U.S. Nuclear Strategy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Nichols
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Flexible Response ◽  
Massive Retaliation

Because of their awesome destructive capability, nuclear weapons require national security policymakers to carefully evaluate how they fit within a country’s national security posture. No consensus exists as to whether the use of such weapons is in fact an option for decision makers to consider or whether the goal is to ensure that they can never be used. The different strategies that have been developed since 1945 for U.S. nuclear strategy—massive retaliation, flexible response, a fatalistic acceptance of the logic of mutually assured destruction, and the search for the most effective ways of stemming nuclear proliferation in unstable or unpredictable actors—all reflect attempts to provide guidance for policymakers as to the strategic purpose of these weapons.

The Scientific Strategists Follow the Economists to an Intellectual Dead End

2019 ◽  
pp. 145-175
Author(s):  
Michael C. Desch
Keyword(s):  
Social Science ◽  
National Security ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Security Studies ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Dead End ◽  
Road Maps ◽  
Policy Problems ◽  
Thomas Schelling ◽  
Academic Social Science

This chapter assesses whether academic social science had any influence on nuclear strategy. Social science did have important effects on strategy. At times this was direct. More often it was indirect, working not through the formulation of doctrine or the drafting of operational plans, but rather by providing the intellectual frameworks and mental road maps that shaped senior policymakers' and presidents' thinking about the utility of nuclear weapons during confrontations with other nuclear states. Academic strategists such as Thomas Schelling reputedly exercised such influence that the period between 1945 and 1961 is regarded as the “golden age” of academic national security studies. However, scientific strategists reached a dead end by privileging internal disciplinary concerns like logical rigor and the use of sophisticated methods over addressing concrete policy problems.

Rational Superiority, Crises, and Arms Control, 1961–1963

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Cameron
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Rhetoric ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Test Ban

Chapter 1 describes how John F. Kennedy rose to power by articulating his own new nuclear strategy, which would use the latest advances in social and organizational sciences, combined with US superiority in nuclear weapons, to defend the United States’ national security interests. The foremost exponent of this strategy of “rational superiority” was Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. The chapter then explains how this scheme was dealt a series of blows by Kennedy’s experiences during the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, which disabused him of the idea that nuclear superiority could be used to coerce the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Kennedy administration used the rhetoric of rational superiority to advance the Limited Test Ban Treaty and was planning to employ it as part of the president’s reelection campaign in 1964. Kennedy had not reconciled this gap between his public rhetoric and personal doubts at the time of his death.

scholarly journals Perceptions and purpose of the bomb: Explaining India's nuclear restraint against China

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-42
Author(s):  
Yogesh Joshi
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
New Delhi ◽  
Indian Government ◽  
Nuclear Threat ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Nuclear Behaviour ◽  
The Third World ◽  
The Cold War

Abstract Much of the literature on India's nuclear programme assumes that China's nuclear capability drove New Delhi, the strategically weaker actor, to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. China's nuclear tests not only rendered New Delhi militarily insecure and dented its claim for the leadership of the Third World but they also polarized the domestic debate over the utility of the bomb. In the global scheme of nuclear proliferation, therefore, India was just another fallen nuclear domino. Marshalling recently declassified documents, this article revisits India's nuclear behaviour during the crucial decade between 1964 and 1974. By focusing on threat assessments made at the highest levels and internal deliberations of the Indian Government, this article shows how, contrary to the claims made in the literature, Indian decision-makers did not make much of the Chinese nuclear threat. This conviction emanated out of their distinct reading of the purpose of nuclear weapons in China's foreign and military policy; their perceptions of how India could achieve nuclear deterrence against China by using the bipolar international politics of the Cold War; and, finally, their understanding of the political costs of developing an indigenous nuclear response to China's nuclear threat. New Delhi's nuclear restraint resulted from its perceptions of Chinese nuclear intentions and its beliefs about the purpose of the bomb in Sino-Indian relations. India's perceptions of China as a nuclear adversary and its decision-makers’ views on the purpose of nuclear weapons in this rivalry were fundamentally different from the expectations set out by the domino theory of nuclear proliferation.

Nuclear Weapons in Foreign Policy

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Molly Berkemeier ◽  
Matthew Fuhrmann
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
World Politics ◽  
International Peace ◽  
Dual Use ◽  
Coercive Diplomacy ◽  
Nuclear Strategy

This essay reviews academic research on the role of nuclear weapons in foreign policy. It begins by discussing the “Theory of the Nuclear Revolution,” which holds that nuclear weapons revolutionized world politics due to their overwhelming destructive capacity. The article then identifies several ways in which this theory has been challenged in scholarship. The article focuses in particular on four big debates in the literature on nuclear weapons and foreign policy: Does nuclear proliferation promote international peace and stability? Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Do nuclear weapons make countries more assertive? How does nuclear strategy influence deterrence and security? After discussing these debates, the article concludes by calling for more research on the implications of dual-use nuclear technology for foreign policy and international security.

Conclusion

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Cameron
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
National Security ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Personal Beliefs ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Public Expectations ◽  
The Cold War

The conclusion summarizes the argument of the book as a whole, pointing to the central importance of domestic public and congressional opinion since the presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson, and through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of Richard Nixon’s administration, in the formulation of US nuclear strategy, even when such opinion diverges fundamentally from the views of the president. This forces presidents into playing a double game in their attempt to reconcile their personal beliefs on nuclear weapons with public expectations. The chapter argues that this dilemma is common across U.S. national security policymaking, but is especially acute in the case of nuclear strategy because of its extremely abstract nature. The chapter concludes by showing how the double game between presidents and their publics played out for the rest of the Cold War. It then offers a tentative prediction regarding its resurgence as the United States’ global commitments come under new pressure from Russia and China.

Conventional Forces and Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO Strategy

2019 ◽  
pp. 54-89
Author(s):  
Simon J. Moody
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The Political ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
Military Organizations ◽  
Flexible Response ◽  
Nuclear Exchange ◽  
Nuclear Warfare ◽  
Massive Retaliation ◽  
The Cold War

Chapter 2 analyses how the British deterrence habit of mind manifested in a preference for a ‘pure-deterrence’ strategy for NATO. NATO’s forums were a market for strategic ideas, and competing visions of nuclear warfare reflected the often incompatible preferences of its member states. Bargaining and compromise resulted in significant changes to defensive concepts throughout the Cold War and saw the emergence of two distinct strategies, massive retaliation and flexible response, which provided the conceptual framework for the Army’s thinking about nuclear war. The chapter explores the most important assumptions made about the character of nuclear warfare, the political and military utility of tactical nuclear weapons, and the perceived role of ground forces within NATO’s deterrent posture. It argues that the British reluctance to accept that military organizations could perform a useful function during or after a nuclear exchange set an ominous tone for the Army’s own theorizing about future war.

Introduction

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vipin Narang
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Cold War ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Proliferation ◽  
Valuable Insight ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
International Stability ◽  
Insight Into

This chapter lays out the volume's main arguments in brief. Contrary to the usual focus on superpowers and Cold War nuclear competition, the chapter proposes a different dynamic. It asks what strategies and choices certain states will make about their nuclear weapons and how those decisions about nuclear strategy can affect international relations and conflict. Examining the decisions that regional nuclear powers—such as China, India, Pakistan, Israel, France, and South Africa—have made about their arsenals thus far, and their resulting behavior, helps address these questions. Regional nuclear powers, for systematic and predictable reasons, choose clearly identifiable nuclear postures and these postures matter to a regional power's ability to deter conflict. These countries' nuclear choices, therefore, provide valuable insight into the crucial challenges of contemporary nuclear proliferation and international stability.

Grappling with Dr. Strangelove’s “Wargasm” Fantasy

2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 464-481
Author(s):  
Rodger A Payne
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
International Relations ◽  
National Security ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Sexual Fantasies ◽  
Stanley Kubrick ◽  
Security Dilemma ◽  
Nuclear Strategy ◽  
Private Correspondence

Abstract Dr. Strangelove continues to be viewed as one of the most acclaimed films of all-time. Likewise, international relations (IR) experts commonly list the film among the most essential IR-themed movies. The IR scholars who discuss Dr. Strangelove as a text or recommend it for courses generally claim that it can be used to explain nuclear deterrence, the security dilemma, mutually assured destruction, Cold War competition, and various other traditional serious concerns of the field. They also recognize that the satirical film is critical of nuclear strategy. This article considers Dr. Strangelove’s sexual subtext, involving important metaphors and symbols that IR scholars characteristically ignore. Yet, for decades, film critics and scholars from other disciplines have identified and emphasized the importance of the film's comedic “sexual framework” and concluding “wargasm.” Director Stanley Kubrick even acknowledged these key elements in private correspondence. The film suggests that the national security establishment's masculine view of the utility of nuclear weapons and deterrence are comparable to absurd male sexual fantasies. Feminist IR scholars frequently note that mainstream scholars largely ignore their critique of masculine views of the discipline and nuclear strategy. The article concludes that scholars in the field should both prioritize Dr. Strangelove’s sexual subtext and rely upon feminist contributions to help understand those elements.

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