‘I, Me, Mine’: Bodies, Parts and Property

1998 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 299-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Grubb

The idea that human bodies and their parts are ‘property’ has traditionally found little support in English law. By contrast, philosophers have mused at the prospect of persons owning themselves and the justice of self-ownership and its implications for the product of a person's labours. There are signs that the common law may be prepared to recognise that parts of a body are ‘property’ and subject to control by their source or another. In the recent case of R v Kelly, the English Court of Appeal decided that parts of corpses held as anatomical specimens were ‘property’ and could be stolen. The impact of the court's view may be considerable in respect of tissue and parts held by medical or other institutions for research, storage, archival or transplantation purposes; conferring legal protection where otherwise there would be none. What, however, of body parts or tissue taken from living persons? Is this ‘property’ and, if so, who has “rights” over it? The implications are considerable for patients and others, particularly researchers where commercial exploitation is envisaged.

1956 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Jolowicz

The proposition that a master, who has become liable for an injury caused by a servant acting in the course of his employment, can recover an indemnity from the servant is one which has been stated on a number of occasions, but until the recent case of Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Lister no clear authority could be cited in support. It is true that the master's rights against his servant have been canvassed in at least three modern cases, but in all of them the common law position has been obscured by the application of the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935. In Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Lister, however, by what those interested in legal principle can only regard as a happy chance, it was necessary for the Court of Appeal to deal with the matter independently of the Act.


2009 ◽  
pp. 253-256
Author(s):  
M.H. Ogilvie

Cases of duress in contract law are few and far between. Most are concerned with improper threats or taking advantage of a weaker party to procure a contract rather than with actual physical threats of the “[y]our money or your life” variety, which are more likely to be controlled by the criminal law. A recent decision on a preliminary issue of law in relation to duress in the English Court of Appeal answered an interesting question that appears never to have been raised in earlier cases about duress, that is, whether rescission of a contract can be granted where restitution is impossible because one of the parties has destroyed documents relating to the contract as required by the contract so that they could not be restored. The trial judge found that rescission could not be granted and that no other remedy was available in the common law for duress, but the Court of Appeal reversed that finding by assimilating the fact situation with those in which equity has done “practical justice,” thereby further fusing the common law and equity relating to duress and undue influence, and possibly also fraud as well. The facts of this highly complex case, which also involved conflict of laws, mistake, frustration, and uncertainty have yet to be resolved at trial, but the Court of Appeal entertained two preliminary questions of law, duress, and conflict of laws before sending the case to trial. This comment is focused on the duress point.


2017 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 555-576
Author(s):  
Luke Moffett

Victim personal statements (VPS) have been introduced in a number of common law criminal justice systems. Although they have been espoused as important in ensuring victims’ ‘voices’ are ‘heard’ in sentencing, this article examines the extent of improving victim satisfaction and procedural justice in Northern Ireland. In light of increasing juridification of victim participation through the VPS by the EU and the English Court of Appeal, its impact on sentencing has received mixed views amongst victims, intermediaries and legal practitioners. Drawing from 24 interviews with judges, lawyers and intermediaries, this article finds that greater attention should be paid to vulnerable victims’ inclusion and that judges should better articulate the impact the VPS has on sentencing and the significance of such statements in acknowledging the victim’s experience, rather than engendering harsher sentences.


Author(s):  
Filippo Ranieri

Summary The numerous translations through which the Commentaries on the Laws of England by William Blackstone – a milestone in the history of the common law – became known in France, and thus contributed for the first time to acquaint French jurists with English law, have been largely neglected by legal historians. The first section of the present contribution introduces the French anglophile visitors to England who, during the second half of the eighteenth century, disseminated the work of William Blackstone and its first translations in France. The biography and work of these first translators require a detailed examination. A second section assesses the influence of these translations, particularly in the legal and political debates on the English trial by jury in the context of revolutionary legislation. A third section considers the later translations of Blackstone’s work during the Napoleonic period and the following years. Finally, a call for further research outlines the impact of that translation literature.


2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 196-207
Author(s):  
James C Fisher

This note analyses the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd, a case that confirms the long uncertain ability of ‘No Oral Modification’ clauses to exclude informal variations in English law. This note argues that, while the Court was correct to reject the putative oral variation in question, the majority’s description of the law is unsatisfactory because of its detachment from wider contract law principle, and compares unfavourably with the alternative ratio by which Lord Briggs reached a concurring outcome. This note also comments on the Supreme Court’s (cursory) treatment of the portentous Court of Appeal decision in Williams v Roffey Bros, which has reformulated the law on contract variation across common law jurisdictions. The Court acknowledged, but declined to resolve, the tensions Roffey introduced in to the law on part payment of debts. While it is unfortunate that the opportunity to resolve these tensions was missed, this note endorses the Court’s ( obiter) rejection of the analysis by which the Court of Appeal below sought to extend Roffey to the part payment of debts.


2001 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-492
Author(s):  
Richard Mullender

In the law of defamation, the jury is “the constitutional tribunal” of fact (J.C.C. Gatley, Libel and Slander, 9th ed. (London 1998), pp. 889-890). The jury’s occupation of this position is usually traced back to Fox’s Libel Act 1792. While confined in terms to criminal trials, the 1792 Act is regarded as declaratory of the common law (see Sir Martin Nourse, “The English Law of Defamation-Is Trial by Jury Still the Best?”, in B.S. Markesinis (ed.), The Clifford Chance Lectures, vol. I, Bridging the Channel (Oxford 1996), ch. 4). One way in which to explain the jury’s role in defamation trials can be found in the ideal of institutional justice. This ideal specifies that institutions should, in order to be legitimate, adequately accommodate the views of those in the society where they operate (G. Cupit, Justice As Fittingness (Oxford 1996), ch. 5). There is, however, reason to regard defamation law’s commitment to institutional justice as qualified. Support for this view can be found in Grobbelaar v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2001] 2 All E.R. 437. In Grobbelaar, a unanimous Court of Appeal overturned a jury’s findings of fact on the ground that they were perverse and unreasonable. This decision appears ground-breaking since the Court was unable to point to domestic authorities in which the same step had been taken.


2005 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 197-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
KJ Keith

In 1769, by a nice coincidence, Captain James Cook made landfall in New Zealand, the first British mariner to do so, and William Blackstone published the final volume of hisCommentaries on the Law of England. Blackstoněs discussion of the application of the law of Englandto newly acquired colonies is not completely coherent, but it does give a strong sense that much, if not all, of the common law did come to apply to many, if not all, of them.1The Privy Council was reminded of this, with express reference to Blackstone, in November 2003 when it was asked to determine whether the rule inSmith v Selwyn,2a decision of the English Court of Appeal given in 1914, was part of the law of Jamaica.3


2010 ◽  
Vol 11 (6) ◽  
pp. 656-670
Author(s):  
Kate Sutherland

Professor Joseph Weiler will soon stand trial for criminal libel in France for refusing to remove a book review from a website associated with an academic journal for which he serves as editor. His case has disturbing implications for all those who write, edit, and publish critical scholarly work. In this article, I explore those implications for Canadian scholars at home and as members of a global scholarly community. I assess the likelihood of success of a similar complaint under Canadian defamation law, and I consider the impact of libel chill and libel tourism. I conclude that although the defendant in such a case would have a good chance of prevailing under Canadian law through the defense of fair comment, a threat to academic freedom remains that requires action on the part of individuals and institutions committed to its preservation and enhancement.


1966 ◽  
Vol 1 (4) ◽  
pp. 562-579 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. M. Apelbom

Eighteen years after attaining independence Israel remains essentially a common law country. Introduced by the British Mandatory administration to supplement the Ottoman legislation in force at the time of the British occupation of Palestine, the common law has been retained by the Israeli legislator, so far as not modified or replaced by local legislation. But this common law, far from being residual only, also embraces a considerable body of interstitial law developed by two generations of judges, British, Palestinian and Israeli, in the process of applying and interpreting statute law—whether Ottoman, Mandatory or Israeli—according to common law methods. On the other hand the importation of common law institutions was neither wholesale nor systematic and in a number of fields no clear line of demarcation can be drawn between domestic and English law.


Author(s):  
David B. Schorr

This article recovers a debate, played out over the course of a century, in courts across the « common law world », over whether nature had normative force in water law. It explores areas of water law, such as the extent of public ownership in rivers and the effects of shifting watercourses on ownership, in which some courts, not without controversy, departed from the established rules of English law in order to make rules more appropriate, as they saw it, to the local environment.


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