The Working of Cooperative and Collaborative Federalism in India: Understanding Intergovernmental Relations

2021 ◽  
Vol 67 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-164
Author(s):  
Rekha Saxena

A federal constitution is based on at least two levels of governments— federal/union and provincial/state—which are generally constitutionally assigned exclusive as well as concurrent dominions, in addition to the residual powers. Consequently, union–state coordination is indispensable to negotiate and devise joint policies in field of shared jurisdictions. Moreover, such coordination is also essential for exclusive jurisdiction apparently because in the eras of ‘cooperative federalism’ and ‘collaborative federalism’, the federal government frequently utilises its usually bigger revenues to introduce centrally sponsored schemes of development and social policies with approval of state governments. These schemes may be entirely or partially financed by the union and executed by the states. Besides, residual powers or new policy areas that may emerge also need union–state cooperation, even though they are judicially adjudicated to go to any of the two levels of government. In an era of intergovernmental and global interdependence, functional link of governance may require cooperative action by different levels of governments besides the civil society organisations.

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3.30) ◽  
pp. 163
Author(s):  
Rasyikah Md Khalid ◽  
. .

Federalism refers to an agreement between several states which agree to be united as a nation state but with shared administrative responsibility. Under the dual federalism theory, the federal and the state governments are co-equals with specific powers granted by the constitution. In contrast, cooperative federalism denotes that although the federal government is supreme over the states, both acts cooperatively to solve common problem. Malaysia practices dual federalism as legislative powers of the federal and state governments are separated in the Federal Constitution. Rather than fostering cooperation, dual federalism in Malaysia has created tension between different levels of governments in the water sector as highlighted in the Selangor water woes. This paper evaluates issues arising in the Malaysian water sector from the federalism perspectives. Towards this end, doctrinal analysis on relevant laws and commentaries are made to appreciate the meaning of federalism and different approaches towards federalism. The paper concludes that different approaches towards federal-state relation can assist in improving the water sector and solve water conflict between different levels of governments in Malaysia.   


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-25
Author(s):  
Anne Kallies

Abstract The law and regulation of the energy sector in Australia is subject to overlapping responsibilities of both federal and state governments. Crucially for energy transition efforts, neither energy, environment nor climate is mentioned in the Australian Constitution. Australia has a tradition of creative cooperative federalism solutions for responding to problems of national importance. In the energy sector this has resulted in an intricate national framework for energy markets, which relies on mirror legislation passed by participating states, with oversight by state and federal executive governments. Independently of these frameworks, both federal and state governments have passed climate change legislation, which crucially includes renewable energy support mechanisms. At a time when a rapid transition to a decarbonized energy system is essential, legal frameworks struggle to respond in a timely fashion. The political discourse around energy has become increasingly toxic – reflecting a dysfunctional state–federal relationship in energy and climate law. Australia needs to consider whether its cooperative federalism solutions are sufficient to support the energy transition and how climate law at the state and federal levels interacts with energy market legal frameworks.


2005 ◽  
Vol 6 (10) ◽  
pp. 1283-1295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur B. Gunlicks

In both the United States and Germany constitutional lawyers, politicians, and the attentive public speak of “dual federalism.” In the United States this means that the federal government and the states have separate political and administrative responsibilities and their own sources of revenues. In Germany, in contrast, dual federalism means that the federal government, i.e., the executive and legislative branches, are responsible for most legislation, and that the Länder (states; singular, Land) generally administer the laws (in large part through their local governments) on their own responsibility. In both federal systems “dual federalism” has been undermined if not replaced by “cooperative federalism,” generally associated with the New Deal era in the United States and the Finance Reform of 1969 in Germany. In the meantime “intergovernmental relations” has more or less replaced the concept of “cooperative federalism” in the United States, while Politikverflechtung (political/policy interconnection and coordination) is perhaps the more commonly used term in Germany today. In both cases the new terms reflect an interrelationship among federal, regional, and local levels that goes beyond mere cooperation.


1987 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-135
Author(s):  
P Self

In 1984 the Hawke Government appointed a National Inquiry to review the federal revenue-sharing grants for local government introduced eight years previously, and to propose desirable aims and a basis for future federal support. Australian local government is on a small scale and closely under the control of state governments; federal support raises complex issues of intergovernmental relations. In this paper, the wide-ranging Report of Inquiry, and its political outcome, are related to basic issues about federal-state relations and the rationale and extent of federal interventions. In particular, the Australian experience is interesting for its attempts at combining vertical redistribution of revenue with ambitious and detailed equalisation policies, financed at federal level but administered by independent state agencies.


Author(s):  
Silk Ogbu ◽  
Fred Ezeh

The study examined the influence of inter-governmental relations, specifically, in terms of relations between the federal and state governments on road maintenance in Nigeria. The motivation for the study was the deplorable condition of several Nigerian roads which has been largely attributed to role conflicts between the two tiers of government. The influence of three types of inter-governmental relation (Partnership, Principal/Agent and Dual Functionalism models) on road maintenance was examined. The study conveniently drew its sample from staffs of federal and state ministry of works as well as staffs of the Federal Road Maintenance Agency (FERMA) in Enugu State. Data were collected using a five-point Likert scale questionnaire. The reliability of the instrument was ascertained by means of Cronbach Alpha which gave a coefficient of 72 percent. The data obtained were analyzed using frequency, percentages and multiple linear regression analysis. The findings revealed that the partnership model and functional dualism model of intergovernmental relations significantly influence road maintenance in Nigeria. It was recommended that all levels of government should strive to adopt the partnership or functional dualism model of intergovernmental relations. This would enable them to cooperate rather than compete, knowing that they are all partners in national progress.


ICR Journal ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-241
Author(s):  
Apnizan Abdullah ◽  
Mohamed Azam Mohamed Adil

Generally, halal matters in Malaysia are governed by piece-meal legislation, inter alia, the Trade Descriptions Act (TDA) 2011 and its by-laws, the Food Act 1983, Food Regulations 1985, state-issued fatwas, and the rules and guidelines promulgated by relevant authorities, whether under the federal or state governments. Consequently, as prescribed by the law, halal matters are assigned to various different entities. For instance, the Ministry of Domestic Trades, Cooperatives and Consumerism (KPDNHEP) supervises halal trade practices. Both the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM) and Islamic Religious Councils (IRCs) of the states take charge of the halal certification portfolio. The Halal Industry Development Corporation (HDC) handles services related to the internationalisation of halal products, whereas the Department of Standards Malaysia (DOSM) issues and revises time-relevant halal standards. This situation, however, may lead to the overlapping of mandates and confusion among industry players as to whether halal matters fall under the federal or state governments as prescribed in List II of the Malaysian Federal Constitution. Since Malaysia is at the global forefront of promoting the halal agenda, the Malaysian government must call for the centralisation of its regulatory framework to provide better supervision and harmonise practices in the industry. Hence, this paper discusses and deliberates on the legal and regulatory outlook of the country for the purpose of centralising halal matters under the federal government of Malaysia.


Author(s):  
Nicholas Davies

Examina procedimentos do Tribunal de Contas (TC) de Mato Grosso para a contabilização da receita e despesa vinculada à Manutenção e Desenvolvimento do Ensino (MDE), pesquisa que pretende abranger todos os Tribunais de Contas do Brasil. Embora a documentação consultada não seja suficientemente detalhada, foi possível constatar equívocos e oscilação nas interpretações do TC. Por exemplo, num ano o TC considerou o percentual mínimo dos impostos (35%) fixados pela Constituição estadual, porém em outros se baseou, sem nenhuma justificativa, nos 25% da Constituição federal. Outro equívoco foi incluir na base de cálculo do percentual mínimo receitas que são adicionais a este mínimo, como os convênios e salário-educação. O surpreendente foi constatar a aceitação pelo TC, desde 2004, a partir de consulta formulada pela Secretaria Estadual de Fazenda, de que o imposto de renda dos servidores estaduais e municipais não seria classificado como imposto e, portanto, não entraria na base de cálculo dos impostos. Na classificação das despesas em MDE, o TC não teve uma interpretação uniforme sobre o pagamento dos inativos com o percentual mínimo, ora aceitando-o, ora rejeitando-o. Na questão das renúncias fiscais, que correspondem a centenas de milhões de reais por ano, o governo estadual e o TC não cumpriram a Constituição estadual, pois elas não podem ser subtraídas do montante sobre o qual incide o percentual mínimo vinculado à educação. Outro equívoco do TC foi contabilizar restos a pagar que sejam pagos no exercício. É um equívoco, porque tais despesas pertencem a exercícios anteriores, mesmo porque suas fontes também a eles pertencem. Em síntese, em conseqüência destes procedimentos equivocados dos governos estaduais e provavelmente dos municipais e sua aceitação pelo TC, é possível estimar em centenas de milhões de reais o prejuízo anual para a educação pública estadual e municipal do Estado de Mato Grosso. Palavras-chave: financiamento da educação; orçamento da educação; Tribunais de Contas; Mato Grosso. Abstract The article examines procedures adopted by the Audit Office of the Brazilian State of Mato Grosso to calculate revenue and expenditures linked to the maintenance and development of education (MDE) and is part of a research intending to cover all the Audit Offices in Brazil. Although the documentation consulted was not sufficiently detailed, it was possible to find mistakes and oscillation in the interpretations by Audit Office. For example, in one year, the Office took into account the minimum percentage of 35% of taxes set by the State Constitution, but in other years, with no justification, it considered the percentage of 25% stipulated in the Federal Constitution. A further mistake was to include in the minimum percentage revenues that are an addition to the above said minimum. It was surprising to find that the Office has accepted since 2004, after a consultation by the State Treasury Secretariat, that the income tax paid by state and municipal civil servants would not be classified as tax and would not, therefore, be included in the calculation of the percentage linked to education. In the classification of expenditures in MDE, the Office has not adopted a uniform interpretation about the payment of retired education personnel using the funds linked to education (the minimum percentage). In the issue of tax incentives reducing the funds to education and amounting to hundreds of millions of Brazilian reais per year, the State government and the Audit Office have not complied with the State Constitution, for the incentives may not be disregarded in the calculation of funds linked to education. Finally, as a result of these mistaken procedures adopted by state governments and probably by municipal administrations and their acceptance by the Audit Office, it is possible to estimate that the state and municipal education in Mato Grosso lose hundreds of millions of Brazilian reais every year. Keywords: education funding; education budget; Audit Offices; the Brazilian State of Mato Grosso.


Subject Controversy over the 15th Finance Commission. Significance Finance ministers of three southern states met last month to discuss grievances over the central government’s 15th Finance Commission, which defines revenue redistribution across the federal union. Prime Minister Narendra Modi champions the notion of ‘cooperative federalism’, with central and state governments to share responsibility for economic development. As the 2019 general election approaches, political opponents of Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are contemplating the formation of a ‘Federal Front’. Impacts The BJP will step up efforts to undermine Karnataka’s new Janata Dal (Secular)-Congress ruling coalition. While Congress may join a Federal Front, other parties will resist its attempts to assert leadership of the alliance. Modi will prioritise personal campaigning in southern India ahead of the 2019 election, hoping to win over critics.


2008 ◽  
pp. 146-150
Author(s):  
Graham Sansom

"Vice-chancellors have a responsibility to get down and say that we're prepared to reform the sector in the following sensible and constructive ways … rather than going back in a traditional way and saying, 'Give us more money and leave us alone'. We will get nothing simply by asking for more money.”The Australian Labor Party went to the 2007 election promising a new era of cooperative federalism that would end the ‘blame game’ between federal and state governments and re-energise reform and productivity agendas. On the evidence of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) meeting on 26 March 2008, these agendas are advancing rapidly. The communiqué foreshadowed a raft of new commonwealth-state agreements, streamlined arrangements for special purpose grants and, perhaps most significantly, performance criteria for payment of at least some of those grants.2


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