Chapter II. The World Economy

1982 ◽  
Vol 100 ◽  
pp. 51-64

In the United States in particular, the long-awaited upturn in economic activity has been further postponed even though inflation has been running below the rates that had generally been expected. Industry in the OECD countries may well have produced less in the first quarter of 1982 than in any quarter of 1981, and we no longer expect their total output to increase by more than about ½ per cent for the year.

1974 ◽  
Vol 70 ◽  
pp. 23-37

The world economic position and prospects have worsened further in the last three months. In the United States and Japan, in particular, recessionary conditions are proving to be more marked and more prolonged than we had expected, and it looks as though by the end of the year all the major industrial countries, with the possible exception of France, will have experienced at least one quarter in which output has fallen or at best shown no appreciable rise. The other developed countries have fared better, but we no longer expect there to be any growth of output in the OECD area either in the second half of the year or in the year as a whole. In 1975 the position should be rather better, at least by the second half. We expect OECD countries' aggregate GNP to grow by about 2 per cent year-on-year and nearly 3 per cent between the fourth quarters of 1974 and 1975.


1971 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 22-35

Developments in the world economy have on the whole been much as we predicted in February. It is becoming increasingly clear that renewed expansion is under way in the United States at a pace which, even if it falls short of the Administration's hopes, is more than compensating for the slowing down in industrial countries outside North America. This deceleration has become quite marked in Japan as well as Western Europe, but we expect a faster pace to be resumed before the end of the year. We still put real growth in OECD countries at around 4 per cent in 1971, unless there is a prolonged steel strike in the United States. This compares with about 2½ per cent last year, and we expect the rising trend to continue into 1972.


1976 ◽  
Vol 77 ◽  
pp. 33-49

It is now clear that output in the OECD countries rose even faster in the early stage of the recovery than we had previously supposed. Between the third quarter of 1975 and the first quarter of 1976 their aggregate GDP appears to have increased at an annual rate of 7 per cent and their industrial production at 12 per cent. By the second quarter, however, stock movements were probably making a substantially smaller contribution to the expansion of demand. The rate of growth of industrial production has slowed down considerably since the spring and the same is probably true of GDP, particularly in view of the effects of the drought on European agricultural output. By the second half of next year we expect the deceleration to become more pronounced in the major countries, particularly the United States. The smaller countries have, however, been lagging behind their bigger trading partners in the recent cycle and their phase of rapid recovery is probably yet to come. In all we expect OECD countries' aggregate GDP to increase in volume by 5½–6 per cent this year and 5 per cent in 1977.


1980 ◽  
Vol 92 ◽  
pp. 6-17

In the early months of the year the trend of output in OECD countries was still apparently upward—sharply upward in Japan and Italy—with the United Kingdom probably the only important exception to the general rule. There was, however, a growing number of indications that production was running ahead of demand and consumers' expenditure ahead of real disposable incomes. It seems increasingly clear that a period of readjustment must be expected and in the United States it appears to have begun, though otherwise it is little easier than it was three months ago to assess its likely timing, duration or extent. Our own view is that it is imminent but will be neither protracted nor severe.


1975 ◽  
Vol 73 ◽  
pp. 25-40

The recession had probably reached its trough by the middle of the year. Total output in the United States hardly changed in the second quarter and the industrial component began to rise slightly in June, while in Japan industrial production has been increasing since March. On the other hand it now appears that in a number of other industrial countries, notably France and West Germany, output in the early months of the year was substantially lower than we suggested in May and the decline in OECD's aggregate GDP will probably be of the order of 2–2½ per cent for 1975 as a whole. In 1976 we now expect an increase of nearly 5 per cent.


1991 ◽  
Vol 135 ◽  
pp. 3-8

It is clear now that 1991 will be a year of slow growth for the world economy. In the United States in particular there is real fear that a contraction of credit will result in a sharp cutback of economic activity. Our central expectation is that a reduction in inflation, helped by lower oil prices, and a rather more relaxed monetary policy will prevent a deep or prolonged downturn in America. Moreover the buoyancy of investment demand in Germany will help sustain activity in the European economies. The case of the UK economy is potentially more serious, although even here it is reasonable to expect a recovery from the recession to be under way by the end of this year.


2018 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 402-419
Author(s):  
Krishnakumar S.

With Donald Trump as President of United States, multilateralism in the world economy is facing an unprecedented challenge. The international economic institutions that have evolved since the fifties are increasingly under the risk of being undermined. With the growing assertion of the emerging and developing economies in the international fora, United States is increasingly sceptical of its ability to maneuvre such institutions to suit its own purpose. This is particularly true with respect to WTO, based on “one country one vote” system. The tariff rate hikes initiated by the leader country in the recent past pose a serious challenge to the multilateral trading system. The paper tries to undertake a critical overview of the US pre-occupation of targeting economies on the basis of the bilateral merchandise trade surpluses of countries, through the trade legislations like Omnibus Act and Trade Facilitation Act. These legislations not only ignore the growing share of the United States in the growing invisibles trade in the world economy, but also read too much into the bilateral trade surpluses of economies with United States and the intervention done by them in the foreign exchange market.


2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sérgio de Oliveira Birchal ◽  
Âmara Fuccio de Fraga e Silva

European direct investment in Brazil dates back to the discovery of the country and has been since then either hegemonic or more important than a superficial observation can grasp, as this work aims at showing. During the 20th century, the United States has replaced Britain as the worlds economic superpower and the largest direct investor. US dominance in the world economy and geographical proximity to Brazil would suggest that US investments were by far the largest in the country during that century. Furthermore, as Japan had become the second largest economy in the world in the 1980s, we would expect that this would be reflected in the data of the largest multinationals in Brazil. However, as our investigation suggests, Western European direct investment has been as large (and in many occasions even larger) as that of the USA and Japanese firms have never had a prominent presence among the largest firms in Brazil, at least until the late 1990s.


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