scholarly journals Responsibility versus responsiveness…to whom? A theory of party behavior

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 334-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zoe Lefkofridi ◽  
Roula Nezi

Late Peter Mair argued that, in the contemporary multilevel institutional setting of global governance, parties are faced with a dilemma between Responsiveness and Responsibility (RR dilemma). However, Mair did not theorize variation in how different parties experience the RR dilemma (degrees of tension) and how they manage it (strategies). We develop his work in three ways: first, we advance variants of the RR dilemma, where the tension party leaders face differs, and elucidate how viable contenders for executive office are likely to behave in each of these scenarios, and why. Second, we highlight domestic institutional factors (electoral rules and leadership autonomy) that regulate the pressure for being responsive to public opinion and to partisans. Third, we place the RR dilemma in the context of multidimensional issue competition, which helps identify strategies for managing it. Finally, we provide an empirical illustration of our arguments using data on public opinion and partisans. We show that although responsibility can be combined with (some) voters’ representation, tension is high when leaders are constrained and partisans oppose responsibility even if the public endorses it; this is also the case under disproportional electoral rules when the public opposes responsibility, even if party supporters endorse it.

2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 78-99
Author(s):  
Eduardo Alemán ◽  
Juan Pablo Micozzi ◽  
Pablo M. Pinto ◽  
Sebastián Saiegh

ABSTRACTAccording to conventional wisdom, closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) electoral systems create incentives for legislators to favor the party line over their voters’ positions. However, electoral incentives may induce party leaders to tolerate “shirking” by some legislators, even under CLPR. This study argues that in considering whose deviations from the party line should be tolerated, party leaders exploit differences in voters’ relative electoral influence resulting from malapportionment. We expect defections in roll call votes to be more likely among legislators elected from overrepresented districts than among those from other districts. We empirically test this claim using data on Argentine legislators’ voting records and a unique dataset of estimates of voters’ and legislators’ placements in a common ideological space. Our findings suggest that even under electoral rules known for promoting unified parties, we should expect strategic defections to please voters, which can be advantageous for the party’s electoral fortunes.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1532673X2110413
Author(s):  
Jason S. Byers ◽  
Laine P. Shay

President Donald Trump has made various decisions, many controversial, to manage the coronavirus pandemic. The reaction to President Trump’s leadership has been met with a mixed response from the public. This raises an important question; what factors influence a citizen’s evaluation of President Trump’s response to the pandemic? We develop a theory that links a citizen knowing someone diagnosed with COVID-19 with their evaluation of President Trump’s management of the pandemic, with the expectation that this relationship is conditioned by a citizen’s ideology. Using data from two surveys, we find that knowing someone diagnosed with COVID-19 diminishes the effect ideology has on a citizen’s evaluation. Additionally, we find that a citizen’s evaluation of President Trump’s leadership on COVID-19 is associated with their vote choice in the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election. Overall, this article contributes to our understanding of public opinion on COVID-19 and its political ramifications.


2016 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Ceron ◽  
Marco Mainenti

The impact of corruption charges on the electoral performance of parties is conditioned by specific institutional factors. This article shows the extent to which the effects of political corruption depend on the control that party leaders exercise over the ballot. It is argued that voters might abstain or support other lists if they cannot select individual candidates to revitalize the reputation of the political party. Employing data on judicial investigations in Italy from 1983 to 2013, we provide evidence of the role of electoral rules and intra-party xcandidate selection in shaping the relationship between corruption and voters’ behaviour. Parties implicated in corruption or related crimes experience a loss of votes when they compete under a closed list formula or when the candidate selection process is strongly centralized.


2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-436 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabio Franchino ◽  
Marco Mainenti

AbstractElectoral institutions shape the incentives of governments to rely on distributive measures and to comply with international obligations because of the misalignment they may engender between the collective objectives of a government party and the individual objectives of its members in the legislature. We use this argument to explain the puzzle of unlawful state aid measures in the European Union (EU). Existing theories of EU compliance and implementation offer no convincing explanation to their persistence and patterns. Using data from 2000 to 2012, we find that an increase of district magnitude improves compliance. However, compliance decreases with higher magnitude where either party leaders have no control over the ballot rank or other electoral rules strengthen the incentives to search for a personal vote. We also provide evidence for the effects of electoral reforms on compliance. These results have implications for the broader literature on compliance with international regimes.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-37
Author(s):  
Muhammad Sahlan

Since Covid-19 broke out in Indonesia, the public has monitored various government policies in dealing with these health disasters. However, policies run slowly; it gives rise to diverse public opinion. These multiple opinions become a form of communication between the government and society. However, the government does not fully capture people’s views, so people feel they do not receive government policies’ feedback. The purpose of this research is to find out how the Indonesian government’s public communication is in dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic. The research used a descriptive qualitative method using data during Covid-19. This study explains how the debate of government and community communication occurs in the form of public opinion. Various forms of public opinion from adverse to positive states become message instruments aimed at the government. This instrument then forms communication in the form of action as a sense of moral panic due to the absence of a back answer to the opinion expressed. So, these opinions are only as answers and realized by society in phenomena.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 205316802090458 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael R. Touchton ◽  
Casey A. Klofstad ◽  
Jonathan P. West ◽  
Joseph E. Uscinski

The release of classified documents through outlets like WikiLeaks has transformed American politics by shedding light on the innerworkings of governments, parties, and corporations. The high-profile criminal cases associated with such releases – those of Julian Assange, Chelsea Manning, and Edward Snowden – have highlighted important questions about journalism, government secrecy, and the public’s “right to know.” Scholars have focused on the journalistic and legalistic implications but have yet to explore how the public views those who release classified materials, and what factors affect those views. Using data from the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we provide results from three embedded experiments testing the effects of two forms of framing on favorability ratings toward Assange, Manning, and Snowden. The first frame addresses partisanship (i.e., which party is injured by the release) and the second addresses how the action is framed (i.e., did the person “leak” or “blow the whistle”). The data show that both the party and leaking/whistleblowing frames significantly affect favorability in expected ways. The release of classified materials comes with both costs and benefits, but public opinion appears to be more sensitive to its implications for partisan competition.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ye Wu ◽  
Qihui Ye ◽  
Lixiang Li ◽  
Jinghua Xiao

Statistical properties of the human comment behavior are studied using data from “Tianya” and “Tieba” which are very popular online social systems (or forums) in China. We find that both the reply numberRand the view numberVof a thread in a subforum obey the power-law distributionsP(R)=RαandP(V)∝Vβ, respectively, which indicates that there exists a kind of highly popular topics. These topics should be specially paid much attention, because they play an important role in the public opinion formation and the public opinion control. In addition, the relationship betweenRandValso obeys the power-law functionR∝Vγ. Based on the human comment habit, a model is introduced to explain the human view and reply behaviors in the forum. Numerical simulations of the model fit well with the empirical results. Our findings are helpful for discovering collective patterns of human behaviors and the evolution of public opinions on the virtual society as well as the real one.


2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 693-711 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wonjae Hwang ◽  
Wonbin Cho ◽  
Krista Wiegand

Does ongoing animosity between South Korea and Japan over the disputed Dokdo Islands and other issues that originated from historical disputes generate rally effects in Korean domestic politics? This article argues that the Dokdo Islands dispute—and related disputed issues rooted in the colonial experience of Korea under Japan's rule historically—strongly influence Korean presidents’ abilities to effectively mobilize domestic support for not only the issues, but particularly the public opinion of presidents. Using data on Korean presidents’ approval ratings between 1993 and 2016, this article shows that Korea's bilateral disputes with Japan tend to promote Korean presidential popularity. The findings suggest that external crises with Japan related to historical disputes have positive political effects on leadership ratings in Korea.


2006 ◽  
Vol 76 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-610 ◽  
Author(s):  
FREDERICK HESS

In this article, Frederick Hess discusses public opinion trends related to educational issues from the enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) in 2002 through 2006. Using data from three separate public opinion polls, Hess analyzes the general public's and parents' opinions on several issues, including the proper use of large-scale assessments, the appropriateness of punitive action for failing schools, the place of school choice, and the responsibility for closing achievement gaps across groups. Among many important findings, the author determines that NCLB has had little effect on the public's general opinion of public schools; that there is little public support for the sanctioning of struggling schools; and that while the public feels that schools should not be blamed for existing achievement gaps, schools should be responsible for closing them. He concludes with a discussion of implications for policymakers and practitioners.


2012 ◽  
pp. 24-47
Author(s):  
V. Gimpelson ◽  
G. Monusova

Using different cross-country data sets and simple econometric techniques we study public attitudes towards the police. More positive attitudes are more likely to emerge in the countries that have better functioning democratic institutions, less prone to corruption but enjoy more transparent and accountable police activity. This has a stronger impact on the public opinion (trust and attitudes) than objective crime rates or density of policemen. Citizens tend to trust more in those (policemen) with whom they share common values and can have some control over. The latter is a function of democracy. In authoritarian countries — “police states” — this tendency may not work directly. When we move from semi-authoritarian countries to openly authoritarian ones the trust in the police measured by surveys can also rise. As a result, the trust appears to be U-shaped along the quality of government axis. This phenomenon can be explained with two simple facts. First, publicly spread information concerning police activity in authoritarian countries is strongly controlled; second, the police itself is better controlled by authoritarian regimes which are afraid of dangerous (for them) erosion of this institution.


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