scholarly journals Development of second-order theory of mind: Assessment of environmental influences using a dynamic system approach

2019 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 245-254
Author(s):  
Massimiliano Papera ◽  
Anne Richards ◽  
Paul van Geert ◽  
Costanza Valentini
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Dynamic Systems ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Systems Approach ◽  
Age Groups ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Future Behavior ◽  
Dynamic Growth ◽  
Two Age Groups

Theory of mind refers to the ability to attribute beliefs to oneself and others. The present study used a dynamic systems approach to assess how environment may affect the development of second-order theory of mind (e.g., “John knows that Mary knows that he went out yesterday”). Theory of mind is divided into two major dimensions: comprehension (i.e., to understand a mental state) and prediction (i.e., to predict someone else’s future behavior or mental state). Two age groups were assessed: 5–6- and 10–11-year-old children. In both age groups, participants were assigned to a condition of “support” (help provided) or “no support” (help not provided). Results show that second-order theory of mind follows a dynamic growth law that depends on support. Support facilitates performance in theory of mind production (i.e., to predict one’s future behavior) for both the 5–6- and 10–11-year-old children. Interestingly, the 5–6-year-olds who received support presented an increase in the second-order prediction performance at the expense of the second-order comprehension, suggesting that a temporary dip in comprehension performance may facilitate the development of mental rules to predict one’s future behavior.

Moral judgment and its relation to second-order theory of mind.

2014 ◽  
Vol 50 (8) ◽  
pp. 2085-2092 ◽  
Author(s):  
Genyue Fu ◽  
Wen S. Xiao ◽  
Melanie Killen ◽  
Kang Lee
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order

Complex language, complex thought?

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 ◽  
pp. 28-40
Author(s):  
Suzanne T.M. Bogaerds-Hazenberg ◽  
Petra Hendriks
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Production Task ◽  
False Belief Task ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Complex Thought

Abstract It has been argued (e.g., by De Villiers and colleagues) that the acquisition of sentence embedding is necessary for the development of first-order Theory of Mind (ToM): the ability to attribute beliefs to others. This raises the question whether the acquisition of double embedded sentences is related to, and perhaps even necessary for, the development of second-order ToM: the ability to attribute beliefs about beliefs to others. This study tested 55 children (aged 7-10) on their ToM understanding in a false-belief task and on their elicited production of sentence embeddings. We found that second-order ToM passers produced mainly double embeddings, whereas first-order ToM passers produced mainly single embeddings. Furthermore, a better performance on second-order ToM predicted a higher rate of double embeddings and a lower rate of single embeddings in the production task. We conclude that children’s ability to produce double embeddings is related to their development of second-order ToM.

scholarly journals Consciência intencional e autoconsciência. As teses de Brentano perante as teorias de ordem superior

2021 ◽  
pp. 391
Author(s):  
Pedro M.S. Alves
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Related Question ◽  
Mental Life ◽  
Higher Order Theory

En este artículo, examino algunas características importantes de las teorías de conciencia y autoconciencia de Brentano y Rosenthal. En particular, analizo la distinción entre estados mentales y estados conscientes, y la cuestión relacionada con de determinar si todos los estados mentales pueden convertirse en estados conscientes. Interpreto la teoría de Brentano como una teoría de la mente de un nivel que está de acuerdo con la fusión cartesiana entre los estados mentales y la conciencia. Argumento que los problemas que surgen de la posición de Brentano son, hasta cierto punto, superados por una teoría de orden superior, de modo que la posición de Rosenthal es más precisa. Sin embargo, estoy en desacuerdo con ambos en la interpretación de la consciencia de un estado mental como autoconciencia. Desarrollo los fundamentos de una teoría basada en la primacía del organismo y su mundo vital, y de la experiencia consciente como la forma superior de la vida mental, que tiene, sin embargo, sus raíces en la compleja red de estados mentales que son no estados conscientes.In this paper, I examine some important features of Brentano’s and Rosenthal’s theories of consciousness and self-consciousness. In particular, I discuss the distinction between mental states and conscious states, and the related question of determining whether all mental states can become conscious states. I interpret Brentano’s theory as a one-level theory of mind which is in keeping with the Cartesian conflation between mental states and conscious-ness. I argue that the problems arising from Brentano’s position are to a certain extent surpassed by a higher-order theory, so that Rosenthal’s position is more accurate. Nevertheless, I disagree with both in the construal of the consciousness of a mental state as self-consciousness. I develop then the fundamentals for a theory based on the primacy of the organism and its vital world, and of conscious experience as the higher form of mental life, which has, however, its roots in the complex net of mental states which are not conscious states.

Altruism Correlated with Second Order Theory of Mind

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lesley B. Parker ◽  
Cecilia M. Shore
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order

Early Homo Sapiens

2017 ◽  
pp. 68-86
Author(s):  
E. Fuller Torrey
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Homo Sapiens ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Early Homo ◽  
The World ◽  
Cognitive Trait

This chapter describes Early Homo sapiens who lived about 100,000 years ago. Behaviorally, they were the first hominins to decorate themselves and wear fitted clothing. They also migrated across the world, including reaching Australia over water. Cognitively it appears that they had developed a second order theory of mind that we call introspection. Their brain had probably especially developed in the areas known to be associated with this cognitive trait.

scholarly journals Irony processing in Adolescents: an ERP study

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irene Symeonidou ◽  
Iroise Dumontheil ◽  
Wing Yee Chow ◽  
Richard Breheny
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Middle Childhood ◽  
Language Comprehension ◽  
Figurative Language ◽  
Age Groups ◽  
Late Childhood ◽  
Childhood And Adolescence ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Figurative Language Comprehension ◽  
Two Age Groups

Irony comprehension requires complex inferences about a speaker’s mind. Behavioural data indicates that while children between ages 6-10 begin to show some appreciation of the communicative intent in an ironic remark, full appreciation of speaker attitude might be developing beyond middle childhood and into adolescence. Additionally, recent findings suggest that the online use of Theory of Mind (ToM) shows a prolonged development through late childhood and adolescence. We provide ERP evidence that suggests that the two age-groups process irony differently and engage different cognitive mechanisms. This is the first study to investigate figurative language comprehension in adolescents through ERPs.

scholarly journals Seven- and eight-year-old children’s deception in the conflict situation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryoichi Watanabe
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Conflict Situation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Conflict Condition ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Individual Condition

Six-year-olds will deceive in the individual condition, only if a competitor exists; but not in the conflict condition, when a competitor and a cooperator both exist. Seven- and eight-year-olds acquire the second-order theory of mind (ToM2) related to sophisticated deception. However, it is not known whether children and adults resort to deception in the conflict condition; and if a relationship exists between deception and ToM2. Children (N = 34, range = [6; 7-8; 5]) and adults (N = 38, range = [18-24]) participated in two deception tasks: for self-benefit and for the other person’s benefit. Children also participated in a ToM2 task. Although adults deceived above chance levels, children deceived only for self-benefit. Furthermore, although there was no relationship between children’s deception and ToM2; children who passed the ToM2 task tended to deceive by denying or not responding. These findings suggest that 7- and 8-year-olds can deceive for self-benefit in the conflict condition without ToM2.

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