"Concerned About Nuclear Weapons Potential, John F. Kennedy Pushed for Inspection of Israel Nuclear Facilities." National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 547 http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb547-Kennedy-Dimona-and-the-Nuclear-Proliferation-Problem-1961-1962/

Author(s):  
Thomas M. Nichols

Because of their awesome destructive capability, nuclear weapons require national security policymakers to carefully evaluate how they fit within a country’s national security posture. No consensus exists as to whether the use of such weapons is in fact an option for decision makers to consider or whether the goal is to ensure that they can never be used. The different strategies that have been developed since 1945 for U.S. nuclear strategy—massive retaliation, flexible response, a fatalistic acceptance of the logic of mutually assured destruction, and the search for the most effective ways of stemming nuclear proliferation in unstable or unpredictable actors—all reflect attempts to provide guidance for policymakers as to the strategic purpose of these weapons.


2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
PACIFIC AIR FORCES HICKAM AFB HI CHECO DIV

Author(s):  
A. Fenenko

During the last twenty years Washington has used the “counter-proliferation strategy” in Korean Peninsula. The Americans demanded that North Korea eliminate its nuclear arsenals and plutonium production facilities under the watchful eye of the “five powers’ commission” or the IAEA. Pyongyang's recent military provocation may now raise the specter of the United States or even South Korea delivering non-nuclear strikes against its nuclear facilities. That would give the USA an opportunity to raise the question of whether certain regimes should be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons or even to develop nuclear fuel cycle capacity. The last crises demonstrated that under certain circumstances North Korea could also initiate a military conflict in East Asia.


1981 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 213-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
George H. Quester

Nine predictions are advanced on the impact on the international system of a successful effort to contain nuclear proliferation.The world will see a modest dilution of the prerogatives of sovereignty, very much tailored to the halting of nuclear weapons spread. Some breakthroughs will be achieved in the multinational management of nuclear industry. Current “pariah states” may escape such status, simply through the latent possibility of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapons will continue to go unused in combat, just as they have since 1945. Soviet-American cooperation on the nuclear proliferation front will continue. The traffic in conventional arms may by contrast go relatively unchecked, as most countries conclude that this kind of weapons spread is less bad than nuclear proliferation. All of this will be carried through by statements distorted by the normal deceptions of diplomacy. The world will nonetheless generally become more sophisticated in discounting any glamor or political clout in nuclear weapons programs. Most of the barrier to proliferation will come through normal political and economic exchange, rather than through any violent or military interventions.


Author(s):  
Michael C. Desch

This chapter assesses whether academic social science had any influence on nuclear strategy. Social science did have important effects on strategy. At times this was direct. More often it was indirect, working not through the formulation of doctrine or the drafting of operational plans, but rather by providing the intellectual frameworks and mental road maps that shaped senior policymakers' and presidents' thinking about the utility of nuclear weapons during confrontations with other nuclear states. Academic strategists such as Thomas Schelling reputedly exercised such influence that the period between 1945 and 1961 is regarded as the “golden age” of academic national security studies. However, scientific strategists reached a dead end by privileging internal disciplinary concerns like logical rigor and the use of sophisticated methods over addressing concrete policy problems.


Author(s):  
Ian Hurd

This chapter explores the legality of latter-day weapons—specifically, nuclear arms and lethal drones—to consider the potential for voids in the coverage of international law. When technological or other developments enable previously inconceivable kinds of warfare, states face open legal questions. Recent debates over the legality of U.S. drones illustrate this, as do earlier debates about the legality of nuclear arms. The weapons arise in a kind of legal vacuum, empty of specific regulation. Drawing on these examples, the chapter considers the power of the international rule of law in situations where there may be no law. With respect to nuclear weapons, the International Court of Justice decided that despite there being no directly applicable laws, use is nonetheless governed by international law. Rules designed for other weapons are relevant, as is a general principle that in the end, international law must defend states' rights to protect their national security as they see fit. These two sets of resources—general principles and analogies to other laws—are also important in legal debates over drones today: the lawfulness of drones as instruments of war is inferred from the legality of what are said to be analogous weapons from earlier times, and the needs of the state are internalized in legality debates through the mechanism of self-defense.


2018 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Alexander Lanoszka

This chapter introduces the main themes and arguments of the book. It argues that alliances should make problematic instruments for thwarting nuclear proliferation despite the conventional wisdom that they have been partly responsible for keeping the number of states armed with nuclear weapons low. One reason is that they are ultimately unbelievable since states can still decide to forego spending blood and treasure to rescue an ally in dire need. Another reason is that strengthening alliance ties to discourage nuclear proliferation could lead to other undesirable behaviours that might increase the chance of war. In light of this puzzle, this introductory chapter sketches the book’s main argument that alliances can be most useful for preventing potential nuclear proliferation but much less useful for curbing actual nuclear proliferation.


Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press

This chapter summarizes key findings in the proponents of the “theory of the nuclear revolution,” which contend that nuclear weapons are transformative because they greatly reduce the need for countries to engage in intense security competition. It emphasizes that although nuclear weapons are the greatest tools of deterrence ever created, they do not automatically confer national security benefits on their owners, much less guarantee enduring safety from foreign threats. The chapter looks into the unfortunate reality of international politics in the shadow of nuclear weapons, in which countries must still pay close attention to the balance of power, search for ways to change the balance when they find themselves at a disadvantage and contemplate and plan for war in order to protect vital national interests. It explains how fears that tragically drove international politics for centuries still exist and how those fears are justified. The nuclear age remains an age of power politics.


2021 ◽  
pp. 162-200
Author(s):  
Michael E. O’Hanlon

This chapter delves much deeper into three areas — nuclear weapons, space and satellites, and missile defense. It argues that these are among the subjects in military technology that are both simple enough to be accessible to the generalist, and important and enduring enough that they can be expected to remain relevant for policymakers well into the future. The chapter also discusses the significance of space and its purposes for military activities, noting the basic principles of the national security space subject are grounded in immutable principles of physics. It examines the approach used in the study which suggests a methodology for diving deeper into other key areas of defense technology. Ultimately, the chapter contends that constructing adequate defenses, stable military balances of power, and robust means of national protection is fated to be a very difficult undertaking. To put it bluntly, two opposing countries or blocs of nations with roughly comparable military capabilities are generally not inherently safe from each other.


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