Civil–Military Relations and Democratic Control over the Armed Forces in the Republic of Serbia

2013 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 675-694 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vanja Rokvic ◽  
Zoran Jeftic ◽  
Željko Ivanis
Author(s):  
David Darchiashvili ◽  
Stephen Jones

The balance between civil and military structures is central to understanding the development of Georgian statehood since the beginning of the 20th century. The first modern independent Georgian state was established after the 1917 Russian Revolution. The Democratic Republic of Georgia declared its independence in May 1918. In February 1921, the young republic was incorporated into the Soviet state and had no separate army of its own. Since regaining its independence in 1991, Georgia has experienced multiple administrations, and despite significantly different policies on the military, the overall pattern has been one of civilian (though not always democratic) control. Georgian militias and paramilitaries, between 1918 and 1921 and again between 1991 and 1995, played important roles in determining political power at times of revolutionary or constitutional crises. Since 1991 there have been three presidents - Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Eduard Shevardnadze, and Mikheil Saakashvili - with strong executive authority. In 2013, the position of president was made semi-ceremonial and a prime-ministerial system was instituted. Since 2013, there have been multiple prime ministers. Bidzina Ivanishvili was the first and the most powerful. All of Georgia’s leaders have shifted from a Soviet to pro-Western orientation. Since the second half of the 1990s, the relationship with NATO has grown closer, which has had a major impact on the structure of the Georgian armed forces and on their relationship with Georgia’s civil authorities. The 2008 war with Russia had a major impact on the Georgian military, and, since then, the level of professionalization of the Georgian armed forces has increased dramatically. Samuel Huntington, Eric Nordlinger, and other Western students of civil-military relations have pointed to the important balance required between civil and military authorities for a stable democracy. Georgia still displays continuing features of nepotism, clientelism, corruption, and dominant political personalities, which has significant consequences for the independence of the Georgian military and for civil-military relations more generally. Western states such as the United States and Germany, and international organizations like NATO continue to urge reform and provide training to the Georgian armed forces


2021 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ye Phone Kyaw

Under its 2008 Constitution, Myanmar is undergoing a political transition from a military regime to a more liberalized democratic and constitutional government. The current National League for Democracy government’s reforms are in stagnation, while debates on the political role of the Tatmadaw (the Myanmar military) as guaranteed by the 2008 Constitution continue. A widespread perception persists that civil-military relations in Myanmar lack civilian control and are a barrier to the reform processes. Such assumptions, however, are made in the absence of theoretical analysis. This article will argue that Myanmar’s constitutional government has the right to establish “democratic control,” while the Tatmadaw’s national political role remains significant. Democratic control of Myanmar’s civil-military relations is based on a “collective” rather than a “confrontational” approach—one that is called “collective democratic control.” The current stagnation in reform and in the national reconciliation process are the result of a lack of understanding of the existing structure of civil-military relations, rather than a lack of democratic control of the armed forces.


2013 ◽  
Vol 28 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 123-140
Author(s):  
Khadga K.C.

As like in other developing democracies, it is obvious that there are many CMR problems in Nepal. A lack of national security policies and common national interests, ignorance about security sensitiveness, political instability, parochialism, mistrust, are prominent factors contributing to Nepal’s adverse civil-military relations. However, the military though has already begun to tuning with democratic norms and values should further be engaged in serious organizational reform that includes among others; enhancing professionalism, further accountability, transparency and loyalty of army to the civilian authority follow by earliest promulgation of democratic constitution with the clear provision of democratic control over armed forces.


2005 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-85
Author(s):  
J. Mark Ruhl

AbstractThe Guatemalan military dominated the country's politics for nearly half a century, but its political power declined during the 1990s. Democratically elected presidents Alvaro Arzú (1996–2000) and Alfonso Portillo (2000–2004) subordinated the armed forces to their authority and thereby gained an unprecedented opportunity to reduce the role of the military and institutionalize democratic civil-military relations. Unfortunately, neither of these tasks was accomplished. An analysis of the level of democratic control, combining Alfred Stepan's military prerogatives indicators with a newer system of measurement and classification designed by Samuel Fitch, shows that the armed forces retained substantial institutional autonomy and de facto legal immunity when Portillo left office in 2004. The role of the military in Guatemalan society, moreover, expanded again under Portillo after declining under Arzú. This study finds that the lack of sufficient civilian commitment to reform, rather than resistance from the armed forces, was the principal cause of these disappointing outcomes.


Author(s):  
Michał Stelmach

The aim of this article is to analyse the new forms of militarism as well as the position and the role of the armed forces in Latin American political systems in the twenty-first century. The first part analyses two selected forms of military participation in politics: the participation of former servicemembers in presidential elections and their performance as presidents, and the militarisation of political parties. The second part of the article focuses on the issue of contemporary civil-military relations in Latin America, discussing the problems associated with the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces, the reform of the Ministries of Defense and the redefinition of the functions of the army.


Author(s):  
BRANIMIR FURLAN

Prispevek je nadaljevanje analize o vzročno-posledični povezavi med civilnim nadzorom in učinkovitostjo vojske. V prvem delu je bil predstavljen teoretično- metodološki okvir analize, v tem delu pa avtor predstavlja rezultate raziskave o stanju civilno-vojaških odnosov v Republiki Sloveniji ter vplivih civilnega nadzora na učinkovitost Slovenske vojske. Raziskava je pokazala, da se v Sloveniji uveljavlja praksa civilnega nadzora nad oboroženimi silami po vzoru drugih demokratičnih držav, vendar problematika prve generacije civilno-vojaških odnosov še ni končana. Uveljavljanje nadzora v praksi zagotavlja podrejenost vojske civilnim oblastem, pri čemer mehanizmi nadzora ne krepijo sposobnosti Slovenske vojske, da učinkovito izpolni svoje poslanstvo. Posledično lahko povzročijo nezadovoljstvo vojske ali izgubo kredibilnosti v javnosti. This article is a continuation of the analysis of cause-effect relations between civilian control and military effectiveness. The first part presented the theoretical and methodological framework, while in the second part, the author presents the results of the study of civil-military relations in the Republic of Slovenia, focusing on the impact of civilian control on the effectiveness of the Slovenian Armed Forces. The study showed that the practice of civilian control over the armed forces in Slovenia follows the example of those in other democratic states. However, the issue of the first-generation civil-military relations has not yet been completed. The enforcement of civilian control in practice provides for a complete subordination of the military to civilian authorities; however, it does not contribute to the ability of the military to effectively execute its missions. Rather, civilian control can cause military dissatisfaction and reluctance, as well as loss of credibility with the society.


Author(s):  
Jorge Calvário dos Santos ◽  
José Cimar Rodrigues Pinto ◽  
Ricardo Alfredo de Assis Fayal

This article aims to reflect about the possible implications of the use of the Armed Forces in internal security activities on civil-military relations in Brazil. From the Proclamation of the Republic, in 1989, this fraction occupied a prominent position in the national scenario, whose course, until 1964, was characterized by an interventionist function, imbued with messianic spirit and protagonism in the development of Brazilian institutions, configuring a model of intercurrence that had the characteristics of the civilian subjective control as formulated by Samuel P. Huntington in The Soldier and the State. However, on the basis of academic argumentation in recent research by which there was a process aimed at distancing the military from political participation, in its internal individual aspect and in collusion with political parties, radical organizations or social movements, it was admitted that, after 1985, there was a rupture with the previous trajectory, approaching the barracks of the civilian objective control, lineate in same work of that cited author, which, however, may be being hampered in its external institutional side, due to the significant increasing in the use of the armed segment in the so-called Law and Order Guarantee Operations, giving rise to the possibility of an return to that existing condition prior to the Civil and Military Movement of 1964, a phenomenon that will be explored through the use of the path dependence methodology. The result of the investigation points out to the creation of a condition that has an inertial charge capable of altering the course inherited by the so-called New Republic, which, by combining with other social vectors, can contribute to the return to the status quo ante.


Author(s):  
Filip Ejdus

When, how, why, and to what effect did the military involve itself in Serbia’s politics? Due to its decisive role in national liberation and state-building, the Serbian military has always enjoyed high societal reputation. Since the 19th century, the military also played an important role of a nation-builder and social elevator for the lower strata of society. However, Serbia also has a very long tradition of military involvement in politics with several coups that decisively shaped the course of national history. Since the outset of Serbia’s state-building in the first half of the 19th century, Serbia experienced four successful military coups and many occasions when its armed forces were used to quash domestic unrest. The reasons behind the robust involvement of armed forces in Serbian (and Yugoslav politics) have been diverse and ranged from an ambition to provide internal stability and defend national or corporate interests to a desire to change the country’s foreign policy orientation. Since the end of the Cold War, the military played an ambiguous role on some occasions undermining democracy, while on others being an agent of democratic transformation. Since 2006, the military of Serbia has been placed under civilian democratic control and seems to have internalized its role of a politically neutral and professional force with a mission to defend the country, support civilian authorities in the event of emergency, and contribute to international peace and security. Still, the ongoing democratic backsliding, the lack of clarity about the state’s strategic outlook, and the still unresolved status of Serbia’s former province Kosovo all preserve the potential for civil-military tensions in the future.


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