Multi-Level Marketing as “Gig” Work: Worker Motivations, Characteristics, and Outcomes in the U.S.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-39
Author(s):  
Marguerite DeLiema ◽  
Stacie Bosley ◽  
Doug Shadel

Abstract Multi-level marketing (mlm) firms offer recruits the opportunity to earn compensation through starting their own direct selling business and often characterize mlm work as part of the “gig” economy. mlm promotes flexibility, autonomy, and income potential but data suggest that most participants fail to make money. Decisions are made under uncertainty as there is asymmetric information on potential outcomes and their respective likelihood. We use the first nationally representative survey (N = 1016) to understand the motivations for participating in mlm “gigs,” the social and financial outcomes of participation, and the correlates of those outcomes. While approximately three-fourths of mlm workers report that they joined for financial returns, a similar share reported that they did not earn any profit. Results identify a mismatch between expectations and outcomes and underscore decision biases in the context of uncertain financial rewards alongside broader gig economy regulatory concerns.

Author(s):  
Jason Schnittker

This article explores the psychological costs of incarceration, with a particular focus on how psychological factors are related to the social and economic difficulties of reentry. Using descriptive information from a nationally representative survey, this study reveals considerable anxiety, fear, and uncertainty among former inmates. The evidence also reveals that psychiatric disorders are, in some cases, even more disabling among former inmates than among others. The article situates this evidence within the larger debate on the social consequences of incarceration and discusses its implications. Psychological factors are certainly not the only barriers former inmates will face, but they are neglected in the literature and play an important role in how former inmates respond to other difficulties. They are also at the center of a persistent dilemma: former inmates must establish social connections upon release, but they must do so while harboring the stigma of a criminal record. Furthermore, former inmates who have a psychiatric disorder may be particularly disadvantaged because they experience two stigmas simultaneously.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 237802312110529
Author(s):  
Samuel L. Perry ◽  
Kenneth E. Frantz ◽  
Joshua B. Grubbs

Although decades old, the terms “anti-racism/antiracism” and “anti-racist/antiracist” have grown in usage by scholars, authors, and activists to convey the necessity of active opposition to racial injustice. But as the terms have become more mainstream, researchers have yet to examine the social and ideological correlates of actually describing oneself as “anti-racist.” Drawing on nationally representative survey data fielded at the height of national interest in “antiracist/anti-racist” language, the authors find that Blacks and Hispanics are significantly less likely than whites to describe themselves as “anti-racist,” and only the “very liberal” are more likely than other political orientations to identify with the label. Considering ideological correlates, progressive racial ideology is the strongest predictor of identifying as “anti-racist.” However, the second strongest correlate is describing oneself as “color-blind.” Analyses of quadratic terms suggests that this correlation is curvilinear for nonwhites but more linear for whites. Although originally conveying more radical and subversive ideals, those currently most likely to self-describe as “anti-racist” are white progressives with what we call “generically liberal” racial views.


Author(s):  
Anthony Leiserowitz ◽  
Edward Maibach ◽  
Seth A. Rosenthal ◽  
John Kotcher ◽  
Parrish Bergquist ◽  
...  

This report is based on findings from a nationally representative survey – Climate Change in the American Mind – conducted by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication (climatecommunication.yale.edu) and the George Mason University Center for Climate Change Communication (climatechangecommunication.org). Interview dates: March 29-April 8, 2019. Interviews: 1,291 adults in the U.S. (18+).


2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (5) ◽  
pp. 771-792 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachel L. Neo

Research on bandwagon effects suggests that people will yield to aggregate online rating scores even when forming evaluations of contentious content. However, such findings derive mainly from studying partisan news selection behaviors, and therefore, are incomplete. How do people use ratings to evaluate whether factual corrections on contentious issues are trustworthy? Through what I term the social affirmation heuristic, I hypothesize, people will first assess rating scores for compatibility with their own beliefs; and then they will invest trust only in ratings of factual messages that affirm their beliefs, while distrusting ratings that disaffirm them. I further predict that distrusted ratings will elicit boomerang effects, causing evaluations of message trustworthiness to conflict with rating scores. I use an online experiment ( n = 157) and a nationally representative survey experiment ( N = 500) to test these ideas. All hypotheses received clear support. Implications of the findings are discussed.


Author(s):  
James L. Gibson ◽  
Michael J. Nelson

Positivity Theory suggests that increased exposure to the symbols of judicial authority stimulates positive associations within individuals that help courts build and maintain their legitimacy. Indeed, recent research suggests that exposure to the symbols of judicial authority negates the linkage between decisional disappointment and changes in judgments of institutional legitimacy. However, this research has been conducted on predominantly white samples and fails to account for the possibility that individuals’ group attachments and experiences with legal authorities might affect the extent to which they update their diffuse support for a court in response to a displeasing decision. We therefore examine changes in legitimacy, relying on a nationally-representative survey experiment. The results indicate that respondents are particularly likely to withdraw support from the Court under the condition of seeing the symbols of judicial authority if they have negative personal experiences with the police, and if they are both particularly disappointed in the decision and do not have any strong group attachments.


2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (5) ◽  
pp. 866-888 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Hartmann ◽  
Paul R. Croll ◽  
Ryan Larson ◽  
Joseph Gerteis ◽  
Alex Manning

Colorblindness is often conceptualized as a set of deeply held but unrecognized ideological tenets. However, we believe that colorblindness has also now become an explicit cultural discourse involving self-conscious claims and specific convictions. To illustrate this point—which has both conceptual and empirical implications—we introduce the notion of colorblindness as identity. We define this concept as subjectively meaningful, self-asserted identification with colorblindness. We use data from a nationally representative survey to explore the social determinants of colorblind identification and assess its relationship to both colorblind ideologies and standard attitudinal measures. We find that a relatively large percentage of Americans across racial lines identify as colorblind. Furthermore, such identification is connected to racial ideologies but not all tenets of colorblind racism. For white Americans, colorblind identification is associated with decreased perceptions of social distance, but not support for policies designed to ameliorate the effects of racial discrimination. We conclude that colorblind identification is a unique social phenomenon, connected to views on race but not always in the ways that existing research would predict. We also suggest directions for further exploration of the depth of colorblindness as an identity form and implications for theorizing colorblind discourse more generally.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam van Noort

Existing research suggests that too few American voters hold politicians electorally accountable for overt undemocratic behavior to reasonably deter democratic backsliding. Evidence for this proposition comes primarily from hypothetical survey experiments with relatively modest treatments. I test this hypothesis using a natural experiment with a powerful real-world treatment: Donald Trump's incitement of the insurrection of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. The insurrection was unexpected to the general public, did not coincide with other events that could plausibly affect public opinion, and occurred while Gallup was conducting a nationally representative survey using random digit dialing. Comparing Republican Party support among respondents that were interviewed just before, and just after, the insurrection occurred suggests that the insurrection caused a 10.8% decline in support for the Republican Party. Voters predominantly moved to the Democratic Party, rather than Independent. Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggests that this electoral penalty is sufficient to decide presidential elections.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sam van Noort

Existing research suggests that overt undemocratic behavior by elected officials is insufficiently punished by American voters to electorally discourage democratic backsliding. Evidence for this proposition comes primarily from hypothetical survey experiments with relatively weak treatments. I test this hypothesis using a natural experiment with a powerful treatment: Donald Trump's incitement of the insurrection of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. The insurrection was unexpected to the general public, did not coincide with other events that could plausibly affect public opinion, and occurred while Gallup was conducting a nationally representative survey using random digit dialing. Comparing vote choice intention among respondents that were interviewed just before, and just after, the insurrection occurred suggests that the insurrection caused a 10.8% decline in support for the Republican Party, and an 8.4% increase in support for the Democratic Party. Politicians interested in winning elections have strong incentives to avoid insurrection-like events from occurring.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Goldberg ◽  
Sander van der Linden ◽  
Anthony Leiserowitz ◽  
Edward Maibach

It is well established that conservatives in the U.S. are substantially less likely than liberals to accept that climate change is happening and human-caused and are less supportive of policies to limit climate change. However, it is likely that ideological differences in climate change beliefs, attitudes, and policy preferences are smaller when people have close friends and family members who care about climate change. Here we use nine nationally representative survey samples (total N = 16,168) to evaluate this claim and test if perceived social consensus predicts a smaller difference in climate change beliefs between liberals and conservatives. We find that social consensus plays an important role in climate change beliefs, attitudes, and policy preferences for people across the ideological spectrum, but especially among conservatives. These findings provide important insights on how to bridge ideological divides in large social dilemmas such as climate change.


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