMATION MODELS BASED ON GAME THEORY

2007 ◽  
Vol 18 (09) ◽  
pp. 1377-1395 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALESSANDRO DI MARE ◽  
VITO LATORA
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Numerical Simulations ◽  
Opinion Dynamics ◽  
Strategic Game ◽  
Opinion Formation ◽  
Bounded Confidence ◽  
Formation Dynamics ◽  
Bounded Confidence Model

A way to simulate the basic interactions between two individuals with different opinions, in the context of strategic game theory, is proposed. Various games are considered, which produce different kinds of opinion formation dynamics. First, by assuming that all individuals (players) are equals, we obtain the bounded confidence model of continuous opinion dynamics proposed by Deffuant et al. In such a model a tolerance threshold is defined, such that individuals with difference in opinion larger than the threshold can not interact. Then, we consider that the individuals have different inclinations to change opinion and different abilities in convincing the others. In this way, we obtain the so-called "Stubborn individuals and Orators" (SO) model, a generalization of the Deffuant et al. model, in which the threshold tolerance is different for every couple of individuals. We explore, by numerical simulations, the dynamics of the SO model, and we propose further generalizations that can be implemented.

scholarly journals Discrete-TimeH∞Preview Control Problem in Finite Horizon

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hongxia Wang ◽  
Huanshui Zhang ◽  
Lihua Xie
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Control Problem ◽  
Discrete Time ◽  
Finite Horizon ◽  
The Other ◽  
Preview Control ◽  
Discrete Time Systems ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Time Systems

This paper considers theH∞preview control problem for discrete-time systems. It investigates the problem via game theory and dynamic programming. Different from the existing results, on one hand, the proposed approach is suitable for dealing with the corresponding multiple preview channels problem; on the other hand, the approach provides a possibility in explaining how the preview controller improves theH∞performance and why the performance will be saturated.

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