The Incentive Mechanism of College Counselors Based on Intelligent Computing

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yanbo Kong ◽  
Jianquan Hu
Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiaqi Liu ◽  
Shiyue Huang ◽  
Hucheng Xu ◽  
Deng Li ◽  
Nan Zhong ◽  
...  

As a special mobile ad-hoc network, Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) have the characteristics of high-speed movement, frequent topology changes, multi-hop routing, a lack of energy, storage space limitations, and the possible selfishness of the nodes. These characteristics bring challenges to the design of the incentive mechanism in VANETs. In the current research on the incentive mechanism of VANETs, the mainstream is the reward-based incentive mechanism. Most of these mechanisms are designed based on the expected utility theory of traditional economics and assume that the positive and negative effects produced by an equal amount of gain and loss are equal in absolute value. However, the theory of loss aversion points out that the above effects are not equal. Moreover, this will lead to a deviation between the final decision-making behavior of nodes and the actual optimal situation. Therefore, this paper proposed a Loss-Aversion-based Incentive Mechanism (LAIM) to promote the comprehensive perception and sharing of information in the VANETs. This paper designs the incentive threshold and the threshold factor to motivate vehicle nodes to cooperate. Furthermore, based on the number of messages that the nodes face, the utility function of nodes is redesigned to correct the assumption that a gain and a loss of an equal amount could offset each other in traditional economics. The simulation results show that compared with the traditional incentive mechanism, the LAIM can increase the average utility of nodes by more than 34.35%, which promotes the cooperation of nodes.


2021 ◽  
Vol 336 ◽  
pp. 09008
Author(s):  
Yue Li ◽  
Jiepeng Huang ◽  
Hang Guo ◽  
Zhuo Wang

In order to improve the performance of alliance collaborative innovation and stimulate members' willingness and behavior to participate in collaborative innovation, this paper puts forward the incentive mechanism of benefit distribution. This paper divides the needs of members to participate in collaborative innovation into two stages: "risk avoidance-return on investment". Firstly, an effective benefit distribution model is established by using Logistic function. Then, by building a game model, we can get the best effort. The results show that building the benefit distribution model of alliance collaborative innovation according to the different needs of alliance members can fully stimulate members to participate in collaborative innovation and improve the performance of alliance collaborative innovation.


2010 ◽  
Vol 108-111 ◽  
pp. 341-346
Author(s):  
Huang Ling

In this paper, the MRCTM model of closed-loop supply chain was investigated. An effective incentive mechanism that considered the uncertainty quality of product recycling was designed by the introduction of brand conversion factor. The author made an optimal analysis of the incentive mechanism. Moreover, the influence of different parameters, such as quality and brand to the fixed reward and the unit incentive payment was analyzed and some useful results were obtained.


Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Yue Yin

With the rapid development of society, all walks of life need the support of the Internet of Things, and the financial industry is no exception. This article integrates blockchain technology with supply chain finance and builds a supply chain financial alliance architecture based on blockchain technology and an underlying model of the Ethereum blockchain system suitable for supply chain finance. We innovated new supply chain finance models and operating mechanisms and proposed business scenarios for supply chain finance from the perspective of blockchain. Taking into account the actual operation of the blockchain supply chain financial platform, the principal-agent model and the incentive theory are applied, and the supply chain financial accounts receivable model is taken as an example in the case of complete information and incomplete information. The incentive mechanism between the service provider of the chain supply chain financial platform and the core enterprise promotes the better implementation of blockchain technology and supply chain finance. Based on the existing theoretical research, this paper identifies the key influencing factors of the supply chain’s cross-enterprise incentive mechanism. These influencing factors system includes two dimensions: transaction factors and relationship factors. Transaction factors include resource dependence, uncertainty, and cooperation experience; relationship factors include corporate reputation, trust level, and relationship commitment. Based on the nature of the incentive mechanism, information sharing and revenue sharing are extracted as the measurement dimensions of the supply chain’s cross-enterprise incentive mechanism. On this basis, this article draws on the existing enterprise life cycle division method and constructs a hypothetical model of the influencing factors of the incentive mechanism in the incubation period, the growth period, and the maturity period. Relevant data was collected through questionnaires, and SPSS and AMOS software were used to perform statistical analysis, reliability analysis, exploratory factor analysis, confirmatory factor analysis, and structural equation hypothesis testing on the data. The performance of each influencing factor in different stages of the enterprise’s life cycle and the importance of each influencing factor in the same life cycle stage are obtained.


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