New Delhi's Long Nuclear Journey: How Secrecy and Institutional Roadblocks Delayed India's Weaponization

2014 ◽  
Vol 38 (4) ◽  
pp. 79-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gaurav Kampani

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, many academics, think tank analysts, journalists, and government officials came to perceive India as a de facto nuclear weapons power. The consensus among U.S. policymakers was that normative, rather than technical or organizational hurdles, prevented India from transforming its latent nuclear capability into an operational one. New evidence shows, however, that India lacked technical means to deliver nuclear weapons reliably and safely until 1994–95. Further, until the outbreak of the Kargil War in the summer of 1999, political leaders refrained from embedding the weapons within organizational and procedural routines that would have rendered them operational in the military sense of the term. These deficiencies can be traced to a regime of secrecy that prevented information sharing and coordination among the relevant actors. This secrecy stemmed from risk aversion among Indian decisionmakers, who feared international pressures for nuclear rollback, particularly from the United States.

Author(s):  
Marc Trachtenberg

This chapter focuses on a document formally adopted by the NATO Council in December 1954, called MC 48, a report by the Alliance's Military Committee on “The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years.” In approving this document, the Council authorized the military authorities of the Alliance to “plan and make preparations on the assumption that atomic and thermonuclear weapons will be used in defense from the outset.” One very important consequence of the new strategy from the European point of view had to do with what was called “nuclear sharing”—that is, with the provision of American nuclear weapons to the NATO allies. This policy of nuclear sharing was one of the key elements in the history of this period.


2018 ◽  
pp. 79-109
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka

Many scholars would hold that a robust military alliance as well as strong anti-nuclear norms in domestic society would make any nuclear proliferation-related behaviour unlikely on the part of Japan. This chapter challenges such arguments, showing that the alliance with the United States did not fully inhibit Japan’s nuclear ambitions since Japan ratcheted up its interest in enrichment and reprocessing technologies in the late 1960. Indeed, Japan’s nuclear interest piqued amid concerns that the military alliance was weakening. Moreover, although the alliance did discourage some level of interest in nuclear weapons, the United States was reluctant to coerce Japan directly on this issue. Domestic politics and—to a lesser extent—prestige considerations were arguably a greater influence on Japan’s nuclear decision-making in the 1970s than alliance-related ones.


2017 ◽  
pp. 69-79
Author(s):  
Marcin Kowalczyk

The atomic bomb used in 1945 by the United States disturbed the military and symbolic balance of the world then. It became a sign of the Western power. The communist propaganda sought to neutralize the meaning of a new weapon. The text reconstructs the attempts of this neutralization and indicates the ways of presentation of nuclear weapons in the Polish poetry of socialist realism. Several motifs can be mentioned here: juxtaposition of the atomic bomb with apocalyptic motifs, highlighting the lack of intellectual and moral qualifications for possessing it, and emphasizing that it is a dangerous by-product of the Western desire for profit. Above all, however, the poetry of socialist realism underlined that Western culture is an incomprehensible and inhuman evil.


2020 ◽  
pp. 99-109
Author(s):  
Farid Shafiyev ◽  
Vasif Huseynov

The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict resolution process had experienced insurmountable deadlock due to the failure of the peace negotiations brokered by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, co-chaired by Russia, France, and the United States since the mid-1990s. The so-called Velvet Revolution of Armenia in 2018 was unable to deliver any progress, although a breakthrough was expected of, and promised by, the new leadership of the country. This, coupled with the constant provocations of the military and political leaders of Armenia, aggravated the conflict and led to the outbreak of an almost full-scale war on September 27, 2020. The war changed the status quo and created an environment for the negotiated resolution of the conflict following the establishment of a humanitarian ceasefire in Moscow. Armenia’s subsequent violations of the ceasefire regime by targeting Azerbaijani civilians have, however, demonstrated that peace is likely to remain an inaccessible dream of the region’s people in the short to medium term.


1958 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 182-201
Author(s):  
George W. Rathjens

There can be little doubt that the development and increasing availability of modern, especially nuclear, weapons will greatly alter the military policies and relationships that obtain among nations. This article addresses itself to those topics; more particularly it considers, in the light of changing technology, such problems as the objectives of major and minor powers in both general and limited war, the definition of limitations in limited war, the validity of alliances, and alternative military postures for the United States and for small nations.


2007 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
pp. 735-746 ◽  
Author(s):  
John B. Bellinger

During the past year, I have had an intensive and ongoing dialogue with European government officials about U.S. counterterrorism laws and policies, especially those relating to the detention, questioning, and transfer of members of al Qaida and the Taliban. During this same period, the U.S. legal framework governing the detention and treatment of detainees has evolved significantly, through the passage of the Detainee Treatment Act last December, the Supreme Court's decision in the Hamdan case in June, the transfer of 14 al Qaida leaders to Guantanamo in September, the announcement of new DOD detention policies in September, and the enactment of the Military Commissions Act earlier this month. It has been vexing that so many myths and misunderstandings about United States policies have proliferated. My dialogue with EU governments during the past year has helped to clear up some of these myths and to address issues that are troubling to Europeans. Tonight, I want to provide a comprehensive public explanation of our legal views and policy decisions with respect to the detention and treatment of terrorists, as these have evolved in the United States since September 11th.


2003 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-117
Author(s):  
James N. Green

AbstractVirtually no one in the United States raised objections to the 1964 military takeover of the Brazilian civilian government. In the early 1970s, however, the Brazilian regime had become associated with torture and the arbitrary rule of law. By the end of that decade, compliance with human rights standards had developed into a yardstick for measuring U.S. foreign policy initiatives in Latin America. This paper argues that between 1969 and 1974, a small group of dedicated church activists, exiled Brazilians, and academics introduced the issue of human rights in Latin America into the U.S. national body politic. A network of concerned activists fashioned a systematic campaign to educate journalists, government officials, and the public about the abuses taking place under the generals' rule. Their activities helped isolate the military regime and laid the groundwork for a broader solidarity movement with Latin American popular struggles in the late 1970s and 1980s.


2021 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 122-161
Author(s):  
Melinda Haas ◽  
Keren Yarhi-Milo

Why do aligned states sometimes disclose secret information about their miitary plans to use force, whereas other times they choose to deceive their partners? The state initiating these plans may choose among four information-sharing strategies: collusion, compartmentalization, concealment, and lying. Three main considerations shape its decision: the state's assessment of whether it needs its partner's capabilities to succeed at the military mission, the state's perception of whether the partner will be willing to support the state in the requested role, and the state's anticipated deception costs for not fully informing its partner state. Several cases illustrate how these strategies are chosen: Israel, Britain, and France's decision to use force against Egypt during the Suez Crisis (collusion between France and Israel, and concealment vis-à-vis the United States); Israel's 2007 bombing of Syria's al Kibar reactor (compartmentalization); and Israel's deliberations whether to attack Iran's nuclear reactor (lying). These strategies have implications for intra-alliance restraint and contribute to understanding deception and secrecy between allies.


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