National Forces in State Legislative Elections

Author(s):  
Steven Rogers

The race for the White House is at the top of the ticket, but voters will also choose more than 5,000 state legislators in November 2016. While voters elect and hold the president responsible for one job and state legislators for another, the outcomes of their elections are remarkably related. In analyses of elite and voter behavior in state legislative elections, I show that legislators affiliated with the president’s party—especially during unpopular presidencies—are the most likely to be challenged, and compared with individual assessments of the state legislature, changes in presidential approval have at least three times the impact on voters’ decision-making in state legislative elections. Thus, while state legislatures wield considerable policymaking power, legislators’ electoral fates appear to be largely out of their control.

2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (04) ◽  
pp. 643-648 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Klarner

This article offers forecasts made on July 22, 2010, for the 2010 state legislative elections. Most work in the election forecasting field has been done on presidential and U.S. House elections. Less has been done for U.S. Senate elections, and almost none for gubernatorial or state legislative elections. This year will see much attention directed at the 43 state legislatures holding elections, because many will have the responsibility for drawing new district lines based on the 2010 census. Furthermore, of those chambers with elections scheduled in 2010, seven currently contain one party with less than a 5% margin of control. With so much at stake, these will clearly be contests to watch.


1994 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 171-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Gierzynski ◽  
David A. Breaux

The purpose of the analysis presented in this paper is to examine the role that party organizations play in campaign finance systems of state legislative elections. Party organizations are found to be more likely to fund candidates in competitive elections and more likely to fund challengers than are nonparty organizations. The impact of an increased role for party organizations in campaign finance systems is illustrated by simulating the distribution of campaign money and the results of state legislative elections under different scenarios of party funding.


1986 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
James E. Campbell

The president's party consistently loses partisan control of state legislatures in midterm elections, a pattern similar to the loss of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives in midterms. This study examines presidential coattails as a possible explanation of these losses. Aggregate state legislative election outcomes between 1944 and 1984 in 41 states are examined. The analysis indicates that the president's party gains seats in presidential elections in proportion to the presidential vote in a state, and subsequently loses seats in midterm elections also in proportion to the prior presidential vote in the state. The presidential coattail and the midterm repercussion effects are evident even when gubernatorial coattail effects are introduced, but are fairly modest in states lacking competitive parties.


1986 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 65-78 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Grofman ◽  
Michael Migalski ◽  
Nicholas Noviello

We look at the most general feature of multimember districts (MMDs) as compared to single-member districting (SMD) plans: the higher likelihood of submergence of minority voting strength. We focus on data on black legislative representation between 1977 and 1982 in the 11 states with more than 15% black populations, and compare states which use MMDs with those that use SMDs. We also examine changes in black representation in states which shifted from MMDs to SMDs. In addition, for MMD state legislative elections in eight North Carolina counties between 1978 and 1982, we examine in detail the nature of minority submergence including the lack of geographic representativity of the persons elected from MMDs. The counties we examine contain four of North Carolina's largest cities and a substantial portion of North Carolina's black population. Unlike almost all of the previously published literature on racial representation in MMDs, our study deals with state legislative races and not local elections.


2002 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 176-178 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graham P. Ramsden

Over the last 10 years, a great deal of research has been conducted in what had been a neglected field—state legislative campaign finance. Much of this research is motivated by concerns about the impact of money on democracy in state legislative elections. This essay reviews that work critically, looking particularly at studies of spending levels, campaign contributions and fundraising, spending and voting, and campaign finance reform. Comparing campaign finance systems across the states facilitates theory building, provides empirical leverage with which to test hypotheses developed at the congressional level, and allows us to test the efficacy of campaign finance reforms.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Carsey ◽  
Jonathan Winburn ◽  
William D. Berry

Legislators might rely on their partisan base for electoral support—what scholars call their normal vote—or they may cultivate support among nonpartisans through casework or constituency service—what scholars call a personal vote. Previous research frequently argues that legislators face a tradeoff between pursuing the normal vote and a personal vote as traditionally defined, often focusing on resources used by incumbents to build their personal vote. In contrast, we argue that securing the support of partisans and nonpartisans alike should be evaluated based on how a legislator performs in office, and that the so-called normal and personal vote need not be viewed as in conflict. We evaluate our claims using data from state legislative elections following redistricting, focusing on legislative professionalism to measure the resources available to incumbents that they might use to cultivate a personal note.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (005r1) ◽  
pp. 1-52
Author(s):  
Joonkyu Choi ◽  
◽  
Veronika Penciakova ◽  
Felipe Saffie ◽  
◽  
...  

Using American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) data, we show that firms lever their political connections to win stimulus grants and that public expenditure channeled through politically connected firms hinders job creation. We build a unique database that links information on campaign contributions, state legislative elections, firm characteristics, and ARRA grant allocation. Using exogenous variation in political connections based on ex-post close elections held before ARRA, we causally show that politically connected firms are 38 percent more likely to secure a grant. Based on an instrumental variable approach, we also establish that a one standard deviation increase in the share of politically connected ARRA spending lowers the number of jobs created per $1 million spent by 7.1 jobs. Therefore, the impact of fiscal stimulus is not only determined by how much is spent, but also by how the expenditure is allocated across recipients.


2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 460-464
Author(s):  
Jordan Butcher ◽  
Jeffrey Milyo

Variations in state campaign finance regulations across states and over time provide an opportunity to test the effects of reforms on the electoral success of incumbent state legislators. We use the most recent state legislative election returns dataset to test whether state campaign finance reforms help or hinder incumbents. Our analysis of nearly 66,000 contests in 33 years reveals that campaign contribution limits and partial public financing have little impact on incumbent reelection prospects. However, full public financing and prohibitions on corporate independent expenditures significantly increase the probability of incumbent reelection.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document