How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups

2006 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey Kurth Cronin
Keyword(s):  
Terrorist Organizations ◽  
Interstate War ◽  
Ideological Struggle ◽  
Terrorist Organization ◽  
Terrorist Groups

Al-Qaida will end. The fear that a small terrorist organization with a loose network has transformed itself into a protracted global ideological struggle without an end in sight is misguided. There are centuries of experience with modern terrorist movements, many bearing important parallels with al-Qaida; yet the lessons arising from the demise of these groups are little studied. Unfortunately, terrorist organizations in their final stages are often at their most dangerous. The outcomes can range from implosion of a group and its cause to transition to astonishing acts of violence and interstate war. Comparing al-Qaida's differences and similarities with those of earlier terrorist organizations, and applying relevant lessons to this case, can provide insights into al-Qaida's likely demise. It can also inform thinking about how to manage and hasten al-Qaida's end.

Introduction

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Jenna Jordan
Keyword(s):  
Life Span ◽  
Terrorist Organizations ◽  
Terrorist Organization ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Leadership Decapitation

Leadership decapitation, which refers to the arrest or killing of a group’s leadership, has become a key tool in current counterterrorism strategies This chapter presents an overview of the debate about leadership decapitation against terrorist organizations. Much of the optimism regarding the efficacy of decapitation as a counterterrorism strategy stems from the belief that terrorist groups depend upon the charisma of leaders for their cohesion. In order to understand whether decapitation works, this chapter presents three questions that will be answered in the book: (1) Under what conditions does leadership decapitation result in the decline of a terrorist organization? (2) Does leadership decapitation lengthen or shorten a group’s life span? (3) In cases where decapitation does not result in a group’s collapse, to what extent does it weaken a group and hinder its capacity to carry out attacks?

Understanding Suicide Terrorism

2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (04) ◽  
pp. 245-250
Author(s):  
A. Speckhard
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
Field Research ◽  
Suicide Terrorism ◽  
Terrorist Organizations ◽  
Global Migration ◽  
The Balkans ◽  
Single Region ◽  
Extensive Field ◽  
The World ◽  
Terrorist Groups

SummaryAs a terror tactic, suicide terrorism is one of the most lethal as it relies on a human being to deliver and detonate the device. Suicide terrorism is not confined to a single region or religion. On the contrary, it has a global appeal, and in countries such as Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan it has come to represent an almost daily reality as it has become the weapon of choice for some of the most dreaded terrorist organizations in the world, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. Drawing on over two decades of extensive field research in five distinct world regions, specifically the Middle East, Western Europe, North America, Russia, and the Balkans, the author discusses the origins of modern day suicide terrorism, motivational factors behind suicide terrorism, its global migration, and its appeal to modern-day terrorist groups to embrace it as a tactic.

Terrorist organization “revolutionary organization November 17” and its links and relations with “Carlos the Jackal”

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 745-750
Author(s):  
Spyridon Repousis
Keyword(s):  
Design Methodology ◽  
Democratic Society ◽  
Specific Topic ◽  
Terrorist Organizations ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Foreign Service ◽  
Terrorist Organization ◽  
Practical Implications

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to research for possible interconnection of the Greek terrorist organization “November 17” with the international terrorist Ilich Ramirez Sanchez or “Carlos the Jackal.” Design/methodology/approach In this research are discussed documents, visits by Carlos and his team to Greece, operational support through training and supply of weapons to “ELA” and “November 17,” attacks on foreign service targets in Greek territory, reports of close people working with Greek terrorist organizations, terrorist proclamations and interrogation of Carlos. Findings Available data indicate their cooperation and their terrorist murderous activity in Greece, which of course needs deeper investigation. “Carlos the Jackal” acted and cooperated in Greece with the two major terrorist organizations, “ELA” and “November 17,” causing material damages and murders. Practical implications The research is useful for government authorities, law authorities and offices and the democratic society as a whole. Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first study examining the specific topic.

scholarly journals The New Wars: Terrorism and “Asymmetric” Warfare

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 93-108
Author(s):  
Alexander Treiblmaier
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Legal Status ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Terrorist Organizations ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Asymmetric Warfare ◽  
New Wars ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Rules And Principles

The term “new wars” is often used to describe how terrorist groups achieve objectives in addition to the “classic” means of intervention by states. Terrorist organizations use asymmetric methods of warfare to target the weaknesses of Western states. Consequently, conventional wars have also changed into hybrid wars. The legal status of terrorist organizations is a major problem for the rule of law. In responding to terrorist attacks, the distinction between crime and terrorism is difficult. The “war on terror” is governed by different rules and principles and is extremely difficult to wage. Conflicts last a long time and victory against terrorism is rarely possible due to the networked structure of terrorist organizations and the way they intermingle with the population. In addition to an alliance-wide approach, there is a national solution to answer these new threats in form of the comprehensive national defense in Austria.

Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done

2006 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 87-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert F. Trager ◽  
Dessislava P. Zagorcheva
Keyword(s):  
Use Of Force ◽  
Support Networks ◽  
Current Policy ◽  
Force Analysis ◽  
Terrorist Organizations ◽  
The Past ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Abu Sayyaf Group ◽  
Common Interests ◽  
Terrorist Networks

Many scholars and policymakers argue that deterrence strategies have no significant role to play in counterterrorism. The case against deterrence rests on three pillars: terrorists are irrational; they value their political ends far above anything deterring states could hold at risk; and they are impossible tofind. Each pillar is either incorrect or its implications for deterrence have been misunderstood. Under certain conditions, deterrence is preferable to the use of force. Analysis of the structure of terrorist networks and the processes that produce attacks, as well as the multiple objectives of terrorist organizations, suggests that some deterrence strategies are more effective than those of the past. In particular, many terrorist groups and elements of terrorist support networks can likely be deterred from cooperating with the most threatening terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida. Although the use of force against multiple groups creates common interests among them, an appropriate deterrence strategy could fracture global terrorist networks. The current policy of the U.S. and Philippine governments toward the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group illustrates the potential of this approach and the risks of using force. Not only can groups such as the MILF be deterred from cooperating with al-Qaida, they may even be coerced into providing local intelligence on operatives linked to it.

Child Soldiers versus Children in Terrorist Groups

Small Arms ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 27-52
Author(s):  
Mia Bloom
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Theoretical Approach ◽  
Substitution Effect ◽  
Child Soldiers ◽  
Terrorist Organizations ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Adaptation Model

Much of the literature thus far has tended to aggregate child soldiers with child terrorists. This chapter distinguishes between child soldiers and children involved in terrorist organizations focusing on the areas in which the two phenomena diverge. After describing key cases from history, the chapter will take a theoretical approach to understanding children and terrorism as a function of a “substitution effect” (from economic theory) that children step in when adults are no longer available to perform the same tasks and contrast it with a competitive adaptation model in which terrorist organizations adapt to changing circumstances and exploit children as a tactical innovation.

scholarly journals The Wane of Command: Evidence on Drone Strikes and Control within Terrorist Organizations

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
ANOUK S. RIGTERINK
Keyword(s):  
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles ◽  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Terrorist Attacks ◽  
Terrorist Organizations ◽  
Aerial Vehicles ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Drone Strikes ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Better Than

This paper investigates how counterterrorism targeting terrorist leaders affects terrorist attacks. This effect is theoretically ambiguous and depends on whether terrorist groups are modeled as unitary actors or not. The paper exploits a natural experiment provided by strikes by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones) “hitting” and “missing” terrorist leaders in Pakistan. Results suggest that terrorist groups increase the number of attacks they commit after a drone “hit” on their leader compared with after a “miss.” This increase is statistically significant for 3 out of 6 months after a hit, when it ranges between 47.7% and 70.3%. Additional analysis of heterogenous effects across groups and leaders, and the impact of drone hits on the type of attack, terrorist group infighting, and splintering, suggest that principal-agent problems—(new) terrorist leaders struggling to control and discipline their operatives—account for these results better than alternative theoretical explanations.

Living with Terrorism: Unimaginable Nightmare or Prospective Reality

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerome H. Kahan
Keyword(s):  
War On Terror ◽  
Al Qaeda ◽  
Islamic State ◽  
President Obama ◽  
Terrorist Organizations ◽  
Global War On Terror ◽  
Dangerous Situation ◽  
The Us ◽  
Terrorist Organization ◽  
Global War

Abstract Nine days after the transformational 9/11 attacks, President G.W. Bush proclaimed that the nation is fighting a Global War on Terror (GWOT), an attention-grabbing phrase designed as a rallying cry for America to win the battle against al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations threatening our homeland as well as our allies and interests abroad. Eight years later, President Obama inherited what had become an even more dangerous situation, which led to the unexpected and courage attack that felled bin Laden and splintered al Qaeda. However, this success was short-lived when the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) suddenly emerged as our primary terrorist adversary – a new and brutal threat that President Obama vowed to “degrade and ultimately destroy” by doing what it takes to win the war against this and other terrorist organizations. While there has been some progress in halting and reversing ISIS territorial gains with the US providing support to newly trained Iraqi forces, this terrorist organization is not fully contained and far from being destroyed.

Comparative Analyses of Terrorist Threats under Conditions of COVID-19

2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (11) ◽  
pp. 5-12
Author(s):  
G. Machitidze
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Young People ◽  
Target Selection ◽  
Modus Operandi ◽  
Daily Lives ◽  
Terrorist Organizations ◽  
Global Pandemic ◽  
Terrorist Groups ◽  
Informal Economies ◽  
Huge Impact

The coronavirus pandemic has already caused high numbers of deaths, massive economic disruption, and had a huge impact on daily lives of millions of people. In short, – this is everything terrorist organizations affiliated with the ISIL and Al-Qaida would want to achieve with their attacks. The global pandemic serves as inspiration and influences the modus operandi of terrorists, both in terms of tactics and target selection. Since the pandemic started, the ISIL and Al-Qaida have persisted in operations across African, Asian and European countries, leaving hundreds of people dead. These attacks clearly show that terrorism has continued worldwide during the COVID 19 pandemic. Terrorist groups are looking at ways to take advantage of instability, increase recruitment and sympathizers among the vulnerable and terrified, encourage conventional and even biological attacks. Terrorist networks have encouraged followers to weaponise their own illness by trying to infect others. Terrorist groups also use the pandemic to gain visibility. The ISIL has been exploiting hashtags related to the coronavirus to redirect users to its radical propaganda. Terrorists have also found inspiration in the global pandemic with regard to their target selection, in particular critical health infrastructures. In Afghanistan, the Taliban has adopted a different approach to COVID 19 assisting efforts to limit the spread of the virus, including by declaring ceasefires in areas under its control. Hezbollah is working to fight the virus and maintain order within Lebanon. Because they control informal economies, groups like the Taliban or Lebanon’s Hezbollah are better placed to benefit from coronavirus than the ISIL or Al-Qaida. In general, terrorist groups are taking advantage of COVID 19 lockdowns to spread hatred and intensify social media efforts to recruit young people spending more time online.

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