Panopticon, Inc.: Jeremy Bentham, contract management, and (neo)liberal penality

2021 ◽  
pp. 146247452110234
Author(s):  
Spencer J Weinreich
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Contract Management ◽  
State Function ◽  
Jeremy Bentham ◽  
Human Psychology ◽  
Economic Production ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Private Profit ◽  
Private Contractor

This essay revisits Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, perhaps the foundational figure of the study of the prison, to recover a dimension of the project wholly omitted in Michel Foucault’s canonical reading in Discipline and Punish. Nowhere does Foucault mention Bentham’s insistence that the prison be run by a private contractor. With Bentham's penal theory characteristically derived from his account of human psychology, the contract and private profit are essential to the functioning of the Panopticon, because they align the jailer's duty with their self-interest. Bentham built profit and market imperatives into the fabric of the Panopticon, always envisioned as a place of economic production. The contract-Panopticon and its political economy are vital antecedents to the neoliberal penality theorized by Loïc Wacquant and Bernard E. Harcourt, even as they problematize the statism inherited from Foucault and the chronological implications of the prefix “neo.” Bentham was only the theorist of a marketization of governance pervasive in his own time and ever since, raising the question of whether punishment has ever been a purely state function.

Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?

2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (S1) ◽  
pp. S85-S108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sungmin Rho ◽  
Michael Tomz
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
International Political Economy ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Distributional Cues ◽  
Trade Preferences ◽  
Opposing Effects ◽  
Personal Interests

AbstractThe dominant approach to the study of international political economy assumes that the policy preferences of individuals and groups reflect economic self-interest. Recent research has called this assumption into question by suggesting that voters do not have economically self-interested preferences about trade policy. We investigate one potential explanation for this puzzling finding: economic ignorance. We show that most voters do not understand the economic consequences of protectionism. We then use experiments to study how voters would respond if they had more information about how trade barriers affect the distribution of income. We find that distributional cues generate two opposing effects: they make people more likely to express self-serving policy preferences, but they also make people more sensitive to the interests of others. In our study both reactions were evident, but selfish responses outweighed altruistic ones. Thus, if people knew more about the distributional effects of trade, the correlation between personal interests and policy preferences would tighten. By showing how the explanatory power of economic self-interest depends on beliefs about causality, this research provides a foundation for more realistic, behaviorally informed theories of international political economy.

Part III Regimes and Doctrines, Ch.43 Transnational Migration, Globalization, and Governance: Theorizing a Crisis

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Chantal
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Transnational Migration ◽  
Economic Life ◽  
Central American ◽  
Life Changes ◽  
Economic Production ◽  
Global Power ◽  
The Us ◽  
Us Intervention

This chapter emphasizes the role of political economy, and the ways in which global governance has affected (or failed to affect) it, in generating immigration crises. Going beyond politics toward political economy illuminates both the origins of US intervention in Central America, and the ways in which that intervention has shaped migration from the region. US involvement stemmed from global power struggles over the organization of economic production: namely, its concerns about the turn to socialism, particularly after the Cuban Revolution. If foreign policy origins stemmed from economics, often so did policy tools; such measures oriented Central American economies towards the US as a destination for its exports, and increased the Central American presence of US investors and imports. They also engendered profound changes in Central American economic life: changes that each in their own way have reinforced patterns contributing to the current migration surge.

The Political Economy of Trade Policy

1989 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 119-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert E Baldwin
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
International Trade ◽  
Trade Policy ◽  
Machine Tools ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Public Officials ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Social Concerns

International trade seems to be a subject where the advice of economists is routinely disregarded. Economists are nearly unanimous in their general opposition to protectionism, but the increase in U.S. protection in recent years in such sectors as automobiles, steel, textiles and apparel, machine tools, footwear and semiconductors demonstrates that economists lack political influence on trade policy. Two broad approaches have been developed to analyze the political economics of trade policy and the processes that generate protectionism. One approach emphasizes the economic self-interest of the political participants, while the other stresses the importance of the broad social concerns of voters and public officials. This paper outlines the nature of the two approaches, indicating how they can explain the above anomalies and other trade policy behavior, and concludes with observations about integrating the two frameworks, conducting further research, and making policy based on the analysis.

The Political Economy of EU-funds: Evidence from Poland

2017 ◽  
Vol 237 (3) ◽  
pp. 191-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
Monika Banaszewska ◽  
Ivo Bischoff
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Empirical Study ◽  
Local Politics ◽  
The Political ◽  
Minor Role ◽  
Regional Government ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Per Capita ◽  
Primary Focus ◽  
A Minor

Abstract We provide an empirical study analysing the distribution of EU funds among 2478 Polish municipalities in the period 2007–2011. EU funds are found to be concentrated in smaller municipalities and economically weak sub-regions, and do not increase in the municipalities’ fiscal capacity. Our primary focus rests on the question whether regional governments follow their own political self-interest when allocating EU funds even though national parties only play a minor role in Polish local politics and thus the conventional logic of supporting aligned governments does not apply. Difference-in-difference estimations show that the answer is affirmative: Municipalities whose voters are aligned with the regional government receive more EU funds per capita than non-aligned municipalities. Furthermore, we find support for the swing-district hypothesis: EU funds per capita decrease in the vote-share differential between the two leading parties.

scholarly journals Commons Praxis: Toward a Critical Political Economy of the Digital Commons

2018 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 290-305 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin J Birkinbine
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Analytical Framework ◽  
Market Mechanisms ◽  
Organisational Form ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Digital Commons ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Commons

The concept of the commons has provided a useful framework for understanding a wide range of resources and cultural activities associated with the creation of value outside of the traditional market mechanisms under capitalism (i.e., private property, rational self-interest, and profit maximization).  However, these communities often continue to intersect with capital and the state attempts to appropriate their resources. Recent scholarship has sought to unpack some of the contradictions inherent in the claims made about the revolutionary potential of the commons by offering conceptual frameworks for assessing commons-based projects.  This paper builds upon this research by developing a two-pronged argument.  First, by drawing examples from the free software movement, I argue that critical political economy provides the most useful analytical framework for understanding the contradictions inherent in the relationship between capital and the commons. Second, I argue for a commons praxis that attempts to overcome some of these contradictions.  Within this discussion, I build on the notion of ‘boundary commoning’ to understand organisational form, and I develop the concept of ‘subversive commoning’ for understanding various forms of commoning that seek to undermine the capitalist logics of the digital commons.

scholarly journals The debating tradition in Britain and the new political economy: William Thompson and John Stuart Mill at the London Co-operative Society in 1825

Nova Economia ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 609-636
Author(s):  
Carlos Leonardo Kulnig Cinelli ◽  
Rogério Arthmar
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Social Change ◽  
John Stuart Mill ◽  
Economic Benefits ◽  
Historical Background ◽  
General Context ◽  
Jeremy Bentham ◽  
Individual Liberty ◽  
Free Competition ◽  
Working People

Abstract: This paper reviews the debate between William Thompson and John Stuart Mill that happened at the London Co-operative Society in 1825 over the advantages of cooperation as against free competition. The general context of the controversy is provided by some historical background on British debating tradition within the working people. Next, the philosophical doctrines of Jeremy Bentham and Robert Owen are outlined as the main forces of social change in the 1820s, both of which would collide during the faceoff at the Co-operative Society. Following that, we examine William Thompson’s ideas on income distribution and the moral evils of competition. Lastly, we present John Mill’s approach to these same issues, showing that his basic conception of individual liberty did not change throughout his life, despite his late agreement with the economic benefits of cooperation. The final remarks stress the originality of the theoretical elements put forth in the debate.

Gay, Tucker, Paley, and Bentham

2019 ◽  
pp. 187-206
Author(s):  
Roger Crisp
Keyword(s):  
Common Sense ◽  
Jeremy Bentham ◽  
John Gay ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Act Utilitarianism ◽  
William Paley ◽  
Common Sense Morality ◽  
Instrumental View

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of four key figures in the British utilitarian tradition. The associationist theory of virtue of John Gay (1699–1745) is outlined. It is shown how psychological and rational hedonism are combined with utilitarianism in the work of Abraham Tucker (1705–74). The largely instrumental view taken by William Paley (1743–1805) of the rules of common-sense morality is described, and it is demonstrated how he sometimes slides into a non-instrumental position. The ‘split-level’ act utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) is placed within his largely legislative project. A conclusion outlines several philosophical themes running through the ethics of the period discussed in the book, and the importance of that period as an influence on, and a source for, contemporary ethics.

scholarly journals Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety

2009 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 425-457 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward D. Mansfield ◽  
Diana C. Mutz
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
The Political ◽  
National Surveys ◽  
Factor Endowments ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Specific Factors ◽  
Trade Preferences ◽  
Foreign Commerce ◽  
Mass Attitudes ◽  
The U.S

AbstractAlthough it is widely acknowledged that an understanding of mass attitudes about trade is crucial to the political economy of foreign commerce, only a handful of studies have addressed this topic. These studies have focused largely on testing two models, both of which emphasize that trade preferences are shaped by how trade affects an individual's income. The factor endowments or Heckscher-Ohlin model posits that these preferences are affected primarily by a person's skills. The specific factors or Ricardo-Viner model posits that trade preferences depend on the industry in which a person works. We find little support for either of these models using two representative national surveys of Americans. The only potential exception involves the effects of education. Initial tests indicate that educational attainment and support for open trade are directly related, which is often interpreted as support for the Heckscher-Ohlin model. However, further analysis reveals that education's effects are less representative of skill than of individuals' anxieties about involvement with out-groups in their own country and beyond. Furthermore, we find strong evidence that trade attitudes are guided less by material self-interest than by perceptions of how the U.S. economy as a whole is affected by trade.

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