Chapter I. The Oil Situation

1974 ◽  
Vol 67 ◽  
pp. 8-16

When we last reported in November, it seemed that the major problem confronting the world economy (so far as oil was concerned) might be the physical availability of supplies—in other words that world industrial output would be constrained by supply rather than demand shortages. Since then, however, the posted price of crude oil (against which the host governments' ‘take’ is calculated) has been roughly doubled on top of the increases imposed last October, and this now makes it likely that the ‘real’ deflationary impact of the price rise will soon outweigh the effects of supply shortages. And, as many countries will be affected in this way, there are likely to be ‘second-round’ contractionary effects on world trade. The international financial problem and the serious plight of the non-oil-producing developing countries have also been thrown into greater relief by the latest price rise. The sheer size of the latest price rise may also lead to a significant ‘price elasticity’ effect on oil consumption regardless of any rationing or other direct controls.

1990 ◽  
Vol 134 ◽  
pp. 3-6

Our forecasts, like those of the Treasury published in the Autumn Statement, are based on the assumption that oil prices will fall back next year, as the crisis in the Gulf is resolved. We describe briefly below what might be the consequences, for the world economy and for Britain, if oil prices were to be $45 a barrel for the foreseeable future, as might happen as a result of a long war.In Chapter I our main forecasts assume the continuation of existing economic policies, which we interpret as being consistent with a gradual move towards economic and monetary union. In Chapter III we consider some of the alternative policy options which might be considered if the Labour Party wins the next election.


1984 ◽  
Vol 108 ◽  
pp. 5-20

The dividing line in recent economic trends came at the beginning of last year when a two-year phase of slow growth came to an end. Total output, which had risen at a rate of only 1½ per cent a year between the first quarter of 1981 and the fourth quarter of 1982, rose by 2½-3 per cent during 1983. This change of tempo coincided with an upturn in the world economy, but owed little to it initially. Exports followed rather than led a recovery which was based mainly on consumer spending, particularly on durables. Most of this spending was financed by borrowing, but the primary stimulus probably came from falling inflation.


1980 ◽  
Vol 92 ◽  
pp. 6-17

In the early months of the year the trend of output in OECD countries was still apparently upward—sharply upward in Japan and Italy—with the United Kingdom probably the only important exception to the general rule. There was, however, a growing number of indications that production was running ahead of demand and consumers' expenditure ahead of real disposable incomes. It seems increasingly clear that a period of readjustment must be expected and in the United States it appears to have begun, though otherwise it is little easier than it was three months ago to assess its likely timing, duration or extent. Our own view is that it is imminent but will be neither protracted nor severe.


1975 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 569-583 ◽  
Author(s):  
Surendra J. Patel

The world economy is now in intense agony — sharper than ever experienced since the War. The international monetary order, carefully constructed with gold as its lynchpin and fixed exchange rates, is in shambles. Trade patterns laboriously built up since 1945 are facing their biggest challenge. The entire framework of domestic policies constructed on the assumption of steady growth — or only minor recessions — is now being questioned. Expectations of decline in industrial output ranging over io per cent are no longer restricted to whispers at cocktails — they are officially pronounced. Unemployment in the developed countries, some say, could swell nearly anywhere up to io per cent — a level which only a year ago was thought to be impossible. The identification of economic power with international liquidity has been all but destroyed in the wake of the oil price rise. Prices of other primary commodities are falling rapidly.


1986 ◽  
Vol 116 ◽  
pp. 31-37
Author(s):  
S.A.B. Page

Last year, the unexpectedly slow growth of output in the world economy, and of trade relative to it, reinforced doubts as to whether developing countries would recover from their depression and financing crisis. Since then, the fall in oil prices has altered substantially the outlook for industrial countries. The process of re-examining the prospects for developing countries has scarcely begun.This note describes developments in their trade and financing over the past five years, since the second oil price rise, as background to the judgement that the trends expected previously would have been economically and politically impossible to sustain. It then assesses the prospect now—after the fall in oil prices.


1979 ◽  
Vol 88 ◽  
pp. 26-39

The most important changes in the world economy since our last forecasts were prepared at the beginning of the year have been the rise in the price of oil and the associated rises in the pound and dollar against other currencies and particularly against the yen.Despite these developments we have not significantly changed our forecasts of total OECD output in 1979. This is partly because we seem to have underestimated in February the strength of the upward trend in the industrial sector especially in North America. But we do expect higher rates of inflation, partly as a result of the oil price rise, both this year and next, and in 1980 rates of output are likely to slow down rather more than we thought in February. This is partly because of the transfer of purchasing power from oil importers to oil exporters, who will spend only part of it on additional imports, and partly because governments in oil-importing countries must be expected, as in 1974–75, to compound the depressing effects by their policy reactions to faster inflation and higher import bills.


1976 ◽  
Vol 78 ◽  
pp. 6-20

The picture of the development of the economy which we present here differs substantially from that which we gave three months ago. This is for two reasons. In the first place, in August, at the time we were writing: ‘The recovery in UK output is clearly under way, against a background of a world recovery more rapid than we previously anticipated’, in fact output had stopped rising. GDP in the second quarter actually fell and our present estimate for the third quarter is now no higher than for the first. Whereas in August we thought that GDP growth through 1976, i.e. from the fourth quarter of 1975 to the fourth quarter of 1976, would be 4.8 per cent, we now have a figure of only 2.3 per cent. This pause in recovery has not been confined to Britain: it has happened in many industrial countries, including the United States, Germany and Japan. The question is whether the recovery will resume after the pause, or will be aborted. We are in fact assuming for the world economy a resumption of growth though at a somewhat slower rate than we forecast before for 1977.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document