Joint Military Exercises and Crisis Dynamics on the Korean Peninsula

2020 ◽  
pp. 002200272097218
Author(s):  
Jordan Bernhardt ◽  
Lauren Sukin

A number of proposals for reducing tensions with North Korea have discussed alterations to the program of joint military exercises (JMEs) that South Korea holds. North Korea has also repeatedly called for a reduction or secession of JMEs. Would limiting or halting JMEs be a useful concession for securing a reduction of tensions on the peninsula? We argue that JMEs do not deter North Korea but, instead, provoke provocative rhetoric and actions, demonstrating that North Korea views JMEs as a serious threat to its security. In this paper, we establish a relationship between JMEs and North Korea’s actions. In response to a JME, North Korea can issue warnings or threats as well as take costly signals such as conducting missile or nuclear tests. Using new data on JMEs and North Korean behavior, we find that North Korea systematically responds with aggression to South Korean JMEs. Moreover, we find that the intensity of North Korea’s responses to JMEs is driven by the severity of the threat particular exercises pose, indicating that North Korea responds to JMEs as serious security threats.

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vito D'Orazio

Since 1976, the militaries of the United States and South Korea have been holding routine joint military exercises (JMEs) for the purposes of military training and deterrence against North Korea. These exercises are frequently cited as a cause of tension on the peninsula, causing North Korea to escalate its conflictual rhetoric and behavior. I empirically assess this claim using new data on US-ROK JMEs and machine-coded event data collected by the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System. The findings show that North Korea does not systematically escalate its conflictual rhetoric or behavior during or near the occurrence of JMEs. The results hold for both low- and high-intensity exercises and for rhetoric that has the United States and South Korea as its target.


Zootaxa ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 4282 (1) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
DÁVID MURÁNYI ◽  
JEONG MI HWANG

Two new species of Korean needleflies, Perlomyia koreana sp. n. and P. lamellata sp. n. are described from North and South Korea. Additionally, two species, Paraleuctra paramalaisei sp. n. and Perlomyia baei sp. n. are described from South Korea. The previously unknown male of Perlomyia martynovi (Zhiltzova, 1975) is described from South Korean specimens associated with females. Leuctra fusca tergostyla Wu, 1973 comb. n. is proposed for the Far Eastern populations of the Eurosiberian L. fusca (Linnaeus, 1758). Three Leuctridae genera and species are reported from North Korea for the first time and three species are new country records for South Korea. The number of stonefly species known from the Korean Peninsula is increased to 82. A key is presented for the Leuctridae species known from Korean Peninsula including taxa that are expected to occur. Distributional maps are presented and additional notes on the habitats of Korean Leuctridae are given. 


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Hough ◽  
Markus Bell

This article draws on the public testimonies of North Koreans living in South Korea (t’albungmin) and analyzes the role that these narratives play in South Korean society as mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. North and South Korea technically remain at war, with South Korea claiming sovereignty over the entire Korean peninsula. While t’albungmin are eligible for South Korean citizenship, they describe feeling excluded from full social membership. Although some t’albungmin seek anonymity, this paper considers those who gain social status by speaking publicly about their lives and denouncing the North Korean regime. In so doing, they distance themselves from North Korea and align themselves with the “good” discourse of human rights. However, their actions reinforce a logic of exclusion, implying that t’albungmin who prefer anonymity are “sympathizers,” and consequently restricting their access to social benefits and resources. This case of conditional inclusion illuminates tensions that arise when a sovereignty claim entails the incorporation of people from an enemy state. It also highlights the carefully delineated boundaries of publicly acceptable behavior within which “suspect” citizens must remain as a condition for positive recognition.


Author(s):  
Jude Woodward

This chapter looks at South Korea’s response to the US ‘pivot’. It takes stock of the post-war division of the peninsula and its consequences for the international alignment of both North and South. It considers how the ‘economic miracle’ in South Korea led to growing competition with Japan and greater synergies with China. It looks at the degree to which North Korea threatens stability in the region, and to what extent its demonisation justifies a major US presence in close proximity to China. The chapter discusses whether resurgent China is seen as a threat to South Korean interests or chiefly viewed through the prism of mutual economic benefit; and contrasts alleged concerns about China with those provoked by Japan. It concludes that while South Korea has continued to step up its military collaboration with the US, it has not become a cheerleader for pushing back against China and has not signed up to a US strategy to contain China.


2017 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-184
Author(s):  
ShinHyung Seong

Peace matters in various ways in this globalized world, and the Korean Peninsula has been a critical situation in this matter, especially in the current climate. This article delves into Rev. Ik-whan Moon, a leader of the reunification movement, in South Korea in order to deal with the issue of peace. This article examines him in three parts: the enjoyable tenets of his life and social action, the theological meaning of his activism, and the new horizon of social activism through his new vision of the Kingdom of God. Rev. Moon began his social action at 59, but he dedicated his life to society as he wrote many poems, playing a part in the Korean reunification movement. His activism is based on his theology of the oppressed ( min-joong) and the Kingdom of God. Lastly, he created a historical momentum for the Korean reunification movement by visiting North Korea in 1989, in that he opened a new hope that South Korean civilians and North Korean civilians could meet each other. It was a non-obedience movement because no civilians could visit North Korea due to the National Security Law. Rev. Moon's actions towards Korean reunification give us great wisdom for peace in this contemporary violent world.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 411-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joonbum Bae

Abstract Can positive domestic messages generated by a foreign policy of engagement toward another country change public views regarding that state? How resistant are such changes to events that contradict the positive messages? I argue that while positive government messages about an adversary can significantly improve public opinion, highly consequential foreign policy events that contradict the messages influence public opinion at the cost of elites’ ability to shape it through their messages. Such differing effects can lead to a polarization of opinion when the content of the messages and the nature of events diverge from each other. Leveraging the unpredictability of North Korea’s foreign policy behavior, the South Korean government’s sustained policy of engagement toward it during the years 1998–2007, and North Korea’s first two nuclear tests to examine the relative impact of consequential foreign policy events and elite messages on public opinion, I find strong evidence consistent with this argument.


2017 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 433-457
Author(s):  
Jinhee Park

Abstract This article examines autobiographic documentaries about families that expose “dissensus” in the mapping of transborder migration and diasporic desire that were the results of the Cold War in North Korea, South Korea, and Japan. Jae-hee Hong (dir. My Father’s Emails) and Yong-hi Yang (dir. Dear Pyongyang and Goodbye Pyongyang) document the ongoing Cold War in their fathers’ histories through their position as a “familial other,” who embodies both dissensus and intimacy. Hong reveals that anticommunism in South Korean postwar nation building reverberated in the private realm. Yang documents her Zainichi father, who sent his sons to North Korea during the Repatriation Campaign in Japan. The anticommunist father in South Korea (Hong’s) and the communist father in Japan (Yang’s) engendered family migration with contrasting motivations, departure from and return to North Korea, respectively. Juxtaposing these two opposite ideologies in family histories, as well as juxtaposing the filmmakers’ dissonance with the given ideologies in domestic space, provide the aesthetic form for “dissensus.” The politics of aesthetics in domestic ethnography manifests in that the self and the Other are inextricably interlocked because of the reciprocity of the filmmaker and the communist or anticommunist subject.


Significance The message was conveyed by a South Korean delegation in Washington, briefing Trump on its talks earlier this week in Pyongyang. North Korea had said, the delegation reported, that it is “committed to denuclearisation” if regime security is not at risk. This follows months of escalating friction between North Korea and the international community that has seen Pyongyang ramp up its intercontinental missile and nuclear testing. Impacts The risk of confrontation on the Korean Peninsula could be reduced while talks are being prepared. Trump may relax his hawkish trade policy in the interim, to avoid alienating partners he needs in managing Pyongyang, including Beijing. A successful Trump-Kim meeting could gain South Korea’s president political benefits. If significant moves towards denuclearisation did occur, Trump’s administration might revise its pro-nuclear defence strategy. Any sanctions relief could be politically beneficial to the Pyongyang regime, but too much opening up could undermine it.


Subject Politics in South Korea. Significance President Moon Jae-in has hailed the second summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump due to be held in Hanoi on February 27-28 as a “remarkable breakthrough” for peace on the Korean peninsula. Moon hopes the meeting will lead to an easing of sanctions on Pyongyang, enabling inter-Korean cooperation such as the relinking of roads and railways to progress, and that this will boost his waning popularity. Impacts US pressure on Seoul to pay more for US troops in South Korea may stoke anti-US sentiment. Rising tensions with Japan will ultimately cause problems for both countries, and their currently indifferent US ally. Pinning hopes on the unpredictable Kim and Trump is risky; failure with North Korea would galvanise the conservatives.


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