The First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the implied freedom of political communication in the Australian Constitution

2019 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 142-175
Author(s):  
Anthony Davidson Gray

This article suggests that the Australian High Court might usefully utilize more of the First Amendment jurisprudence than it has done so to date. After a succinct summary of the Australian implied freedom and First Amendment case law, it documents cases in which the Australian High Court has either utilised, or not utilised, First Amendment case law. It suggests specific instances in which the Australian case law might utilize some of the American doctrine, and responds to suggestions that the American case law is not applicable to the Australian constitutional context.

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 82-103
Author(s):  
Juhani Rudanko

This article focuses on face-threatening attacks on the Madison Administration during the War of 1812. The discussion is framed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, with the language of the Amendment protecting freedom of speech, and also by the Sedition Act of 1798, which, if it had been made permanent, would have seriously curtailed freedom of speech. The War of 1812 was intensely unpopular among members of the Federalist Party, and their newspapers did not shy away from criticising it. This article investigates writings published in the Boston Gazette and the Connecticut Mirror during the war. It is shown that the criticism took different forms, ranging from accusing President Madison of “untruths” to painting a picture of what was claimed to be the unmitigated hopelessness of his position, both nationally and internationally, and that the criticism also included harsh personal attacks on his character and motives. It is suggested that some of the attacks may be characterised as exhibiting aggravated impoliteness. The article also considers President Madison’s attitude in the face of the attacks.


2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 214-217
Author(s):  
Charles Marowitz

On 13 October 2012, Lenny Bruce, had he not accidentally overdosed on narcotics (or committed suicide – the jury is still out on that one), would be eighty-seven years old. It is, of course, a thoroughly incredible notion – like an octogenarian Mozart, a super annuated Janis Joplin, or James Dean signing up for a senior citizen pension. Poètes maudits, doomed rock icons, and self-destructive superstars are supposed to die young. Their myth demands it, and we wouldn't have it any other way.Bruce at forty-one, perched on a toilet bowl with a spike in his right arm and his last typed words (‘conspiracy to interfere with the Fourth Amendment const—’) in the barrel of his still humming electric typewriter, died characteristically. He was always associated with toilet humour and throughout the last decade of his life ex hausted himself trying to demonstrate that the United States Constitution protected the free speech for which one court after another mercilessly prosecuted him. (The Fourth Amendment, incidentally, protects citizens from ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ and, along with the state's First Amendment violations, was as much responsible for his downfall as the cocaine and morphine.)


2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-21
Author(s):  
Łukasz Machaj

FREEDOMS OF EXPRESSION, POLITICAL EXTREMISM AND SEDITIOUS SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S JURISPRUDENCE PART IThe article is the first part of a monothematic cycle devoted to the case law of the Supreme Court of the United States concerning the scope of constitutional protection of seditious and pol­itically extremist speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The author discusses the historical origins of the problem in question, focusing particularly on the decisions and practical application of the so-called Sedition Act of 1798, a regulation which drastically restricted the freedom of public debate by de facto criminalising speech that was critical of the government. Although the normative act in question has never been the subject of the Supreme Court’s rulings, it was unequivocally condemned in the obiter dicta to several statements of reasons behind the Su­preme Court’s opinions and is commonly deemed unconstitutional in the doctrine.


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamen Franklen Gussen ◽  
Sahar Araghi

AbstractSince the Engineers Case decision in 1920, the role of the United States Constitution in interpreting the Australian Constitution has been diminished, leading to inefficiencies in High Court of Australia (HCA) dealing with constitutional issues. To explain this thesis, the article looks at the 7,657 cases decided by the HCA, from the first case in 1903, to the 31st of August 2020, the centenary of the Engineers Case. The analysis identifies outliers that have much higher complexity (in terms of word-length) than the other judgments. This complexity has one common denominator: comparative analysis with the United States Constitution. The article explains why this common denominator has resulted in such complexity, and concludes with possible research extensions on the roles of the Australian judiciary in embracing SCOTUS jurisprudence when interpreting the Australian Constitution.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 168-258
Author(s):  
P. Brooks Fuller

Under settled First Amendment doctrine, true threats and incitement to violence fall clearly outside the protection of the United States Constitution. However, the line between violent speech and protected political hyperbole is exceedingly blurry, especially in high-conflict protest environments. This study complements doctrinal analysis with an ethnographic field study of abortion clinic protests in the Southern United States to test assumptions about speech, harm, and political discourse. It recommends that courts modify the analytical frameworks for true threats and incitement to better capture the layers of social and historical context that create social and rhetorical meaning amid political conflict.


1992 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 949-958 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Martin ◽  
K. Preston Oade ◽  
Ted D. Nirenberg

Federal law prohibits brewers from disclosing information about the alcohol content of malt beverages on product labels or in advertising. In 1987, the Adolph Coors Company filed suit against the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, arguing that this law is an invalid suppression of speech violating the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Coors won the case in U.S. District Court and the defendants have appealed to the United States Court of Appeals. A hearing and decision on the appeal is pending. This article summarizes the current federal law, describes the Coors case challenging the law, and discusses legal and practical issues concerning alcohol content labeling and advertising for malt beverages.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdul Alim

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution is an essential part of the Bill of Rights. The amendment prohibits making of any law respecting an establishment of religion, obstructing the free exercise of religion, infringing on the freedom of speech, infringing on the freedom of the press, interfering peoples assembling rights in a peaceful manner or prohibiting the petitioning for a governmental remedy of grievances. The guarantees of this Bill of Rights were subject to the limitation imposed by the free speech and press provisions of the First Amendment to the US Constitution as interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court and other courts. The United States and India are the largest democratic country and almost have similar free speech provisions in their Constitutions. This Article is intended to present the free speech provisions of the American and Indian Constitution as a basic fundamental right of human being. It is also to be examined that what is the role of Supreme Court in interpreting the freedom of speech and expression provisions. The study also tries to incorporate the comparison between the looms of both countries as far as freedom of speech is disturbed.


Author(s):  
Maryam Ahranjani

The very first amendment to the United States Constitution protects the freedom of speech. While the Supreme Court held in 1969 that students “do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate,” since then the Court has limited students' freedom of speech, stopping short of considering the boundaries of off-campus, online speech. Lower court holdings vary, meaning that a student engaging in certain online speech may not be punished at all in one state but would face harsh criminal punishments in another. The lack of a uniform standard leads to dangerously inconsistent punishments and poses the ultimate threat to constitutional knowledge and citizenship exercise: chilling of speech. Recent interest in technology-related cases and the presence of a new justice may reverse the Court's prior unwillingness to address this issue. In the meantime, this chapter argues that school districts should erect a virtual schoolhouse gate by implementing a uniform standard.


2020 ◽  
Vol III (I) ◽  
pp. 39-51
Author(s):  
Rida Saeed

A researcher wants to study the role of media of Pakistan in freedom of speech of Lahore district. Each individual has some inborn basic rights, which he and she enjoys no matter, where, he and she lives or what his and her material or social status is, the ability to freedom speech and expression is one of those rights. As said by Newseum, in 1997 that "Freedom of speech is guaranteed, and protected by the first amendment, of the United-States constitution". Connotations, of the freedom of speech have a varied, in different eras of history. There are parts of bills of rights in 1st amendment forbids national, government from restricting freedom of expression, in this article the author looks into the phenomenon of 'Freedom of Speech' within Lahore.


Numen ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-212
Author(s):  
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan

AbstractThe meaning and application of the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution are currently a matter of intense and increasingly intractable public debate. The academic study of religion can make a positive contribution to this debate by inviting its participants into a conversation about human religion that is already struggling with problems of definition and of language and that wishes to affirm the existence and importance of human religion without establishing a particular definition of religion, without unconsciously theologizing. A close examination of the legal debate can, in turn, serve the purposes of scholars of religion. The politically charged context of First Amendment jurisprudence provides an interesting laboratory in which to test theories of religion.


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