Nuclear weapons and limited war

1961 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 146-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morton H. Halperin
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Limited War

Nuclear Weapons and International Conflict: Theories and Empirical Evidence

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel S. Geller
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Nuclear Deterrence ◽  
Deterrence Theory ◽  
Limited War ◽  
Cumulative Knowledge ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Conflict Interaction

The balance of conventional military capabilities is intrinsic to understanding patterns of war among nations. However, cumulative knowledge relating to the effects of nuclear weapons possession on conflict interaction is largely absent. Framework is provided for analyzing the results of quantitative empirical research on this question and to identify any extant strong and consistent patterns in the interactions of states that can be associated with the possession of nuclear weapons. Since 1945, a vast, sophisticated, and contradictory literature has developed on the implications of nuclear weaponry for patterns of international conflict and war. This theoretical and empirical work has principally focused on the conflict effects of these weapons for the interaction of nuclear-armed states, although a growing number of studies have explored the impact of a state’s possession of nuclear weapons on the behavior of nonnuclear opponents. Given the destructive capacity of these weapons and their questionable value for battlefield use, most of this work has concentrated on the requirements for successful deterrence. In categorizing the studies, some scholars note that “classical deterrence theory” derives from the Realist paradigm of international politics and subdivide this theory into two complementary strands: structural (or neorealist) deterrence theory and decision-theoretic deterrence theory. In contrast, other analysts choose to classify work on nuclear deterrence into three schools of thought: nuclear irrelevance; risk manipulation, escalation, and limited war; and the nuclear revolution. The essence of these divisions involves a debate about what the possession of nuclear weapons does for a state that controls them. Does the possession of these weapons affect the behavior of nuclear and nonnuclear opponents in disputes over contested values? Do the weapons impart political influence and hold military utility, or are they useless as tools for deterrence, compellence, or war?

Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia

2008 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Paul Kapur
Keyword(s):  
South Asia ◽  
South Asian ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Regional Security ◽  
Security Environment ◽  
Limited War ◽  
Asian Security ◽  
Nuclear Tests ◽  
To Come

The tenth anniversary of India's and Pakistan's 1998 nuclear tests enables scholars to revisit the issue of South Asian proliferation with a decade of hindsight. What lessons do the intervening years hold regarding nuclear weapons' impact on South Asian security? Some scholars claim that nuclear weapons had a beneficial effect during this period, helping to stabilize historically volatile Indo-Pakistani relations. Such optimistic analyses of proliferation's regional security impact are mistaken, however. Nuclear weapons have had two destabilizing effects on the South Asian security environment. First, nuclear weapons' ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation, and to attract international attention to Pakistan's dispute with India, encouraged aggressive Pakistani behavior. This, in turn, provoked forceful Indian responses, ranging from large-scale mobilization to limited war. Although the resulting Indo-Pakistani crises did not lead to nuclear or full-scale conventional conflict, such fortunate outcomes were not guaranteed and did not result primarily from nuclear deterrence. Second, these Indo-Pakistani crises led India to adopt a more aggressive conventional military posture toward Pakistan. This development could exacerbate regional security-dilemma dynamics and increase the likelihood of Indo-Pakistani conflict in years to come. Thus nuclear weapons not only destabilized South Asia in the first decade after the nuclear tests; they may damage the regional security environment well into the future.

scholarly journals Preparing for the Future War: India and Pakistan's Changing Military Doctrines

2020 ◽  
Vol V (III) ◽  
pp. 51-59
Author(s):  
Ashfaque Ali Banbhan ◽  
Hussain Abbas ◽  
Farooque Ahmed Leghari
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Military Doctrine ◽  
Limited War ◽  
The Future ◽  
Future War ◽  
To Come ◽  
The Military

India and Pakistan have been changing their military doctrines at a faster pace. Indians had been since long focused on the policy of preparing them to fight a full-fledged conventional war against Pakistan. It was the nuclearization of Pakistan that forced them to bring change into Indian military doctrine and focus on a limited war than a full-fledged one. This Indian military tilt pressurized Pakistan to fill the gap at the tactical by introducing low yield nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Furthermore, Indians being restricted to initiate limited war against Pakistan opted for the options of surgical strike and, when failed to gain the desired efforts against Pakistan, opted for airstrikes in 2019, which resulted in a severe crisis. There is still a lot to come in future and bring further changes into the military doctrines of the two countries. This qualitative research gives a detailed discussion on the changing military doctrine of India and Pakistan, adding the views of expert informants.

scholarly journals Pakistan's Low Yield Nuclear Weapons and Indian Option of Limited War

2020 ◽  
Vol V (I) ◽  
pp. 342-351
Author(s):  
Farooq Ahmed Leghari ◽  
Irfan Hasnain Qaisrani ◽  
Shaukat
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Cold Start ◽  
Limited War ◽  
The Face

Since the publication of the Cold Start Doctrine by India in 2004, India had been preparing for launching a limited war against Pakistan. In the face of an Indian threat of limited war, Pakistan had no other option but to go for the manufacture of low yield nuclear weapons. With the introduction of the low yield nuclear weapons by Pakistan with an official announcement in 2015, Pakistan had been able to contain Indians from pursuing the path of limited war against it. This paper has looked into the role Pakistan's low yield nuclear weapons in dealing with the threat of limited conventional war under the Indian Cold Start Doctrine. Firstly, it has explored three Indo-Pak crises with limited war dimensions, which occurred subsequently in 2008, 2016 and 2019 and brought a fear of limited war on Pakistan's side. Secondly, it has explained the changing military doctrines of India and Pakistan and further highlighted the gap which led to the emergence of India's Cold Start Doctrine and Pakistan's low yield nuclear weapons. Third, it has looked at the role of Pakistan's low yield nuclear weapons in creating a roadblock in the Indian Cold Start Doctrine. Finally, it has given a discussion and summary.

Notes on the Military Problems of Europe

1958 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 182-201
Author(s):  
George W. Rathjens
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
The United States ◽  
Limited War ◽  
Minor Powers ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Military

There can be little doubt that the development and increasing availability of modern, especially nuclear, weapons will greatly alter the military policies and relationships that obtain among nations. This article addresses itself to those topics; more particularly it considers, in the light of changing technology, such problems as the objectives of major and minor powers in both general and limited war, the definition of limitations in limited war, the validity of alliances, and alternative military postures for the United States and for small nations.

Norwegian Security Policy for the 1980s

1982 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 207-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan JØRgen Holst
Keyword(s):  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Unilateral Constraints ◽  
Major Power ◽  
The North ◽  
Limited War ◽  
Defence Policy ◽  
Strategic Position ◽  
The Baltic

The key strategic position of Norway in Northern Europe is elaborated in the first part of this article. Norwegian alignment in NATO is based on the proposition that Norwegian (or Scandinavian) means are inadequate to defend the country from attack from a major power. It has become an objective of Norwegian defence policy to block as effectively as possible any option of limited war against North Norway by raising the force requirements for the adversary to a level at which the risks of escalation would appear forbidding. The Norwegian security calculus is predicated on the notion that South Norway has forward defence in the Baltic, Northern Germany and Denmark. Therefore, the defence effort has been concentrated in the north. Public support for Norway's policy of alignment has been rather stable over the last decade. The issue of reinforcement is dealt with in detail, as are the re-emerging nuclear weapons issues. Finally, the evolution of the Norwegian defence effort is analysed. It is concluded that those aspects of alliance policy which relate to nuclear weapons are likely to cause discussion and dissension in the years ahead. The Norwegian Government is likely to support changes in the posture and doctrine of NATO which reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and, particularly, the pressures for early use. The unilateral constraints with respect to the stationing of foreign troops will be maintained.

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