Teach the Children Well

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (6) ◽  
pp. 734-760
Author(s):  
Michelle Mason

What connection is there between living well, in the sense of living a life of ethical virtue, and faring well, in the sense of living a life good for the agent whose life it is? Defenses of a connection between exercising the virtues and living a good life often display two commitments: first, to addressing their answer to the person whose life is in question and, second, to showing that virtue is what I call a reliability conferring property. I challenge both commitments. I propose we take up the question from the dialogical point of view implicit in contexts where one person (an “ethical trustee”) is charged with the care of the character of another (an “ethical trustor”) and argue that virtue is what I call a status conferring property. Ethical trustees benefit their trustors by inculcating the virtues because in doing so they bestow on them a status that is necessary for a good life.

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (12) ◽  
pp. e0261741
Author(s):  
Hervé Michel ◽  
Hélène Prévôt-Huille ◽  
Raphaël Koster ◽  
Fiona Ecarnot ◽  
Zoé Grange ◽  
...  

Introduction Over the last fifteen years, Living Labs have been on the rise in Europe to bridge the gap between service providers, and the needs of end-users, and to speed up innovation, particularly in the field of healthcare and ageing. Ageing tends to be considered by institutions as a set of risks to be managed for older persons, illustrated in particular via the concepts of “ageing well” or “successful ageing”. In this context, this project aims to define the meaning and the conditions for a good life from the point of view of older persons themselves, thereby improving institutions’ recognition and support of older persons’ ways of living well, rather than imposing a general definition of “successful ageing” based on functional capacity. Methods and analysis This qualitative study is designed as an action research underpinned by a Living-Lab approach to co-creation. The aims are to: define the conditions for a good life as accurately as possible with older persons (Step 1); share these findings with different healthcare and service providers to adjust existing services or create new ones (Step 2); and disseminate them more broadly within the regions under study and across the scientific community (Step 3). During Step 1, the features of a “good life” will be analysed in a socio-anthropological study based on semi-directed interviews and observations made in the homes of 70 elderly people living in a wide range of accommodation types and regions. In accordance with French legislation, and as confirmed by our formal Ethics Committee, this study does not require approval. The dissemination stage is integrated into the design of this action research, and notably will provide for the appropriation of research findings by the partners of this study, by setting up creativity sessions (Step 2) and by sharing the general findings through panel discussions bringing together regional and national stakeholders (Step 3).


10.33177/6.4 ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 69-90

Both Sumak Kawsay (SK) in Ecuador and Sufficiency Economy (SE) in Thailand are stories of virtue, identity and progress that bring about an ideal citizen and lifestyle claimed to be good for all, but which are in fact problematic and dangerous for many. These notions arose in political and educational discourses as a promise to “rescue” “indigenous” values; to make possible ways of good-living better suited for each of these countries than “Western” notions of well-being. It is problematic that in trying to make the idea of progress “indigenous” these proposals (re)inscribe particular historically transmitted ideas of who an ideal citizen is, and a lifestyle which makes deviant “kinds” of people who have to be “cured” through education. This paper will argue that SK and SE in education are ways of organizing the behavior of people through stories of virtue. It will also argue that these stories shape and are shaped by their intersection with the traveling and translation of ideas of progress. The paper will look into particular historical events to analyze what categories and notions of progress make SK and SE possible.


Good Lives ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 125-224
Author(s):  
Samuel Clark

Part II works from the point of view of the reader of autobiography, and asks: what should we learn from autobiography? It argues for a lesson about selfhood and the good life, and specifically about the roles of narrative and of self-realization in those targets of human self-knowledge. This investigation addresses four questions: given that autobiographies are narratives, should we learn something from them about the importance of narrative in human life? Could our narration of our lives explain how their parts relate to them as wholes? Could it retrospectively unify them and thereby make them good for us? Could it create self-knowledge by interpretatively making the self? In each case it answers: no. The lesson we should learn here is instead about the centrality of self-realization to selfhood and the good life. To make that case, this part argues for pluralist realism about self-knowledge: autobiographies of self-discovery, martial life, and solitude show that the ‘self’ which is created and known by self-interpretation is, at best, one part of what we can know about ourselves, and not the most interesting part. These modes of self-discovery reveal a self that is unchosen, initially opaque to itself, and seedlike, which could not be a self-interpretation, and whose good is its realization.


Author(s):  
Mark LeBar

The concept of eudaimonia plays a crucial role in understanding virtue on some quite influential virtue ethical theories. It can be understood as happiness, as a property of lives. It is on many influential accounts the focus of virtue and the standard for excellence in living and acting. This chapter grapples with some essential questions in fleshing out this relation: What, beyond merely not dying, does living consist in? What counts as living well? How does eudaimonia give point or focus to virtue? Who is living a good life good for? Can eudaimonism get us beyond an unacceptable egoism? Among the major concerns addressed is that eudaimonia really points more to moral perfection than to happiness. The chapter concludes by taking up a number of objections to allowing the role for eudaimonia that it has traditionally played in virtue ethical theories.


Topoi ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fredrik Svenaeus

AbstractIn this paper I explore health and illness through the lens of enactivism, which is understood and developed as a bodily-based worldly-engaged phenomenology. Various health theories – biomedical, ability-based, biopsychosocial – are introduced and scrutinized from the point of view of enactivism and phenomenology. Health is ultimately argued to consist in a central world-disclosing aspect of what is called existential feelings, experienced by way of transparency and ease in carrying out important life projects. Health, in such a phenomenologically enacted understanding, is an important and in many cases necessary part of leading a good life. Illness, on the other hand, by such a phenomenological view, consist in finding oneself at mercy of unhomelike existential feelings, such as bodily pains, nausea, extreme unmotivated tiredness, depression, chronic anxiety and delusion, which make it harder and, in some cases, impossible to flourish. In illness suffering the lived body hurts, resists, or, in other ways, alienates the activities of the ill person.


1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard J. Arneson

What is the good for human persons? If I am trying to lead the best possible life I could lead, not the morally best life, but the life that is best for me, what exactly am I seeking?This phrasing of the question I will be pursuing may sound tendentious, so some explanation is needed. What is good for one person, we ordinarily suppose, can conflict with what is good for other persons and with what is required by morality. A prudent person seeks her own good efficiently; she selects the best available means to her good. If we call the value that a person seeks when she is being prudent “prudential value,” then an alternative rendering of the question to be addressed in this essay is “What is prudential value?” We can also say that an individual flourishes or has a life high in well-being when her life is high in prudential value. Of course, these common-sense appearances that the good for an individual, the good for other persons, and the requirements of morality often are in conflict might be deceiving. For all that I have said here, the correct theory of individual good might yield the result that sacrificing oneself for the sake of other people or for the sake of a morally worthy cause can never occur, because helping others and being moral always maximize one's own good. But this would be the surprising result of a theory, not something we should presuppose at the start of inquiry. When a friend has a baby and I express a conventional wish that the child have a good life, I mean a life that is good for the child, not a life that merely helps others or merely respects the constraints of morality. After all, a life that is altruistic and perfectly moral, we suppose, could be a life that is pure hell for the person who lives it—a succession of horrible headaches marked by no achievements or attainments of anything worthwhile and ending in agonizing death at a young age. So the question remains, what constitutes a life that is good for the person who is living it?


Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN M. CAMPBELL

This essay introduces and defends a new analysis of prudential value. According to this analysis, what it is for something to be good for you is for that thing to contribute to the appeal or desirability of being in your position. I argue that this proposal fits well with our ways of talking about prudential value and well-being; enables promising analyses of luck, selfishness, self-sacrifice and paternalism; preserves the relationship between prudential value and the attitudes of concern, love, pity and envy; and satisfies various other desiderata. I also highlight two ways in which the analysis is informative and can lead to progress in our substantive theorizing about the good life.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 3644-3649

We humans live life for attaining happiness by the way of fulfilling our needs wants & desires. We work hard to earn and satisfy all our requirements. We strive to derive a better experience upon our every shopping attempt which we make. Retail therapy in shopping is to improve the shoppers mood or disposition which is seen among people during depression or stress, in normal context it is a small duration-lived habit. Products purchased during period of retail therapy are also referred to as "comfort buys". in shopping experience, human brain apparently releases the chemical known as dopamine, a natural messenger required for the normal functioning of the brain, and it plays dominant role in our ability to experience pleasure and pain. It appears also to have a role in addictive behavior. The most important reason shopping malls are so popular is due to convenience. Which include clothing stores, a food court, movie theaters, etc Shopping might not be good for wallet, but it could be good for health, new research suggests. Walking within the mall between stores, multiplex, food court, gaming zone etc provides better enjoyment experience which ultimately results into shopper’s satisfaction. “Therapy” denotes the favorable impact of shopping experience of shoppers at shopping malls, there are indeed psychological rewards. This article discuses about retail therapy from shoppers’ experience point of view as depending upon the experience, knowledge & situation the shoppers intend to make compulsive or impulsive buying which impacts behavior of shopper & emotions which are been motivated by desire to fulfill material needs and wants.


Author(s):  
Astrid Karina Rivero Pérez

ABSTRACTThis paper studies the construction of the notion of "good life" of young students of a high school as a result of the exchange of material and symbolic resources to members of their personal networks. In this research, the actors and their actions are treated as interdependent, so the relational ties between actors influence how young people construct their notion of good life and plan their future. The proposed study is based on the concept of personal networks in which the network is considered from the point of view of the subject, in this of young high school students who lived in a marginal urban area of Merida, Yucatan, Mexico. Since the study subjects are young with few opportunities and situations of social inequality we must know in which social structures they interact.RESUMENEl presente artículo estudia la construcción de la noción de “vida buena” de jóvenes estudiantes de un bachillerato universitario como resultado del intercambio de recursos materiales y simbólicos con los miembros de sus redes personales. En esta investigación, los actores y sus acciones son tratados como interdependientes, por lo cual los lazos relacionales entre los actores influyen en como los jóvenes construyen su noción de vida buena y planean su futuro. El estudio está planteado a partir del concepto de redes personales en el cual se plantea la red desde el punto de vista del individuo, en este caso los jóvenes estudiantes de bachillerato quienes son habitantes de una zona urbana marginal de Mérida, Yucatán, México. Dado que los sujetos de estudio son jóvenes con pocas oportunidades y en situaciones de desigualdad social hay que conocer qué les otorgan o limitan los procesos y estructuras sociales en las que interactúan. Contacto principal: [email protected]


Good Lives ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 3-124
Author(s):  
Samuel Clark

Part I investigates a wide range of autobiographies, alongside work on the history and literary criticism of autobiography, on narrative, and on the philosophies of the self and of the good life. It works from the point of view of the autobiographer, and considers what she does, what she aims at, and how she achieves her effects, to answer three questions: what is an autobiography? How can we learn about ourselves from reading one? About what subjects does autobiography teach? This part of the book develops, first, an account of autobiography as paradigmatically a narrative artefact in a genre defined by its form: particular diachronic compositional self-reflection. Second, an account of narrative as paradigmatically a generic telling of a connected temporal sequence of particular actions taken by, and particular events which happen to, agents. It defends rationalism about autobiography: autobiography is in itself a distinctive and valuable form of ethical reasoning, and not merely involved in reasoning of other, more familiar kinds. It distinguishes two purposes of autobiography, self-investigation and self-presentation. It identifies five kinds of self-knowledge at which autobiographical self-investigation typically aims—explanation, justification, self-enjoyment, selfhood, and good life—and argues that meaning is not a distinct sixth kind. It then focusses on the book’s two main concerns, selfhood and good life: it sets out the wide range of existing accounts, taxonomies, and tasks for each, and gives an initial characterisation of the self-realization account of the self and its good which is defended in Part II.


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