Radical right parties and European economic integration: Evidence from the seventh European Parliament

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matteo Cavallaro ◽  
David Flacher ◽  
Massimo Angelo Zanetti

This article explores the differences in radical right parties' voting behaviour on economic matters at the European Parliament. As the literature highlights the heterogeneity of these parties in relation to their economic programmes, we test whether divergences survive the elections and translate into dissimilar voting patterns. Using voting records from the seventh term of the European Parliament, we show that radical right parties do not act as a consolidated party family. We then analyse the differences between radical right parties by the means of different statistical methods (NOMINATE, Ward's clustering criterion, and additive trees) and find that these are described along two dimensions: the degree of opposition to the European Union and the classical left–right economic cleavage. We provide a classification of these parties compromising four groups: pro-welfare conditional, pro-market conditional, and rejecting. Our results indicate that radical right parties do not act as a party family at the European Parliament. This remains true regardless of the salience of the policy issues in their agendas. The article also derives streams for future research on the heterogeneity of radical right parties.

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sabrina J. Mayer ◽  
Carl C. Berning ◽  
David Johann

This paper offers an explanation of the link between grandiose narcissism and support for radical right parties. Drawing on representative data of the GESIS Panel ( N = 2827), focusing on support for the German radical right populist party Alternative for Germany in 2016 and treating grandiose narcissism as a two–dimensional concept, it is shown that the effects of grandiose narcissism are indirect rather than direct. The paper also reveals that it is mainly narcissistic rivalry that accounts for radical right party support, whereas narcissistic admiration has a protecting relationship. Finally, our results indicate that the indirect effects of narcissistic rivalry on radical right party support via right–wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, respectively, are mediated by anti–immigrant sentiment. All in all, our results suggest that in studies on ideological orientations and voting behaviour, both dimensions of grandiose narcissism should be considered due to their contradictory relationship. Moreover, our findings indicate that the success of radical right parties might be the expression of personality dispositions of some parts of the electorate. © 2020 The Authors. European Journal of Personality published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Association of Personality Psychology


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 377-394 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eva Østergaard-Nielsen ◽  
Irina Ciornei ◽  
Jean-Michel Lafleur

AbstractPolicies allowing enfranchisement of non-resident citizens (emigrants and their descendants) are now implemented in the majority of states worldwide. A growing number of case studies show that the extension of voting rights to non-resident citizens is often contested among country of origin political parties. However, there is no systematic comparative study of why different political parties support or oppose external voting rights and how this position is framed by the parties. Drawing on a unique data set based on 34 debates across 13 countries, we estimate the extent to which ideology and party family are correlated with the positioning and framing of parties. Among the findings are that the more to the right is a party, the more it tends to support external voting rights, except in the case of radical right parties. The position on emigrant voting rights is largely framed along more pragmatic arguments.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-84 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stijn van Kessel ◽  
Nicola Chelotti ◽  
Helen Drake ◽  
Juan Roch ◽  
Patricia Rodi

Populist radical right parties are naturally Eurosceptic. Many responded positively to the British referendum vote to leave the European Union; various observers even spoke of a potential populist radical right-instigated ‘domino effect’. We ask whether this Brexit-enthusiasm prevailed in the proximate aftermath of the UK referendum, by means of a comparative analysis of populist radical right parties’ national election campaigns in the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Italy. The analysis considers whether the UK referendum result served as an external stimulus for populist radical right parties to harden their Euroscepticism and politicise the issue of European integration. The results show that this has, generally speaking, not been the case, and that Brexit has also not stimulated or amplified calls for leaving the European Union. Relating our findings to literature on the politicisation of European integration and strategic party behaviour, we argue that populist radical right parties had few incentives to act differently given the uninviting political opportunity structure.


2010 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul E. Sum

Increasingly, European radical right parties have capitalized on citizen dissatisfaction with the European Union institutions. As a new EU member, to what extent have supporters of the radical right in Romania turned away from Europe? I evaluate this question by tracking the evolution of radical right parties in Romania. I find that supporters of the radical right in Romania are generally do not support or do not trust the EU. The Greater Romania Party is well-positioned to expand its electoral base in the foreseeable future if it can widen its appeal to those Romanians who are ambivalent to the EU.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-40
Author(s):  
Luiza-Maria Filimon

The Nordic states had an active radical right presence long before the economic and refugee crises that swept the shores of the European Union (EU) left in their wake a reinvigorated right-wing contingent. The radical right parties (RRPs) have not only registered various degrees of electoral success, but have also made inroads into the political mainstream. The three defining characteristics that set these parties apart from the more traditional far-right ones are: 1) the repudiation of hardcore extremism; 2) the search for political viability; and 3) the acquisition of mainstream recognition. The present article argues that as these parties compete for legitimacy, they are forced to alter their discriminatory rhetoric by switching tonal registers. One of the political strategies that enables them to put the outright “overt” in the “covert” is the recourse to dog whistle politics. How well can they overcome the stigma associated with their more extreme reflexes depends on a case by case basis. This article examines whether the four most prominent examples of Nordic radicalism (the Danish People’s Party, Finns Party, Sweden Democrats, and Norway’s Progress Party) have integrated dog whistles in their political messaging and tracks how these coded appeals change from one country to another. In analyzing the response to the 2015 refugee crisis, the study finds that to a certain extent, the rhetoric utilized falls into the coded register or at the very least purposefully attempts to veer away from the radical excesses which are marginalizing and self-exclusionary.


2021 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 25-42
Author(s):  
Luca Manucci

In May 2019, the elections for the European Parliament (EP) saw populist parties obtain almost a third of the available seats, with populist radical right parties making the biggest gains compared to the 2014 elections. Despite the results were less resounding than some predictions anticipated, a considerable amount of Members of the EP represent a populist party. This article first presents the performance of populist parties in forty years of EP elections, from their first occurrence in 1979 until 2019, and then focuses on populist radical right parties. The analysis suggests that (i) the number of seats occupied by populist parties in the EP continues to grow over time; (ii) right-wing populist parties no longer struggle to form political groups within the EP; (iii) radical right populist parties have become the most common type of populist party within the EP.


Author(s):  
Sofia Vasilopoulou

This chapter examines the role that the European Union (EU) issue plays in radical right party agendas. It shows that, despite the fact that radical right parties tend to adopt dissimilar positions on the principle, practice, and future of European integration, they all tend to criticize the EU from a predominantly sovereignty-based perspective justified on ethnocultural grounds. The EU is portrayed as posing a threat to national sovereignty, its policies dismantling the state and its territory, as well as being responsible for the cultural disintegration of Europe and its nation-states. The analysis of EU issue positions and salience over time suggests that—despite variations—radical right parties engage in EU issue competition not only by adopting extreme positions but also by increasingly emphasizing these positions over time.


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