What is the Common Good? The Case for Transcending Partisanship

Daedalus ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 142 (2) ◽  
pp. 84-94
Author(s):  
Mickey Edwards

Even if most of us can agree on a definition of the “common good” (not a simple matter), there are substantial barriers to establishing public policies in accord with that agreement. The “democratic” element in our political system – the right of voters to choose the men and women who will create our laws – depends on the views of those voters being given considerable weight in determining eventual policy outcomes. Unfortunately, we have developed a political system – both in our elections and in the governing process – that gives disproportionate influence to relatively small numbers of voters (who are also the most partisan) and allows political parties through their closed procedures to limit the choices available to general election voters. Coupled with legislative rules that allow partisans to determine the makeup of legislative committees, the resulting process leaves the common good, however defined, a secondary consideration at best.

Author(s):  
Matteo Bonotti

This chapter rejects the ‘extrinsic’ view of public reason examined in Chapter 4, and argues that political parties can play an important role in helping citizens to relate their comprehensive doctrines to political liberal values and institutions. Once we understand the distinctive normative demands of partisanship, this chapter claims, we can see that there is no inherent tension between them and the demands of the Rawlsian overlapping consensus. This is because partisanship (unlike factionalism) involves a commitment to the common good rather than the sole advancement of merely partial interests, and this implies a commitment to public reasoning. The chapter further examines three distinctive empirical features of parties that particularly enable them to contribute to an overlapping consensus. These are their linkage function, their advancement of broad multi-issue political platforms, and their creative agency.


Horizons ◽  
2002 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-134
Author(s):  
Patrick T. McCormick

ABSTRACTMany oppose the mandatum as a threat to the academic freedom of Catholic scholars and the autonomy and credibility of Catholic universities. But the imposition of this juridical bond on working theologians is also in tension with Catholic Social Teaching on the rights and dignity of labor. Work is the labor necessary to earn our daily bread. But it is also the vocation by which we realize ourselves as persons and the profession through which we contribute to the common good. Thus, along with the right to a just wage and safe working conditions, Catholic Social Teaching defends workers' rights to a full partnership in the enterprise, and calls upon the church to be a model of participation and cooperation. The imposition of the mandatum fails to live up to this standard and threatens the jobs and vocations of theologians while undermining this profession's contribution to the church.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-112
Author(s):  
Nachman Alexander

This article examines how Fadlallah and Khomeini’s respective quests for sovereignty are reflected in their political thought, particularly vis-a-vis their notions of maṣlaḥa, which I define as the “common good.” I argue that if, to an extent, Islamic political thought seeks to maximise maṣlaḥa, then this can also constitute a claim to sovereignty, the definition of which remains multidimensional and contentious. By closely examining Fadlallah and Khomeini’s writings and pronouncements on governance, popular movement, and state, I attempt to reveal how discussions regarding Islamic governance demonstrate a broader claim to authority in Islamic history.


2020 ◽  
pp. 34-50
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin

Aristotle agrees with Plato that virtue requires the cooperation of the rational and the non-rational parts of the soul, and that the virtuous person is always better off than the non-virtuous, even though virtue alone is not sufficient for happiness. To strengthen Plato’s argument for this claim, he offers a more detailed account of the nature of happiness, and of the relation between virtue and happiness. Since happiness is the supreme human good, it should be identified with rational activity in accordance with virtue in a complete life, in which external circumstances are favourable. A virtue of character is the appropriate agreement between the rational and the non-rational parts of the soul, aiming at fine action (i.e., action that promotes the common good). This requirement of appropriate agreement distinguishes virtue from continence (mere control of the rational over the non-rational part). To show that a life of virtue, so defined, promotes the agent’s happiness, Aristotle argues that one’s own happiness requires the right kind of friendship with others, in which one aims at the good of others for their own sake.


2008 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 497-521 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claude Rochet

Public management has been dominated by the quest for efficiency and has left us with fundamental ethical questions that remain unresolved. It is argued that Machiavellian thought may provide us with concepts and tools applicable to ruling societies confronted with uncertainties and change that are (1) in line with the most recent insights into institutional evolution and (2) appropriate to solve complex decision-making problems. The common good — a central concept of Machiavelli's thought — appears to be an invisible hand that lowers the transaction costs and acts as the keystone of complex public affairs thinking. This analysis is illustrated by a comparative case study of the two management projects of infrastructure crossing the Alps, the AlpTransit in Switzerland, and the Lyon Torino Link. It concludes with a proposal to upgrade the research program in public management that allows effectiveness (legitimacy of the ends) and effectiveness in its implementation. Points for practitioners The mainstream of public management theories and reform has been dominated by the quest of efficiency as a Holy Grail. I argue that theses reforms didn't deliver with their promises and left us with fundamental ethical questions unresolved: doing things right do not answer to the question of doing the right things. The main reason is a profound misunderstanding of the very nature of the ongoing change process that makes any kind one size fits all recipes inappropriate. Such a sea change occurred in the Renaissance era and Machiavelli bequeathed us a comprehensive understanding of how to rule a public body in a changing and uncertain world. I explain Machiavelli's misunderstood legacy and apply his teaching to analyzing two huge management projects of public infrastructures. I conclude on what has to be upgrade in the research programmes in public management to confront with the challenges of our era that call for a back to basics of classical political philosophy


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-142
Author(s):  
Nurnazli Nurnazli

The development of science and technology today is not a reason to remove the provisions about ‘iddah that has been set in the Qur'an and Sunnah. 'Illat law and the purpose of enactment of ‘iddah which has been discussed needs to be reviewed. ‘iddah not only to know the empty uterus of the fetus, self-introspection, condition and period of mourning, but there is a higher purpose, that is belief in Allah and honor the noble covenant at the marriage ceremony. The noble agreement is realized in the ijâb and qabûl between men and women guardians. Consequently, if the marriage breaks up either because of death or divorce, both sides must respect the agreement. They must be equally restricted with the ‘iddah way until the time set by Syar'i, especially for women whose existence is more glorified and also the aim of the law' ‘iddah is for the common good.


2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 383 ◽  
Author(s):  
Māmari Stephens

New Zealand's social security system was born out of a vision of society consistent with a definition of the common good informed by Christian ethics. The past 30 years, in particular, have seen fierce ideological battles fought between the left and right over the extent, coverage, and generosity of the system. Yet a remnant of the vision of the common good remains, whereby individuals can have some access, by virtue of social security, to the sufficient conditions of social life to be free enough to find some level of fulfilment in that life. However, the freedom to be good, as is also required by a broad understanding of the common good, is under threat within New Zealand's social security law. Social security law asserts a vision, and not a coherent one, of what it means to be good in New Zealand society.  Newly minted social obligations in the Social Security Act 1964 go beyond the purposes of the legislation; being unconnected to relieving need, maintaining fiscal prudence, or even seeking paid employment as a means of achieving welfare. These modern moral obligations ensure that beneficiaries' freedom to choose to live life in a way consonant with the common good is frustrated, if not substantially abrogated, striking the wrong balance between the law's protection of individual autonomy and its implementation of social imperatives in pursuit of the common good.


Author(s):  
Jason Brennan

Nothing is more integral to democracy than voting. Most people believe that every citizen has the civic duty or moral obligation to vote, that any sincere vote is morally acceptable, and that buying, selling, or trading votes is inherently wrong. This book challenges our fundamental assumptions about voting, revealing why it is not a duty for most citizens—in fact, it argues, many people owe it to the rest of us not to vote. Bad choices at the polls can result in unjust laws, needless wars, and calamitous economic policies. The book shows why voters have duties to make informed decisions in the voting booth, to base their decisions on sound evidence for what will create the best possible policies, and to promote the common good rather than their own self-interest. They must vote well—or not vote at all. This book explains why voting is not necessarily the best way for citizens to exercise their civic duty, and why some citizens need to stay away from the polls to protect the democratic process from their uninformed, irrational, or immoral votes. In a democracy, every citizen has the right to vote. This book reveals why sometimes it's best if they don't. In a new afterword, “How to Vote Well,” the book provides a practical guidebook for making well-informed, well-reasoned choices at the polls.


What has social science learned about the common good? Would humanists even want to alter their definitions of the common good based on what social scientists say? In this volume, six social scientists—from economics, political science, sociology, and policy analysis—speak about what their disciplines have to contribute to discussions within Catholic social thought about the common good. None of those disciplines talks directly about “the common good”; but nearly all social scientists believe that their scientific work can help make the world a better place, and each social science does operate with some notion of human flourishing. Two theologians examine the insights of social science, including such challenging assertions that theology is overly irenic, that it does not appreciate unplanned order, and that it does not grasp how in some situations contention among self-interested nations and persons can be an effective path to the common good. In response, one theologian explicitly includes contention along with cooperation in his (altered) definition of the common good.


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