scholarly journals Property beyond princely authority: the intellectual and legal roots of Ulrik Huber’s fundamental law

2016 ◽  
Vol 84 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 225-244
Author(s):  
Gustaaf van Nifterik
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Context ◽  
Fundamental Law ◽  
Do So

In this paper I argue for a rule-of-law-reading of Ulrik Huber’s fundamental law on freedom of property. My aim is to show that there is enough contemporary intellectual and legal context for such a reading. I do so by arguing along three lines: the medieval tradition that rooted the origin of private property in natural law, protection of property in the constitution of Holland in the seventeenth century, and property rights protected by fundamental law in English common law.


scholarly journals PROPERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW

Legal Theory ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 79-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa M. Austin
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Liberties ◽  
Private Property Rights ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Substantive Content ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
New Framework

This paper offers a new framework for thinking about the relationship between the common law of property and the rule of law. The standard way of framing this relationship is within the terms of the form/substance debate within the literature on the rule of law: Does the rule of law include only formal and procedural aspects or does it also encompass and support substantive rights such as private property rights and civil liberties? By focusing on the nature of common-law reasoning, I wish to question the form/substance dichotomy that frames this debate and to show that the formal aspects of the rule of law are in fact principles widely adopted within the practice of common-law reasoning and as such play a large role in shaping the substantive content of common-law property rights. Understanding this has implications beyond the relationship between property law and the rule of law.

Cardinal Richelieu between Vattel and Machiavelli

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Carty
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
International Law ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Historical Research ◽  
Practical Implementation ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
God's Will ◽  
Legal Thought ◽  
Rule Of Reason

The view that no form of international law existed in seventeenth-century France, and that this time was a part of ‘prehistory’, and thus irrelevant for international legal thought today is challenged. In addition, the traditional claim of Richelieu to be an admirer of Machiavelli and his Ragion di Stato doctrine to the detriment of the aim of concluding treaties and keeping them (as sacred), is refuted by careful historical research. In Richelieu’s thinking, there is a role for law to play but it is law as justice, law in the classical natural law tradition. Those who rule are subject to the rule of law as justice, the rule of God, or the rule of reason. In Richelieu’s world, kings and ministers are rational instruments of the practical implementation of God’s will on earth.

Natural law

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annabel S. Brett
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Animal Behavior ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
Social Perspective ◽  
Individual Agency ◽  
The Social ◽  
Do So ◽  
Scholastic Tradition

This chapter explores the concept of natural law, turning first to the Protestant milieu. Alterity—what would in the seventeenth century come to be theorized, and problematized, as “sociability”—is the dominant mood of the humanist and Protestant handling of natural law. It is there even in Thomas Hobbes, whose natural law coincides with moral philosophy and concerns the sphere of one's actions in respect of others. However, the Catholic scholastic tradition presents a very different framing of natural law, one that centers on individual agency and regulates the behavior of individual agents in their aspect as beings of a particular kind. While authors in this tradition grapple equally with the question of animal behavior in relation to law, they do not do so from the social perspective that characterizes Protestant humanist Aristotelians and jurists.

13. John Locke

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeremy Waldron
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
John Locke ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Civil Disobedience ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Limited Government ◽  
Short Biography ◽  
Political Thinker

This chapter examines and defends the relevance of John Locke's writings as political philosophy. Locke's political philosophy continues to have an enormous impact on the framing and the pursuit of liberal ideas in modern political thought — ideas about social contract, government by consent, natural law, equality, individual rights, civil disobedience, and private property. The discussion and application of Locke's arguments is thus an indispensable feature of political philosophy as it is practised today. After providing a short biography of Locke, the chapter considers his views on equality and natural law, property, economy, and disagreement, as well as limited government, toleration, and the rule of law. It concludes with an assessment of Locke's legacy as a political thinker.

Forty Years of Public Law

1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 341-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kretzmer
Keyword(s):  
Public Administration ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Public Law ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Judicial Decisions ◽  
Comprehensive Survey ◽  
Intellectual Revolution ◽  
Do So

It would be impossible in a short lecture to give a comprehensive survey of all the changes that have occurred in the last forty years in that branch of law known as “Israel common law”. I will not, therefore, try to do so. Instead, I wish to single out the most distinctive phenomenon in this area of law. I refer to the conceptual/intellectual revolution in the outlook of the court regarding the nature of its judicial function. The original view, according to which the sole function of the court in the area of public law is to decide disputes between citizens and public authorities, has been abandoned and replaced by an outlook that views the court as an institution responsible for the legality of public administration, or, as the court itself is accustomed to defining the matter, for the rule of law.I shall divide my discussion into two parts. In the first part I will briefly discuss the prominent changes that have occurred in the judicial decisions regarding public law in recent years, and the judicial philosophy underlying these changes.

The Chartists and the Constitution: Revisiting British Popular Constitutionalism

2017 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josh Gibson
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Political Development ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Common ◽  
Fundamental Law ◽  
English Law ◽  
Scholarly Attention ◽  
Popular Constitutionalism

AbstractDespite having a powerful influence on the historiography of radicalism and nineteenth-century politics for the past several decades, the language of the constitution has not recently received scholarly attention. In Chartist and radical historiography, the constitution is usually treated as a narrative of national political development. This article extends the horizons of Chartist constitutionalism by exploring its similarities with American constitutionalism. By doing so, it also opens up questions regarding the ideas of the movement. Like the Americans sixty years before, the Chartists were confronted by a parliament that they believed had superseded its constitutional authority. This perception was informed by a belief that the constitution rested on the authority of the fixed principles of fundamental law, which they argued placed limits beyond which Parliament had no power to reach. As a result, the Chartists imagined that the British constitution functioned like a written constitution. To support this claim, they drew on a sophisticated interpretation of English law that argued that the common law was closely related to natural law.

Rousseau's Moral Realism: Replacing Natural Law with the General Will

1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 633-651 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur M. Melzer
Keyword(s):  
Social Contract ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Moral Realism ◽  
General Will ◽  
Classical View ◽  
Natural Goodness ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Do So

The Social Contract is reinterpreted by emphasizing its relation to Rousseau's other writings and doctrines. In the spirit of Hobbesian realism, Rousseau regards natural law and other forms of “private morality” as ineffectual, invalid, and in practice dangerous tools of oppression and subversion. But, still more realistic than Hobbes, Rousseau thinks it impossible to build a nonoppressive state on men's selfish interests alone and embraces the classical view that morality or virtue is politically necessary (as well as intrinsically good). Rousseau's doctrine of the natural goodness of man, however, which traces all vice to the effects of oppression, leads him to conclude that the non-oppression more or less guaranteed by the absolute rule of general laws is also sufficient to make men virtuous. Thus Rousseau can declare law as such (General Will) infallible and “sovereign”—and he must do so in order to protect rule of law from its greatest danger, the subversive appeal to “natural law.”

Tiptoeing through the Tripwires: Recent Developments in Jurisdictional Error

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 467-503
Author(s):  
Aaron Moss
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Future Development ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
Effective Governance ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Academic Publications ◽  
Do So

Australian administrative law's continuing emphasis on the concept of jurisdictional error is increasingly unique amongst common law jurisdictions. This paper argues that recent developments in Australian jurisprudence have provided little guidance for administrative decision-makers, who are left ‘tiptoeing through the tripwires’ of judicial review. Combining a detailed analysis of primary decisions, academic publications and historical scholarship, this paper suggests that this lack of guidance is the result of a widespread judicial reluctance to engage with either the guidance or educative roles of judicial review. As this paper demonstrates, failure to do so encourages uncertainty, unpredictability and a general lack of clarity which inhibits judicial review's ability to guide decision-makers and contribute to the maintenance of effective governance, administrative justice, and the rule of law in Australia. Particular attention is given to the decisions of Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li, Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth, and NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, which together encapsulate many of the most problematic aspects of recent jurisprudence. To avoid these consequences, this paper calls on senior judges and commentators to articulate a clearer framework which will be applied to guide the future development of the doctrine of jurisdictional error.

E Pluribus Unum

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
William E. Nelson
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
American Revolution ◽  
Political System ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Main Theme ◽  
American Colonies ◽  
The Common ◽  
Do So

This book examines the role of the common law in the life and politics of Great Britain’s North American colonies from the founding of Virginia in 1607 to the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775–76. The main theme of the book is that when the different colonies were initially founded, they followed very different law—typically not the common law of England. But over the course of the seventeenth century and first half of the eighteenth century, the colonies all received the common law, with the result that by the 1750s the common law constituted the foundation of every colony’s law and every colony’s political system. Some of the colonies adopted the common law because of pressure from the Crown to do so, but others turned to the common law because of socioeconomic pressures on the ground. During the more than century-long process of reception, the common law gradually changed, and thus, what was on the ground in 1776 was not identical to the common law of England. Rather, it was a body of rules that would constitute a foundation for an Americanized version of the common law.

binds a company and its members under the terms of the memorandum and articles of association. In each case, there is separate provision for these varieties of contract under other legislation. Apart from the provisions of the 1999 Act, the third party’s rights arising under some other rule of law will remain unaffected. Thus, if an existing common law or equitable exception to the doctrine of privity of contract applies in favour of T, he may rely on that instead of invoking the provisions of the 1999 Act. This will be particularly important in cases in which T is unable to prove that he has relied on the term in the contract between A and B or in any other case in which the restrictive provisions of s 1 and s 2 might work against T. Thus, if T can establish the existence of a trust of the promise made in his favour or if he has an action in the tort of negligence or if some other statutory exception applies in his favour, T will still be able to avail himself of that alternative route. Although s7(1) only refers to T’s right under s 1, it must follow that the provisions of ss 2 and 3 are also inapplicable, since both of these provisions expressly state that they apply where T has relied on s 1. It has been seen above that at common law there is nothing to prevent the promisee from enforcing a term expressed to be for the benefit of the third party, if he wishes to do so. This position is preserved under s 4 of the 1999 Act.

1995 ◽  
pp. 805-806
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Alternative Route ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
Privity Of Contract ◽  
A Company ◽  
Made In ◽  
Do So
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