Socrates and Democracy

2001 ◽  
Vol 18 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 91-105
Author(s):  
Shigeru Yonezawa

The aim of this paper is to reveal Socrates as a thorough democrat. In the first section, I will disprove the credibility of Xenophon’s Memorabilia, a common source for scholars who view Socrates as an antidemocratic thinker. I will then argue, in the second section, that the views of a few scholars who portray Socrates as a prodemocratic thinker represent a far-from-satisfactory depiction of his political views. In the third section, I will then demonstrate that Socrates’ criticism of democracy is not of democracy itself nor of Athenian laws, but instead a criticism of a particular sort of democracy seen in the period of Athenian imperialism, and that it derives from his fundamental recognition of human ignorance. After pointing out Socrates’ special preference for the democratic laws of Athens, seen in the Crito, I will establish, in the fourth section, a preference in his philosophy showing him as a staunch democrat who upheld the concept of the rule of law.

Author(s):  
Henk Addink

The pivotal aim of this book is to explain the creation, development, and impact of good governance from a conceptual, principal perspective and in the context of national administrative law. Three lines of reasoning have been worked out: developing the concept of good governance; specification of this concept by developing principles of good governance; and implementation of these principles of good governance on the national level. In this phase of further development of good governance, it is important to have a clear concept of good governance, presented in this book as the third cornerstone of a modern state, alongside the concepts of the rule of law and democracy. That is a rather new national administrative law perspective which is influenced by regional and international legal developments; thus, we can speak about good governance as a multilevel concept. But the question is: how is this concept of good governance further developed? Six principles of good governance (which in a narrower sense also qualify as principles of good administration) have been further specified in a systematic way, from a legal perspective. These are the principles of properness, transparency, participation, effectiveness, accountability, and human rights. Furthermore, the link has been made with integrity standards. The important developments of each of these principles are described on the national level in Europe, but also in countries outside Europe (such as Australia, Canada, and South Africa). This book gives a systematic comparison of the implementation of the principles of good governance between countries.


Author(s):  
Kent Roach

This chapter examines the distinct operational and ethical challenges that prosecutors face in national security and especially terrorism cases. The second part of this chapter focuses on the operational challenges that prosecutors face. These include demands for specialization that may be difficult to fulfill given the relative rarity of national security prosecutions; the availability of special investigative powers not normally available in other criminal cases; exceptionally broad and complex offenses; and the demands of federalism and international cooperation. The third part examines ethical and normative challenges that run throughout the many operational aspects of the prosecutorial role in national security cases. These include the challenges of ensuring that often exceptional national security laws are enforced in a manner consistent with the rule of law and human rights. There are also challenges of maintaining an appropriate balance between legitimate claims of secrecy and legitimate demands for disclosure and between maintaining prosecutorial independence and discretion while recognizing the whole of government and whole of society effects of the many difficult decisions that prosecutors must make in national security cases.


2009 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan K. Ocko ◽  
David Gilmartin

This paper uses the concept of the “rule of law” to compare Qing China and British India. Rather than using the rule of law instrumentally, the paper embeds it in the histories of state power and sovereignty in China and India. Three themes, all framed by the rule of law and the rule of man as oppositional yet paradoxically intertwined notions, organize the paper's comparisons: the role of a discourse of law in simultaneously legitimizing and constraining the political authority of the state; the role of law and legal procedures in shaping and defining society; and the role of law in defining an economic and social order based on contract, property, and rights. A fourth section considers the implications of these findings for the historical trajectories of China and India in the twentieth century. Taking law as an instrument of power and an imagined realm that nonetheless also transcended power and operated outside its ambit, the paper seeks to broaden the history of the “rule of law” beyond Euro-America.


2020 ◽  
pp. 527-550
Author(s):  
Kristina Daugirdas

This chapter explores the promotion of the rule of law. In drafting and publishing Restatements of Foreign Relations Law, both the American Law Institute and the reporters have understood the projects as contributing to the rule of law at the international level, at the domestic level, or both. There are at least three distinct ways that these Restatements might promote the rule of law. First, they might do so by clarifying the content of the law. Second, the Restatements might contribute to the development of new legal rules, specifically to the evolution and consolidation of customary international law. Finally, the Restatements might promote the rule of law by promoting compliance with the law. Ultimately, the Third and Fourth Restatements have taken quite different approaches to promoting the rule of law. To some extent these different approaches are a consequence of changes in the legal landscape over the past three decades. They also reflect different choices that the reporters and the American Law Institute have made about how to carry out the project of restating foreign relations law.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 248-267
Author(s):  
Sławomir Tkacz

The present paper aims to present an outline of the views of the Polish legal theorist Józef Nowacki (1923–2005). The claim put forward is that Nowacki was the chief representative of Hans Kelsen’s normativism in Polish legal theory. The paper begins with a short historical sketch presenting the reception of Hans Kelsen’s views in Polish jurisprudence, noting that in the post-war period the communist authorities believed that normativism was at odds with the then prevailing system of actually existing socialism. Drawing inspiration from German-speaking authors, Nowacki rejected the ideology prevailing in Poland at that time and became a staunch advocate of the normativist stance, in particular with regard to the theory of the legal system. The second part of the paper discusses Nowacki’s views regarding the concept of the rule of law, and the third and last part presents Nowacki’s critique of the case-law of the Polish Constitutional Court.


Author(s):  
Chibli Mallat

This article examines comparative law in Islamic legal culture. The first section discusses the comparative framework in Islamic law and civilization. The second section describes the rule of law in the prism of the legal profession. The third section discusses the notions of public and private in issues such as constitutions, contracts and torts, and family law. A millennium and a half after the Islamic revelation, unrest and violence associated with the Islamic/Middle Eastern world make one wonder, from a comparative perspective, whether West and East are not on a collision course precisely because of their diametrically opposed concepts of law. On the Western side, law is associated with nation-states and their territory; on the Islamic/Middle Eastern side, law is dominated by the personal dimension, defined on the basis of religion and even sect within that religion.


2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ilg

AbstractThis article proposes that there are three types of individual interest perception that explain adherence to the rule of law. The first level, “profit,” refers to tangible individual gain, whether in the form of economic enrichment or the accumulation of political power. The second layer of interest, “persuasion,” involves social norms and reputation. In this second level, individuals adhere to a rule not because of the threat of government sanction or reward, but rather because of intangible concerns for reputation and social status. Finally, the third layer of interest involves individuals forgoing tangible benefit for the sake of fidelity to a constitutional order or a shared set of beliefs. A potential advantage of the three-interest view is that it provides for an accessible descriptive framework that captures the broad nature of the rule of law, moving from the small bribe for a local official to the question of whether a constitution will constrain the powerful. The three-interest view also aligns well with modern developments in experimental and behavioural economics and suggests future lines of research into how individuals and groups navigate from self-interest toward cooperation and fidelity.


2001 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 331-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD ROSE ◽  
DOH CHULL SHIN

Countries in the third wave of democratization have introduced competitive elections before establishing basic institutions of a modern state such as the rule of law, institutions of civil society and the accountability of governors. By contrast, countries in the first wave of democratization became modern states before universal suffrage was introduced. Because they have democratized backwards, most third-wave countries are currently incomplete democracies. Incomplete democracies can develop in three different ways: completing democratization; repudiating free elections and turning to an undemocratic alternative; or falling into a low-level equilibrium trap in which the inadequacies of elites are matched by low popular demands and expectations. The significance of incomplete democratization is shown by analysing public opinion survey data from three new democracies varying in their predecessor regimes: the Russian Federation (a totalitarian past); the Czech Republic (both a democratic and a totalitarian past) and the Republic of Korea (formerly an authoritarian military regime).


2021 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 281-293
Author(s):  
Jakub Hudský

The growing influence of populists on the exercise of power in many European countries made it necessary to analyze populism also in the context of its relation to law and jurisprudence. Populism as an anti-liberal structure introduces a different view on many demoliberal legal institutions, including the key concept of the rule of law. The first part of the article focuses on the concept of populism and its analysis to the extent that is justified by the chosen topic. Investigating the current scientific discourse allows the thesis that populism has a dualistic character. On the one hand, it can be seen as a set of ideas, based on specific “material” assumptions, but on the other hand, it is a specific modus operandi used to promote any ideology. The second part of the article attempts to analyze the concept of the rule of law and focuses on its goals as well as the role it plays in the structue of liberal democracy. In this context, it should be noted that the meaning of the rule of law cannot be reduced solely to the principle that not only citizens, but also authority can act only within the limits of valid and binding law. For the rule of law — by clearly delineating the boundaries of power — also creates a broader context for the functioning of the system: specific “rules of the game” which define the way and rules of its functioning. In this sense, the rule of law is a key element of liberal democracy, which, although based on the power of the poeple, constitutes procedures and mechanisms that prevent its implementation to an unlimited extent. The third part of the paper summarizes the theses indicated in previous parts. Among the basic ideological tenets of populists is the pursuit of institutional unlimited power of the people. However, such a belief is incompatible with the basic demoliberal assumption that all power and its functioning should be subject to a rigid procedural framework, the violation of which is unacceptable. would seem that the rule of law — which is, after all, the realization of those restrictions within the liberal democracy framework — will be rejected by populists in advance. However, the populists do not deny the necessity of the rule of law existing, but modify it in such a way that complies with their tenets. Populists emerge from the agonistic conviction that the rule of law in the demoliberal discourse — although presented as politicaly neutral — in fact served only the interests of the elites and the establishment. With populist views gaining real influence on power, the time comes for the rule of law to be an instrument in the hands of the people, serving only the realization of their free will in the greatest possible extent.


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