Obligating Reasons, Moral Laws, and Moral Dispositions

2014 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luke Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Moral Obligations ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
In Virtue Of

Moral obligations rest on circumstances (events, states of affairs, etc.). But what are these obligating reasons and in virtue of what are they such reasons? Nomological conceptions define such reasons in terms of moral laws. I argue that one such conception cannot be correct and that others do not support the familiar and plausible view that obligating reasons are pro tanto (or contributory) reasons, either because they entail that this view is false or else because they cannot explain – or even help to explain – how it could be true. I also argue that a particular dispositional conception of obligating reasons does support this view of obligating reasons by enabling an explanation of how it could be true. Moreover, my arguments show that the dispositional moral metaphysic on which this conception is predicated can do something that nomological alternatives cannot: explain why obligating reasons and moral obligations are pro tanto reasons and obligations.

scholarly journals The function of consciousness is to generate experience

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Axel Cleeremans ◽  
Catherine Tallon-Baudry
Keyword(s):  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Intrinsic Value ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
The Core ◽  
Core Function ◽  
Functional Advantage ◽  
The Hard Problem ◽  
In Virtue Of

Why would we do anything at all if the doing was not doing something to us? In other words: What is consciousness good for? Here, reversing classical views, according to many of which subjective experience is a mere epiphenomenon that affords no functional advantage, we propose that the core function of consciousness is precisely to enable subject-level experience. “What it feels like” is endowed with intrinsic value, and it is precisely the value agents associate with their experiences that explains why we do certain things and avoid others. Thus, we argue that it is only in virtue of the fact that conscious agents experience things and care about those experiences that they are motivated to act in certain ways and that they prefer some states of affairs vs. others. In this sense, conscious experience functions as a mental currency of sorts, which not only endows mental states with intrinsic value, but also makes it possible for conscious agents to compare vastly different experiences in a common subject-centered space — a feature that readily explains the fact that consciousness is unified. If, as we argue, the function of consciousness is to endow agents with subjective experience, then the hard problem of consciousness seems to dissolve.

How to Do Things Without Words: A Theory of Declarations

2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. P. Smit ◽  
Filip Buekens
Keyword(s):  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
New States ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Theoretical Import

Declarations like “this meeting is adjourned” make certain facts the case by representing them as being the case. Yet surprisingly little attention has been paid to the mechanism whereby the utterance of a declaration can bring about a new state of affairs. In this paper, we use the incentivization account of institutional facts to address this issue. We argue that declarations can serve to bring about new states of affairs as their utterance have game theoretical import, typically in virtue of the utterer signaling a commitment to act in an incentive-changing way.

scholarly journals How does God know that 2 + 2 = 4?

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
ANDREW BRENNER
Keyword(s):  
General Model ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Truth Values ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Free Actions ◽  
In Virtue Of

AbstractSometimes theists wonder how God's beliefs track particular portions of reality, e.g. contingent states of affairs, or facts regarding future free actions. In this article I sketch a general model for how God's beliefs track reality. God's beliefs track reality in much the same way that propositions track reality, namely via grounding. Just as the truth values of true propositions are generally or always grounded in their truthmakers, so too God's true beliefs are grounded in the subject matters of those beliefs (i.e. God believes that p in virtue of the fact that p). This is not idle speculation, since my proposal allows the theist to account for God's true beliefs regarding causally inert portions of reality.

Truthmaking

Philosophy ◽  
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aaron M. Griffith
Keyword(s):  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
Subjunctive Conditional ◽  
Alternative Approaches ◽  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Truthmaker Theory ◽  
To Come ◽  
Property Instances ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
In Virtue Of

The notions of “truthmaking” and “truthmakers” are central to many attempts in contemporary metaphysics to come to grips with the connection between truth and reality. The intuitive motivation for theories of truthmaking is the idea that truth depends on reality: that truth is not primitive or fundamental, but rather derivative and dependent. The idea, more precisely stated, is that true propositions (or whatever are the primary truth-bearers, e.g., statements, sentences, or beliefs) are not true in and of themselves but must be made true by reality. Truthmaker theorists think that for a proposition to be made true is for it to be true in virtue of the existence of some entity, which is called its “truthmaker.” While many find the thought that truths are “true in virtue of,” or “grounded in,” or “determined by” reality compelling, not everyone finds the truthmaker theorist’s way of articulating this idea adequate. This article focuses on recent truthmaker theories, their challenges, and alternative approaches to truthmaking. One major point of contention surveyed here is the scope of truthmaking: i.e., whether every truth has a truthmaker, or only some. Another important issue is the nature of truthmakers. Some contend that states of affairs are truthmakers, while others hold that particular property instances (“tropes”) are better qualified to ground truths. Truthmaker theorists also disagree about how to characterize the “truthmaking relation” that holds between truths and their truthmakers. The various principles of truthmaking (principles setting out necessary and sufficient conditions under which an entity is a truthmaker for some proposition) offered in the literature are also surveyed in this entry. Perhaps the most contentious matter in truthmaker theory is how to deal with “problem cases”: i.e., truths for which there are no obvious truthmakers, such as negative existential truths, necessary truths, and subjunctive conditional truths. Some deny that these truths have truthmakers, but others have come up with ingenious and therefore controversial accounts of the truthmakers for these truths. Works on the relation between theories of truth and theories of truthmaking are also surveyed. Because it brings together foundational issues in ontology and truth, the nature of truthmaking and truthmakers has and will continue to be a source of interest and excitement for philosophers.

What Truth Is

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Jago
Keyword(s):  
Liar Paradox ◽  
Final Part ◽  
States Of Affairs ◽  
The Third ◽  
The World ◽  
Novel Theory ◽  
Metaphysical Notion ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Do So

What Truth Is presents and defends a novel theory of what truth is, in terms of the metaphysical notion of truthmaking. This is the relation which holds between a truth and some entity in the world, in virtue of which that truth is true. By coming to an understanding of this relation, I argue, we gain better insight into the metaphysics of truth. The first part of the book discusses the property being true, and how we should understand it in terms of truthmaking. The second part focuses on truthmakers, the worldly entities which make various kinds of truths true, and how they do so. I argue for a metaphysics of states of affairs, which account for things having properties and standing in relations. The third part analyses the logic and metaphysics of the truthmaking relation itself, and links it to the metaphysical concept of grounding. The final part discusses consequences of the theory for language and logic. I show how the theory delivers a novel and useful theory of propositions, the entities which are true or false, depending on how things are. One feature of this approach is that it avoids the Liar paradox and other puzzling paradoxes of truth.

Shared Epistemic Responsibility

Episteme ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Boyd Millar
Keyword(s):  
Shared Responsibility ◽  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Direct Control ◽  
Doxastic Responsibility ◽  
Epistemic Obligation ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Epistemic Obligations ◽  
Epistemic Blame ◽  
Incomplete Picture

AbstractIt is widely acknowledged that individual moral obligations and responsibility entail shared (or joint) moral obligations and responsibility. However, whether individual epistemic obligations and responsibility entail shared epistemic obligations and responsibility is rarely discussed. Instead, most discussions of doxastic responsibility focus on individuals considered in isolation. In contrast to this standard approach, I maintain that focusing exclusively on individuals in isolation leads to a profoundly incomplete picture of what we're epistemically obligated to do and when we deserve epistemic blame. First, I argue that we have epistemic obligations to perform actions of the sort that can be performed in conjunction with other people, and that consequently, we are often jointly blameworthy when we violate shared epistemic obligations. Second, I argue that shared responsibility is especially important to doxastic responsibility thanks to the fact that we don't have the same kind of direct control over our beliefs that we have over our actions. In particular, I argue that there are many cases in which a particular individual who holds some problematic belief only deserves epistemic blame in virtue of belonging to a group all the members of which are jointly blameworthy for violating some shared epistemic obligation.

The joy of obligation: Human cultural worldviews can enhance the rewards of meeting obligations

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma E. Buchtel
Keyword(s):  
Prosocial Behavior ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Heritage Culture ◽  
Confucian Heritage Culture ◽  
Cultural Worldviews

Abstract Is it particularly human to feel coerced into fulfilling moral obligations, or is it particularly human to enjoy them? I argue for the importance of taking into account how culture promotes prosocial behavior, discussing how Confucian heritage culture enhances the satisfaction of meeting one's obligations.

Differentiating between different forms of moral obligations

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajen A. Anderson ◽  
Benjamin C. Ruisch ◽  
David A. Pizarro
Keyword(s):  
Moral Character ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Different Types

Abstract We argue that Tomasello's account overlooks important psychological distinctions between how humans judge different types of moral obligations, such as prescriptive obligations (i.e., what one should do) and proscriptive obligations (i.e., what one should not do). Specifically, evaluating these different types of obligations rests on different psychological inputs and has distinct downstream consequences for judgments of moral character.

What Is an Institution?

2007 ◽  
pp. 5-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Searle
Keyword(s):  
Physical Structure ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Collective Intentionality ◽  
Institutional Facts ◽  
Institutional Fact ◽  
The Status ◽  
The Creation ◽  
State Of Affairs ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Typical Point

The author claims that an institution is any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts. These rules typically have the form of X counts as Y in C, where an object, person, or state of affairs X is assigned a special status, the Y status, such that the new status enables the person or object to perform functions that it could not perform solely in virtue of its physical structure, but requires as a necessary condition the assignment of the status. The creation of an institutional fact is, thus, the collective assignment of a status function. The typical point of the creation of institutional facts by assigning status functions is to create deontic powers. So typically when we assign a status function Y to some object or person X we have created a situation in which we accept that a person S who stands in the appropriate relation to X is such that (S has power (S does A)). The whole analysis then gives us a systematic set of relationships between collective intentionality, the assignment of function, the assignment of status functions, constitutive rules, institutional facts, and deontic powers.

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