A lesson in un-creativity: (R (on the application of Friends of the Earth Ltd and others) v Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52

2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 344-349
Author(s):  
Joanne Hawkins
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Decision Maker ◽  
National Policy ◽  
Policy Statement ◽  
Infrastructure Projects ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Missed Opportunity

Plans for a third runway at Heathrow airport have been the subject of ongoing melodrama. In the latest instalment, (R (on the application of Friends of the Earth Ltd and others) v Heathrow Airport Ltd [2020] UKSC 52), the Supreme Court comprehensively reversed the Court of Appeal's judgment, rejecting the finding that the decision maker acted unlawfully in designating the Airport National Policy Statement (ANPS). This commentary highlights that the Supreme Court judgment signals a missed opportunity to develop a more creative approach to the polycentric and dynamic issue of climate change in the context of nationally significant infrastructure projects. It argues that the decision is, if not wholly unexpected, a disappointing one.

scholarly journals Climate change and nationally significant infrastructure projects: R (on the application of Plan B Earth) v Secretary of State for Transport

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-132
Author(s):  
Edward Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
National Policy ◽  
Paris Agreement ◽  
Policy Statement ◽  
Infrastructure Projects ◽  
Secretary Of State ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Plan B ◽  
Court Of Appeal

In R ( on the application of Plan B Earth) v Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWCA Civ 214, [2020] 2 WLUK 372, the Court of Appeal held that the Secretary of State had acted unlawfully by failing to take into account the UK’s commitments in the 2015 Paris Agreement when he decided to designate a policy formulated to enable the construction of a third runway at Heathrow airport as a ‘national policy statement’ under the Planning Act 2008. An appeal to the Supreme Court is pending. The outcome of that appeal should help to clarify the legal significance of the Paris Agreement and will have significant implications both for expansion at Heathrow airport, for other major infrastructure projects and for other planning and environmental litigation.

The National Green Tribunal in India: examining the question of jurisdiction

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 190-216
Author(s):  
Nupur Chowdhury ◽  
Nidhi Srivastava
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Constitutional Amendment ◽  
Rhetorical Question ◽  
Environmental Disputes ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Limitation Periods

Can a tribunal deliver justice? By posing this rhetorical question this article attempts to contextualize the introduction of the tribunal system of adjudication in India. Some of these tribunals have been able to evolve into mechanisms that have overcome their birth infirmities. The Supreme Court has intervened and supported strengthening of these tribunals and their evolution into entities (if not fully but certainly) more independent of the executive. This article explores these questions through a case study of the National Green Tribunal (NGT)—specifically focusing on the subject of jurisdiction. NGT is the newest of the tribunals that have been established since the Constitutional amendment was passed allowing for them. The jurisdiction of the NGT, although statutorily limited, has evolved in the light of Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the powers of tribunals. Further, the nature of environmental disputes are such that the NGT has had to expansively interpret both procedural mechanisms, such as limitation periods for allowing more disputes to be brought to the bench, and by entering into substantive areas such as climate change.

The tenure of English judges

1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. H. McIlwain
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
General Object ◽  
William Iii ◽  
Science Association

At the meeting of the Political Science Association last year, in the general discussion, on the subject of the recall, I was surprised and I must admit, a little shocked to hear our recall of judges compared to the English removal of judges on address of the houses of parliament.If we must compare unlike things, rather than place the recall beside the theory or the practice of the joint address, I should even prefer to compare it to a bill of attainder.In history, theory and practice the recall as we have it and the English removal by joint address have hardly anything in common, save the same general object.Though I may not (as I do not) believe in the recall of judges, this paper concerns itself not at all with that opinion, but only with the history and nature of the tenure of English judges, particularly as affected by the possibility of removal on address. I believe a study of that history will show that any attempt to force the address into a close resemblance to the recall, whether for the purpose of furthering or of discrediting the latter, is utterly misleading.In the history of the tenure of English judges the act of 12 and 13 William III, subsequently known as the Act of Settlement, is the greatest landmark. The history of the tenure naturally divides into two parts at the year 1711. In dealing with both parts, for the sake of brevity, I shall confine myself strictly to the judges who compose what since 1873 has been known as the supreme court of judicature.

Equity and certainty in contract law

Acta Juridica ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 141-176
Author(s):  
F Brand
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
High Court ◽  
Contractual Relationships ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Do So

The role of abstract values such as equity and fairness in our law of contract has been the subject of controversy for a number of years. In 2002 the Supreme Court of Appeal took the position that these values do not constitute self-standing grounds for interfering with contractual relationships. Despite this being consistently maintained by the SCA in a number of cases, some High Court judges deviated from this position on the basis that they were permitted to do so by some minority judgments and obiter dicta in the Constitutional Court. The uncertainty thus created has fortunately now been removed by the judgment of the Constitutional Court in Beadica v The Trustees for the Time being of the Oregon Trust.

scholarly journals Czy przebaczenie niweczy skutki uprzedniego wydziedziczenia?

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 ◽  
pp. 143-153
Author(s):  
Anna Moskal
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Civil Code ◽  
Inheritance Law ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Legal Nature ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Made In

Does forgiveness nullify the effects of previous disinheritance? The legal nature of forgiveness is the subject of passionate debates among the representatives of civil law doctrine. According to the dominant position in the literature, forgiveness is an act of affection or its manifested expression of forgiveness of the perpetrator of experienced injustice and related to this grudge. This institution has been applied three times in the Civil Code — once with the donation agreement, twice in regulations of inheritance law. Article 1010 § 1 provides that a testator cannot disinherit eligible for legal portion if he forgave him. The wording of the above article indicates that accomplishment of disinheritance in case if testator eligible for legal portion has previously forgiven. The legislator did not, however, determine the effects of forgiveness in relation to previous disinheritance. In the act of 1971, the Supreme Court accepted that such forgiveness would automatically nullify the effects of disinheritance, and could be made in any form. In recent years, lower courts have begun to question the Supreme Court's position, and judges increasingly refer to the critical statements of numerous doctrines. As it was rightly stated, admitting the possibility of invoking the forgiveness made after disinheritance poses a serious threat to the realization of the testator’s will, who, by forgiving, does not necessarily want to revoke the effects of his previous disinheritance. The postulate of de lege ferenda is, according to the author of the article, giving of freedom of judging the effects of forgiveness to the courts and each examination of the forgiving testator’s will on the possible abatement of the consequences of previous disinheritance.]]>

scholarly journals After Labaye: The Harm Test of Obscenity, the New Judicial Vacuum, and the Relevance of Familiar Voices

2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 741 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Jochelson
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Tolerance Test ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Obscenity Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Tolerance Approach ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Community Standards

In R. v. Labaye, the Supreme Court of Canada finally retired the community standards of tolerance test of obscenity. The test had been the subject of much academic critique, a matter that reached its zenith in the period following Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), in which a gay and lesbian bookshop contested the procedures and legislative regime of customs officials in detaining its imports. The engagement in the literature on the efficacy of the community standards test that followed was often heated, always interesting, and ultimately unresolved. To date, we have not seen any clarifying applications of the newly proposed harm test by the Supreme Court, nor have we seen a profound articulation in any lower courts. Subsequently, the academic discussion has slowed to a crawl. In this article, the author reviews four accounts of the community standards test that were prominent following Little Sisters, and asks if the newly proposed Labaye standard meets their concerns. The Labaye case provides much fodder for the previous critics and supporters of a community standards of tolerance approach to analyze. After a critical analysis of the new Labaye test, the author concludes that the concerns have not been muted by the retirement of the community standards test, even if the voices have been. The engaged voices heard in the aftermath of Little Sisters should not hold back and they should not abandon the work to be done in obscenity law and freedom of expression discourse generally.

scholarly journals RESPONSABILIDADE EM FACE DE PIQUETE NA JURISPRUDÊNCIA NORTE-AMERICANA

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (54) ◽  
pp. 499
Author(s):  
Edilton MEIRELES
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
United States Supreme Court ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Deductive Method ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Right

RESUMONeste trabalho tratamos do direito de manifestação em piquetes e da responsabilidade que possa advir desses atos em face da jurisprudência da Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos da América. A partir da análise das principais decisões da Suprema Corte se pode concluir que, de modo geral, os participantes do piquete não respondem quando agem de forma não ilegal. Está sedimentado, no entanto, o entendimento de que o organizador do piquete responde pelos atos dos participantes. A pesquisa desenvolvida se justifica enquanto estudo comparativo e diante do pouco debate existente no Brasil a respeito do tema. Na pesquisa foi utilizado o método dedutivo, limitada à ciência dogmática do direito, com estudo de casos apreciados pelo judiciário. PALAVRAS-CHAVES: Responsabilidade; Piquete; Estados Unidos; Suprema Corte; Liberdade De Expressão. ABSTRACTIn this work we deal with the right of demonstration in pickets and the responsibility that may arise from these acts in the face of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States of America. From the analysis of the Supreme Court's main decisions it can be concluded that, in general, the picket participants do not respond when they act in a non-illegal way. It is settled, however, the understanding that the picket organizer responds by the acts of the participants. The research developed is justified as a comparative study and in view of the little debate that exists in Brazil regarding the subject. In the research was used the deductive method, limited to the dogmatic science of law, with study of cases appreciated by the judiciary.KEYWORDS: Responsibility; Picket; United States; Supreme Court; Freedom Of Expression.

scholarly journals Dishonesty

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 5-14
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Criminal Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Alumni Association ◽  
Uk Supreme Court ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Obiter Dictum

This article provides an exposition and assessment of the UK Supreme Court judgment in the case of Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd. It identifies the Supreme Court’s reconsideration, obiter dictum, of the test of dishonesty in civil and criminal law. This term is used in particular in offences such as those set out in the Theft Act 1968. Prior to the Supreme Court’s intervention, the leading case was R v Ghosh [1982] EWCA Crim 2. However, the Ghosh test in that case has been the subject of significant criticism in the academy and elsewhere, and some such critiques are discussed in the Supreme Court judgment. This article, which considers these developments, was first delivered as the Bristol Alumni Association Lecture on 23 February 2018.

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