Threat Construction and Military Intervention in Internal Security: The Political Use of Terrorism and Drug Trafficking in Contemporary Argentina

2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (6) ◽  
pp. 10-24
Author(s):  
Jorge Battaglino
Keyword(s):  
Drug Trafficking ◽  
Military Intervention ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Government Policies ◽  
The Political ◽  
Critical Perspective ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Security Discourse ◽  
Copenhagen School ◽  
The Military

Argentina has a deeply rooted tradition of rejecting participation by the military in internal security and legislation that prohibits such involvement. The current construction of a threat from drug trafficking and terrorism and the proposal of intervention by the armed forces to contend with them is the result of a narrative justifying the implementation of various government policies. Exploration of the mechanism of discursive threat construction, or securitization, from the critical perspective of the Copenhagen School demonstrates how security discourse and practices allow actors and institutions to mobilize resources, control agendas, and use violence with greater discretion. Argentina tiene una arraigada tradición de rechazo a la participación de los militares en temas de seguridad interna y posee, además, una legislación que prohíbe tal involucramiento. La construcción actual de la amenaza del narcotráfico y el terrorismo y la propuesta de intervención de las fuerzas armadas para enfrentarlas son el resultado de un discurso que es funcional a la implementación de distintas políticas por parte del gobierno. Una examinación de la dinámica de la construcción discursiva de la amenaza, o la securitización, a partir de la perspectiva crítica de la Escuela Copenhague evidencia cómo el discurso y las prácticas de la seguridad permiten a actores e instituciones movilizar recursos, controlar agendas y utilizar la violencia con mayor discrecionalidad.

The Military and Society in Greece

1974 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 244-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Brown
Keyword(s):  
Military Intervention ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Political Activism ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Arena ◽  
The Military

In this century military intervention in the political arena on the part of the Greek armed forces has been, either directly or indirectly, the rule and not the exception (i). The forms of and the motivations for this political activism have varied greatly, but in spite of the often decisive effects of their intervention in political affairs the Greek military and the reasons for their intervention have not been studied in any serious or systematic manner.

scholarly journals The anniversary of the military coup attempt in Turkey, July 15–16, 2016. The evolution of a political system

2017 ◽  
pp. 63-68
Author(s):  
Y. S. Kudryashova
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Authoritarian Regime ◽  
Military Coup ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Military ◽  
Ruling Party ◽  
Coup Attempt

During the government of AK Party army leaders underprivileged to act as an exclusive guarantor preserving a secular regime in the country. The political balance between Secular and Islamite elites was essentially removed after Erdogan was elected Turkish President. Consistently toughening authoritarian regime of a ruling party deeply accounts for a military coup attempt and earlier periodically occurred disturbance especially among the young. The methods of a coup showed the profundity of a split and the lack of cohesion in Turkish armed forces. Erdogan made the best use of a coup attempt’s opportunities to concentrate all power in his hands and to consolidate a present regime. The mass support of the population during a coup attempt ensured opportunities for a fundamental reorganization of a political system. Revamped Constitution at most increases political powers of the President.

scholarly journals The Degree of Military Political Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentine and Brazilian Transitions

1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Zaverucha
Keyword(s):  
Third World ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Political ◽  
Civilian Control ◽  
Political Autonomy ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Third World ◽  
The Military ◽  
Democratic Country

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.

Variations among North African Military Regimes

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 55-78
Author(s):  
Federico Battera
Keyword(s):  
Political Development ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
North African ◽  
Military Rule ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
Supreme Council ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Military

This article explores the differences between two North African military regimes—Egypt and Algeria—which have been selected due to the continuity of military dominance of the political systems. Still, variations have marked their political development. In particular, the Algerian army’s approach to civilian institutions changed after a civilian president was chosen in 1999. This was not the case in Egypt after the demise of the Hosni Mubarak regime of 2011. Other important variations are to be found in the way power has been distributed among the military apparatuses themselves. In the case of Egypt, a principle of collegiality has been generally preserved within a body, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which is absent in the case of Algeria, where conflicts between military opposed factions are more likely to arise in case of crisis. How differences generally impact the stability of military rule in these two cases is the main contribution of this paper.

Myanmar: Civil–Military Relations in a Tutelary Regime

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Bünte
Keyword(s):  
Political Institutions ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Power Sharing ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
Civil Military Relations ◽  
Military Regimes ◽  
The Government ◽  
Military Relations ◽  
The Military

Myanmar has had one of the longest ruling military regimes in the world. Ruling directly or indirectly for more than five decades, Myanmar’s armed forces have been able to permeate the country’s main political institutions, its economy, and its society. Myanmar is a highly revealing case study for examining the trajectory of civil–military relations over the past seven decades. Myanmar ended direct military rule only in 2011 after the military had become the most powerful institution in society, weakened the political party opposition severely, coopted several ethnic armed groups, and built up a business empire that allowed it to remain financially independent. The new tutelary regime—established in 2011 after proclaiming a roadmap to “discipline flourishing democracy” in 2003, promulgating a new constitution in 2008, and holding (heavily scripted) elections in 2010—allowed a degree of power-sharing between elected civilian politicians and the military for a decade. Although policymaking in economic, financial, and social arenas was transferred to the elected government, the military remained in firm control of external and internal security and continued to be completely autonomous in the management of its own affairs. As a veto power, the military was also able to protect its prerogatives from a position of strength. Despite this dominant position in the government, civil–military relations were hostile and led to a coup in February 2021. The military felt increasingly threatened and humiliated as civilians destroyed the guardrails it had put in place to protect its core interests within the tutelary regime. The military also felt increasingly alienated as the party the military had established repeatedly failed to perform in the elections.

Personalist dictators and the choice of military intervention in civil conflicts

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Adriana M. Boersner H.
Keyword(s):  
Personality Traits ◽  
Military Intervention ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
World Politics ◽  
University Of Missouri ◽  
Civil Conflicts ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
Hugo Chavez ◽  
The Military

[ACCESS RESTRICTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI AT AUTHOR'S REQUEST.] Are all personalist dictators equally prone to intervene in civil conflicts? The current bulk of work on authoritarianism and international relations shows that personalist autocrats are more prone to be hawkish in foreign policy when compared, for example, to military dictators. What is missing, however, is a better understanding as to whether different personalist dictators behave similarly to one another in world politics. In this study, I argue that not all personalist dictators behave in the same way on military intervention due to the interaction between their personality traits and the military capabilities available to them. Drawing on an original dataset on personalist dictators' personality traits, I employ leadership trait analysis - using 386,510 words of text and 1,580 documents from twenty dictators in the period between 1990 and 2009. I find that personality traits do indeed matter for leaders' choices to intervene militarily abroad. Specifically, I show that dictators' level of sensitivity to advice and information (conceptual complexity) in interaction with military capabilities is a significant factor shaping whether they send weapons or deploy troops into a civil conflict abroad. I illustrate my findings and the mechanisms with one case study: Hugo Chavez and his decision to support the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia -FARC).

Coup-Proofing in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) Region

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Derek Lutterbeck
Keyword(s):  
Arab Spring ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Arab Countries ◽  
Common Finding ◽  
North African ◽  
Mena Region ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
The Arab Spring ◽  
The Military

Coup-proofing—that is, measures aimed at preventing military coups and ensuring military loyalty—has been a key feature of civil–military relations in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) states. Just as the MENA region has been one of the most coup-prone regions in the world, coup-proofing has been an essential instrument of regime survival in Arab countries. The most commonly found coup-proofing strategies in the region include (a) so-called “communal coup-proofing,” involving the appointment of individuals to key positions within the military based on family, ethnic, or religious ties; (b) providing the military with corporate and/or private benefits in order to ensure its loyalty; (c) creating parallel military forces in addition to the regular military, so as to “counter-balance” the latter; (d) monitoring of the military through a vast internal security and intelligence apparatus; and (e) promoting professionalism, and thus political neutrality, within the military. The experiences of the “Arab Spring,” however, have shown that not all of these strategies are equally effective in ensuring military loyalty during times of popular upheavals and regime crises. A common finding in this context has been that communal coup-proofing (or militaries based on “patrimonialism”) creates the strongest bonds been the armed forces and their regimes, as evidenced by the forceful suppression of the popular uprising by the military in countries such as Syria, or by parts of the military in Libya and Yemen. By contrast, where coup-proofing has been based on the provision of material benefits to the military or on counterbalancing, as in Tunisia or Egypt, the armed forces have refrained from suppressing the popular uprising, ultimately leading to the downfall of these countries’ long-standing leaders. A further lesson that can be drawn from the Arab Spring in terms of coup-proofing is that students of both military coups and coup-proofing should dedicate (much) more attention to the increasingly important role played by the internal security apparatus in MENA countries.

Krieg und Frieden. Land und Militär in direkter Konfrontation 1797–1918

2021 ◽  
pp. 331-358
Author(s):  
Willibald Rosner
Keyword(s):  
Dominant Factor ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Movements ◽  
War And Peace ◽  
Internal Security ◽  
The Social ◽  
The First World War ◽  
The 19Th Century ◽  
The Military ◽  
First World

War and Peace. Land and Military in Direct Confrontation 1797–1918. This chapter focuses on the extremes in relations between the land and the military. The first part deals with the period until 1866, when wars actually took place on Lower Austrian soil and foreign forces were stationed in the land. Here the analysis centres on strategies developed by the population to cope with extraordinary situations. The second section deals with the emergence of the military as a state regulatory power in the sphere of internal and public security in war and peace. The social conflicts following the Vormärz and the political movements in the second half of the 19th century played a role here, as did the First World War, when, although Lower Austria was not a frontline area, the military were the dominant factor in terms of internal security, public control, working life and food security.

Turkey: The Rise and Fall of the Influence of the Military in Politics

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Acar Kutay
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
National Security ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Political Polarization ◽  
The Political ◽  
Turkish Republic ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Political Processes ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
The Military

The continued influence of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) on politics characterized the political history of the Turkish Republic, until such influence was first bridled and then ultimately broken by the Justice and Development Party governments during the 2000s. When the new regime was established in 1923, the military identified itself with its founding ideology, namely Kemalism, which was built on the ideas of modernism, secularism, and nationalism. Because the TAF assumed the roles of guardian of the regime and vanguard of modernization, any threat to the foundational values and norms of the republican regime was considered by the military as a threat to the constitutional order and national security. As a self-authorized guardian of the regime and its values, the TAF characterized itself as a non-partisan institution. The military appealed to such identity to justify the superiority of the moral and epistemological foundations of their understanding of politics compared with that of the elected politicians. The military invoked such superiority not only to intervene in politics and take power (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007). They also used such identity to monitor and control political processes by means of the National Security Council (established after the 1960 military intervention) and by more informal means such as mobilizing the public against the elected government’s policy choices. In the context of the Cold War, domestic turmoil and lasting political polarization helped legitimate the military’s control over security issues until the 1980s. After the end of the Cold War, two threats to national security drew the TAF into politics: the rising power of Islamic movements and the separatist terrorism of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which posed threats to the constitutional order. Turkey’s EU membership bid is one of the most important aspects that bridled the influence of the TAF on politics. Whereas the democratic oversight of the military and security sector constituted a significant dimension of the EU reforms, events that took place around the nomination of the Justice and Development Party’s candidate, Abdullah Gül, for the presidency created a rupture in the role and influence of the military on politics. Two juristic cases against members of the TAF in 2008 and 2010 made a massive impact on the power of the military, before the ultimate supremacy of the political sphere was established after the coup attempt organized by the Gülenist officers who infiltrated the TAF during the 2000s.

Lebanon: A Military in Politics in a Divided Society

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oren Barak
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Middle Eastern ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
The State ◽  
The Political ◽  
Political Role ◽  
Divided Society ◽  
The Military

Since Lebanon’s independence in the mid-1940s, its military—the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)—has played a pivotal role in the country’s politics. The political role of the LAF in Lebanon might seem surprising since the Lebanese state did not militarize, and its political leaders have continuously managed to keep their military relatively weak and small. Indeed, in this respect Lebanon has been markedly different from its close neighbors (Syria and Israel), but also from several other Middle Eastern states (especially Egypt and Iraq), where the military, which was large and powerful, was continuously involved in politics. Additionally, both Lebanon and the LAF have persistently striven to distance themselves from regional conflicts since 1949, particularly in relation to the Palestinian issue, albeit not always successfully. Still, and despite these ostensibly unfavorable factors for the military’s involvement in politics in Lebanon, the LAF has played an important political role in the state since its independence. This role, which has been marked by elements of continuity and change over the years, included mediation and arbitration between rival political factions (in 1945–1958, 2008, 2011, and 2019); attempts to dominate the political system (in 1958–1970 and 1988–1990); intervention in the Lebanese civil war (in 1975–1976 and 1982–1984); attempts to regain its balancing role in politics (in 1979–1982 and 1984–1988); and facilitating the state’s postwar reconstruction (since 1991). The political role of the military in Lebanon can be explained by several factors. First, the weakness of Lebanon’s political system and its inability to resolve crises between its members. Second, Lebanon’s divided society and its members’ general distrust towards its civilian politicians. Third, the basic characteristics of Lebanon’s military, which, in most periods, enjoyed broad public support that cuts across the lines of community, region, and family, and found appeal among domestic and external audiences, which, in their turn, acquiesced to its political role in the state.

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