Singulars, Plurals, and Section 57 of the Constitution

1977 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-56
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Sawer

Whether words in the singular include the plural or whether words in the plural include the singular is a common problem of statutory interpretation. Acts interpretation legislation of the States and the Commonwealth offer slightly varying presumptions for dealing with the problem. Professor Sawer analyses these presumptions and their application in numerous cases. As well, reforms that would lead to greater clarity and uniformity of such legislation are suggested. The second part of the article explores the special problems regarding singulars and plurals in the context of the Constitution and, in particular, section 57 which provides for the resolution of deadlocks between the Senate and the House of Representatives with regard to “any proposed law”. The High Court's resolution of some of the problems raised when more than one proposed law is the subject of disagreement between the Houses of Parliament is exhaustively analysed. In addition, solutions are offered to a number of judicially unanswered questions relating to section 57 of the Constitution.

2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 98-106
Author(s):  
Khaled Elgindy

This essay looks at the hearing held by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives in April 1922 on the subject of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, as well as the broader congressional debate over the Balfour Declaration at that crucial time. The landmark hearing, which took place against the backdrop of growing unrest in Palestine and just prior to the League of Nations' formal approval of Britain's Mandate over Palestine, offers a glimpse into the cultural and political mindset underpinning U.S. support for the Zionist project at the time as well as the ways in which the political discourse in the United States has, or has not, changed since then. Despite the overwhelming support for the Zionist project in Congress, which unanimously endorsed Balfour in September 1922, the hearing examined all aspects of the issue and included a remarkably diverse array of viewpoints, including both anti-Zionist Jewish and Palestinian Arab voices.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-194
Author(s):  
Novianto Murthi Hantoro

Prior to the decision of the Constitutional Court (MK), the implementation of the right to inquiry was regulated in two laws, namely Law No. 6 of 1954 on the Establishment of the Rights of Inquiry of the House of Representatives (DPR) and Law No. 27 of 2009 on MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD. Through proposal for judicial review, MK decided the Law on the Rights of Inquiry was null and void because it was not in accordance with the presidential system adopted in the 1945 Constitution. Today, the exercise of the right of inquiry is only based on Law on MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD. Nonetheless, the Amendment of Law No. 27 of 2009 into Law No. 17 of 2014 could not accommodate some substances of the null and void Law on the Rights of Inquiry. The urgency of the formulation of the law on the right to inquiry, other than to carry out the Constitutional Court’s decision; are to close the justice gap of the current regulation; to avoid multi-interpretation of the norm, for example on the subject and object of the right of inquiry; and to execute the mandate of Article 20A paragraph (4) of the 1945 Constitution. The regulation on the right to inquiry shall be formulated separately from the Law on MPR, DPR, DPD and DPRD, with at least several substances to be discussed, namely: definition, mechanisms, and procedure, as well as examination of witnesses, expert, and documents. AbstrakSebelum adanya putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK), pelaksanaan hak angket diatur dalam dua undang-undang, yaitu Undang-Undang Nomor 6 Tahun 1954 tentang Penetapan Hak Angket DPR (UU Angket) dan Undang-Undang Nomor 27 Tahun 2009 tentang Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, dan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (UU MPR, DPR, DPD, dan DPRD). Melalui permohonan pengujian undang-undang, MK membatalkan keberlakuan UU Angket karena sudah tidak sesuai dengan sistem presidensial yang dianut dalam UUD 1945. Pelaksanaan hak angket saat ini hanya berdasarkan UU MPR, DPR, DPD, dan DPRD. Penggantian UU No. 27 Tahun 2009 menjadi UU No. 17 Tahun 2014 tentang MPR, DPR, DPD, dan DPRD ternyata tidak mengakomodasi beberapa substansi UU Angket yang telah dibatalkan. Berdasarkan hal tersebut, terdapat urgensi untuk membentuk Undang-Undang tentang Hak Angket DPR RI. Urgensi tersebut, selain sebagai tindak lanjut putusan MK, juga untuk menutup celah kekosongan hukum pada pengaturan saat ini dan untuk menghindari multi-interpretasi norma, misalnya terhadap subjek dan objek hak angket. Pengaturan mengenai hak angket perlu diatur di dalam undang-undang yang terpisah dari UU MPR, DPR, DPD, dan DPRD, dengan materi muatan yang berisi tentang pengertian-pengertian, mekanisme, dan hukum acara. Pembentukan Undang-Undang tentang Hak Angket diperlukan guna memenuhi amanat Pasal 20A ayat (4) UUD 1945.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Annette Singh

It is interesting that prior to Nicholson J’s judgment in the matter of Jacob Zuma v The National Director of Public Prosecutions, that Judge President Tshabalala stated quite categorically that he did not want the judge who was to preside over the corruption trial of Jacob Zuma to be placed under scrutiny (see “Zuma Judge Gets Legal Professional’s Approval” 31 July 2008 Business Day 3). However, since Nicholson J’s decision of the Jacob Zuma trial, both the judge and his judgment have invariably become the subject of intense scrutiny. Nicholson J’s judgment is fraught with inconsistencies, incongruities and controversy. Nevertheless, no matter what the views are regarding the findings of Nicholson J, it has to be conceded that it resulted in one of the most far reaching political decisions in South African legal history, which resulted in the ousting of the country’s president (Thabo Mbeki). While the judgment raises a plethora of both political and legal issues, it is not the intention of the author to venture into the political arena; rather an analysis ofthe approach adopted to statutory interpretation which influenced the court’s decision, is considered.


2014 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 248-275
Author(s):  
Kevin Aquilina

This article analyses the case law of the European Court of Human Rights relating to Parliamentary removal of a judge. The Court’s earlier approach did not extend the right to a fair trial to judicial removal motions before the Maltese unicameral House of Representatives. The Court’s latest case law has reversed its earlier interpretation with all the attendant consequential implications brought about for Malta which now has to amend its Constitution on the subject. This novel landmark interpretation implies that should Parliament attempt to remove a judge, that constitutional procedure will fall foul of the right to a fair trial.


1969 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 787-807 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nelson W. Polsby ◽  
Miriam Gallaher ◽  
Barry Spencer Rundquist

Popular discussions of the internal management of the U.S. House of Representatives in the present era generally give great weight to the ubiquity and arbitrariness of the seniority system as a significant determinant of outcomes there. Careful attention to the scholarly literature, however, should long since have modified this view. For it appears that except for relatively unimportant matters such as the allocation of office space on Capitol Hill, the criterion of seniority is generally intermingled in House decision-making with a great many other crite ria of choice, and the business of choosing is not automatic, but remains in the hands of persons having some considerable discretion. This, apparently, is the case with respect to such decisions as the allocation of Capitol Hill patronage, the initial assignment of Representatives to committees, the distribution of responsibilities within committees, and the choice of party leaders. The one important area in which seniority seems to play a role of overwhelming significance is in the matter of succession to the chairmanship of committees; this is in turn governed by the custom (not a formal rule) of seniority that guarantees members reappointment to committees at the opening of each new Congress, in rank order of committee service. It is the growth of this method of selecting committee chairmen in the House that is the subject of this paper.


Author(s):  
William Nunes ◽  
Saurabh Anand

The chapter argues that political parties have to incorporate the idea of sustainable development in their manifesto itself. The goals of sustainable development cannot be achieved if the political parties themselves are not committed to it. The goals of sustainability can only be achieve if sustainability is truly integrated into core party values. No major work in the area has been done in India so far. This paper is an attempt to analyse the constitutions and rule of the major national political party while also particularly analysing the manifesto as published from time to time, to examine whether they have, and if yes then how have, they addressed the subject of environment and sustainability. The scope of the analysis of the manifesto mainly focuses on the 2014 election manifestos, as the 2014 election was the most recent election constituting the 16th Lok Sabha (house of representatives).


2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 20-42
Author(s):  
Eric S. Smith

ABSTRACT The direct charitable contribution deduction was an experimental deduction for the 1982–1986 tax years. It represents the only example in the tax laws in which non-itemizers were allowed a charitable contribution deduction in tandem with the standard deduction. This article offers a review of three distinct eras in tax history: the advent of the standard deduction, the enactment of the direct charitable contribution deduction, and its subsequent abandonment. This article clarifies the literature to demonstrate that the direct charitable contribution's demise was not a matter of course. The deduction was made permanent by the House of Representatives. Its extension was the subject of rigorous debate in the Senate and was tabled by only a few votes. This article also considers the prospect of a modern-day direct charitable contribution. Taken on balance, concerns of economic necessity, fiscal viability, and measurable impact on the charitable sector suggest that reinstatement is neither necessary nor a prudent tax subsidy. Modern-day data indicate that non-itemizers are already giving. The tax incentive, therefore, proffered through the non-itemizer charitable contribution deduction would likely have relatively minimal effect on the charitable sector.


1980 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-202 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Winterton

The author considers whether the Commonwealth can enact “manner and form” legislation, especially provisions enabling the House of Representatives to enact laws which are the subject of a deadlock between the Houses, and legislation entrenching civil liberties. He argues that the legislative power of the Commonwealth has the same properties as that of the United Kingdom Parliament, which can impose “manner and form” limitations on itself; parliamentary supremacy is procedurally self-embracing. Hence, the Commonwealth Parliament can do likewise, except in so far as the Commonwealth Constitution provides to the contrary. The Constitution does prevent Parliament requiring legislation to be enacted by specified majorities in Parliament, or substituting a new legislature for the present Parliament. But the Commonwealth Parliament can enact provisions requiring legislation to be enacted in a specified form, and can establish an additional legislature for the enactment of legislation, including appropriation laws. Such legislation may be enacted pursuant to the procedure in section 57 of the Constitution, and could provide a method of avoiding a Supply crisis like that of 1975.


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