The Nixon Administration, the “Horror Strategy,” and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969–1972

2005 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 34-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Burr
Keyword(s):  
Air Force ◽  
Nixon Administration ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
Defense Department ◽  
White House ◽  
Richard Nixon ◽  
Major Review ◽  
Nuclear Warfare ◽  
Operational Plan

In early 1969 President Richard Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, received a brie fing on the U.S.nuclear war plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). Appalled by the catastrophic scale of the SIOP, Nixon and Kissinger sought military options that were more credible than massive nuclear strikes. Participants in the Air Force Nuclear Options project also supported more flexible nuclear war plans.Although Kissinger repeatedly asked Defense Department of ficials to construct limited options, they were skeptical that it would be possible to control nuclear escalation or to introduce greater flexibility without weakening the SIOP.Interagency studies presented a mixed verdict about the desirability of limited options; nevertheless, continued White House pressure encouraged Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to sponsor a major review of nuclear targeting.In 1972 the Foster panel developed concepts of limited, selective, and regional nuclear options that were responsive to Kissinger's interest in credible nuclear threats. The Foster panel's report led to the controversial “Schlesinger Doctrine” and further efforts to revise the SIOP, but serious questions endured about the whole concept of controlled nuclear warfare.

The Nixon Years

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Riley
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
National Security ◽  
Financial Resources ◽  
Food Aid ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
White House ◽  
War Of Independence ◽  
Richard Nixon ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
National Security Adviser

The administration of President Richard Nixon presents several examples of how Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, used food aid as a tool to advance foreign policy goals that Congress was attempting to foreclose. This chapter discusses two such examples: (1) food aid to Thailand in 1971, intended to free other financial resources in support of Southeast Asian military purchases, and (2) White House intervention in food aid decisions involving East Pakistan/Bangladesh and India in the months after Pakistani leader General Yahya Kahn unleased military reprisals against East Pakistan that led to the latter’s war of independence and a consequent flood of millions of East Pakistani refugees into India. Nixon’s support of Yahya Kahn and reluctance to assist India and the food aid-related repercussions of that support are described in this chapter.

Kissinger and the Limits of Power

Worldview ◽  
1982 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 17-19
Author(s):  
Ralph Buultjens
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
National Security ◽  
Nixon Administration ◽  
World War ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
White House ◽  
Historical Moment ◽  
Rare Opportunity

In the early 1970s the international relationships that had been frozen since soon after World War II showed signs of decongealing. Sensing the historical moment, the Nixon administration aspired to be both the catalyst and the beneficiary of this time of rare opportunity. As national security assistant and then secretary of stale, Henry Kissinger was uniquely situated to participate in, shape, and observe these efforts. The first volume of his memoirs, White House Years, detailed his part in the early Nixon period, January. 1969, to January, 1973. Now he continues the story in a weighty second volume. Years of Upheaval (Little. Brown; 1,283 pp.; $24.95) takes us from 1973 to the Nixon resignation in August, 1974.

Striving for a Lasting Peace: The Paris Accords and Aftermath

2020 ◽  
pp. 57-70
Author(s):  
Hoàng Ðức Nhã
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Transformational Change ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nixon Administration ◽  
The Other ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
Richard Nixon ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The One ◽  
Challenging Situation

This chapter takes a look at the tumultuous relationship between President Thiệu and President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger from the perspective of Thiệu's personal secretary. The South Vietnamese government at that time was in a unique and challenging situation. On the one hand, it had to defend the Republic of Vietnam's territorial integrity and defeat the communist invasion, and on the other hand, it had to create transformational change for the betterment of the entire population. All this had to be done while cooperating with the Nixon administration to restore peace to the two parts of Vietnam. However, this chapter reveals that South Vietnam's negotiating position with the United States was being constantly frayed by secret exchanges and communications with Hanoi. Relations gradually took a turn for the worse when after it was revealed that President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger wanted to end the war their way, South Vietnamese opinions or objections be damned.

Khenry and Anatol

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard A. Moss
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
The State ◽  
Nixon Administration ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
Summit Meeting ◽  
Richard Nixon ◽  
Private Correspondence ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Over Time

Richard Nixon endorsed the use of a back channel between Henry Kissinger, as his personal representative, and Anatoly Dobrynin, as the intermediary to the Kremlin. Over time, the relationship came to be known as “the Channel” and was the primary back channel in U.S.-Soviet relations during the Nixon administration. Long before Nixon became president, the executive branch had utilized private correspondence with foreign leaders, presidential emissaries, confidential channels, and other types of communication beyond the purview of the normal foreign policy bureaucracy. Despite the earlier precedents, the Dobrynin-Kissinger channel was novel in its breadth, its sweeping exclusion of the State Department, and most significantly for its central role in shaping détente. Back-channel diplomacy with the Soviets was not dominant until 1971, when the Channel became “operational,” as Kissinger later wrote, to cover the Berlin negotiations, break an impasse in SALT, and begin tentative planning for a summit meeting.

Implementing Grand Strategy

2021 ◽  
pp. 272-291
Author(s):  
William Inboden
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Security System ◽  
Nixon Administration ◽  
Grand Strategy ◽  
National Security Council ◽  
Considerable Time ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
Richard Nixon ◽  
Organizational Issues

This chapter describes the Richard Nixon administration, particularly in its early months. Nixon and his indispensable partner Henry Kissinger took office with a coherent and well-developed grand strategy, based on ideas they had been developing and articulating for years. Much scholarship has been devoted, and rightfully so, to the strategic principles and policies that Nixon and Kissinger pursued while in office. Yet the way they organized their national security system and attempted to implement their strategy has received much less attention—despite the fact that Nixon and Kissinger themselves devoted considerable time and intellectual energy to these organizational issues. In other words, they were concerned not merely with what policies they wanted to pursue and why they would pursue them, but also how they would advance those policies. In the case of Nixon and Kissinger, this “how” included the remarkable centralization of power in the National Security Council, often at the expense of the State and Defense Departments. The chapter assesses how and why Nixon and Kissinger went about this, particularly focusing on how they connected their organizational decisions to their grand strategy.

Fulbright's Circle

Worldview ◽  
1973 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-12
Author(s):  
Daniel Yergin
Keyword(s):  
Vietnam War ◽  
Foreign Relations ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
White House ◽  
Richard Nixon ◽  
Lyndon Johnson ◽  
The Vietnam War ◽  
Bay Of Pigs

Bill Fulbright has suffered for some time from a Cassandra complex," said a senatorial colleague of the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. With reason enough, for Fulbright has spent more than a decade warning of the dangers that come from the arrogance of power. In 1961 he advised John Kennedy against the Bay of Pigs invasion. Throughout 1965 and 1966 he warned Lyndon Johnson not to escalate the Vietnam war— and was rewarded with whispered rumors about his mental balance.But on one occasion, although Fulbright's advice was good, his prophecy was wrong. One pleasant spring afternoon in 1969 he went to the White House for an amiable two-hour discussion with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger.

Stepping Forward?

2020 ◽  
pp. 81-115
Author(s):  
Kenneth Kolander
Keyword(s):  
Nixon Administration ◽  
White House ◽  
Military Aid ◽  
Richard Nixon ◽  
The Third ◽  
Congressional Record ◽  
Peace Negotiations ◽  
Ambitious Program ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Gradual Approach

The third chapter, based on research from the Richard Nixon Presidential Library, FRUS, and the Congressional Record, explores congressional reactions to Nixon’s request for $2.2 billion in emergency military aid for Israel, as well as U.S. efforts to restart the peace process. Despite efforts by Fulbright and several other legislators, along with the Nixon administration’s lack of effort to justify such a massive aid package, Congress passed the emergency aid bill in full. Legislators successfully argued that Israel needed the immense amount of aid in order to feel strong enough to take risks in peace negotiations. But by May 1974, fearful that Israel felt too strong, the Nixon administration started to threaten to cut off all military aid to soften Israel’s position in peace negotiations. The fall of Nixon due to Watergate sapped the power of the White House at precisely the moment when a strong president was needed to advance such an ambitious program of U.S. peace diplomacy. Also important, Kissinger had to work against pro-Israel elements that sought to scuttle his gradual approach to a comprehensive peace.

The French Factor in U.S. Foreign Policy during the Nixon-Pompidou Period

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Trachtenberg
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Foreign Policy ◽  
National Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nixon Administration ◽  
Nuclear Area ◽  
Henry Kissinger ◽  
Sharp Turn ◽  
Close Relationship ◽  
The 1960S

This chapter discusses relations between France and the United States under the Nixon administration. When Nixon took office as president in early 1969, he and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger wanted to put America's relationship with France on an entirely new footing. Relations between the two countries in the 1960s, and especially from early 1963 on, had been far from ideal. Nixon and Kissinger tried to develop a close relationship with the Pompidou government and in the early Nixon–Pompidou period the two governments were on very good terms. Both governments were also interested in developing a certain relationship in the nuclear area. However, by 1973 relations between the two countries took a sharp turn for the worse. The chapter considers what went wrong and why the attempt to develop a close relationship failed.

Last Years

2018 ◽  
pp. 376-386
Author(s):  
Robert E. Lerner
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
West Coast ◽  
The United States ◽  
Virgin Islands ◽  
Ruptured Aneurysm ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
The West ◽  
Richard Nixon ◽  
The 1950S

This chapter details Ernst Kantorowicz's final years. Kantorowicz died of a ruptured aneurysm in September 1963. Before this, he worked on a succession of recondite articles, attended the annual meetings of the Medieval Academy and the Byzantine Institute at “Oakbarton Dumps,” vacationed on the West Coast and the Virgin Islands, and carried on earnestly with his dining and imbibing. His politics also became more leftward from the postwar years until the time of his death. For a decade and a half he was deeply worried about the possibility of nuclear war, and he held the United States responsible. During the 1950s, he was bitterly hostile to Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon. On the day after Kennedy's inauguration, Kantorowicz wrote the he “couldn't be worse than Eisenhower, ” although he did change his mind.

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