Rawls’ traces in contemporary philosophy of education

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 296-300
Author(s):  
M. Victoria Costa (William & Mary)
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Philosophy Of Education ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Educational Implications ◽  
The Many ◽  
Proper Balance

This article examines the many traces of John Rawls’ theory of justice in contemporary philosophy of education. Beyond work that directly explores the educational implications of justice as fairness and political liberalism, there are many interesting debates in philosophy of education that make use of Rawlsian concepts to defend views that go well beyond those advocated in justice as fairness. There have also been methodological debates on Rawls’ distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory which concern the proper balance between empirically informed discussion and fruitful normative reflection.

O Liberalismo em John Rawls e a Resposta aos Comunitaristas

2007 ◽  
Vol 15 (30) ◽  
pp. 61-82
Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira ◽  
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice

The aim of this article is to characterize the John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness developed in A Theory of Justice (1971), Political Liberalism (1993), Replay to Habermas (1995) and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), with a view to identifying the convergent points between deontological conception with teleological characteristics and identify a substantive conception of justice, not purely procedural, which is universalist albeit not transcendental, making possible an approach between communitarian and liberal ethical theories.

Ideal and Nonideal Theory in Political Philosophy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Thompson
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Institutions ◽  
Comparative Judgment ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Nonideal Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Status ◽  
Just Society ◽  
Methodological Concern ◽  
The Many

The distinction between ideal and nonideal theory is an important methodological concern in contemporary political theory. At issue is the extent to which political theorizing is a practical endeavor and, consequently, the extent to which real-world facts should either be factored into political theorizing or else be assumed away. The distinction between ideal theory and nonideal theory was first introduced by John Rawls in his classic A Theory of Justice. Rawls’s ideal theory is an account of the society we should aim for, given certain facts about human nature and possible social institutions, and involves two central assumptions. First, it assumes full compliance of relevant agents with the demands of justice. Second, it assumes that historical and natural conditions of society are reasonably favorable. These two assumptions are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for his ideal theory. For Rawls, nonideal theory primarily addresses the question of how the ideal might be achieved in practical, permissible steps, from the actual, partially just society we occupy. The account of ideal and nonideal theory advanced by Rawls has been subject to criticism from different directions. Amartya Sen accepts Rawls’s distinction between ideal and nonideal theory but argues that Rawlsian-style nonideal theory is too ideal. Given the many and severe injustices we face we do not need to know what ideal (or “transcendental”) justice looks like; our focus should not be on how to transition toward this ideal. Instead, the advancement of justice requires a comparative judgment which ranks possible policies in terms of being more or less just than the status quo. G. A. Cohen, by contrast, argues that Rawlsian-style ideal theory is not really ideal theory as such, but instead principles for regulating society. Our beliefs about normative principles should, ultimately, be insensitive to matters of empirical fact; genuine ideal theory is a form of moral epistemology (an exercise of identifying normative truths).

scholarly journals Posição original e equilíbrio reflexivo em John Rawls: o problema da justificação

2009 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-157
Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice

O objetivo deste artigo é estabelecer algumas considerações sobre o papel dos procedimentos de posição original e equilíbrio reflexivo na teoria da justiça como equidade de John Rawls, nas obras A Theory of Justice, Political Liberalism e Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Eu pretendo mostrar que Rawls faz uso de um modelo coerentista-pragmático de justificação dos princípios de justiça em um âmbito público, que é não-fundacionalista em razão da interconexão entre estes procedimentos.

scholarly journals APRESENTAÇÃO – DOSSIÊ RAWLS

2011 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 11
Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Law Of Peoples ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Law

A edição especial da Revista Dissertatio pretende refletir sobre a importância da filosofia moral e política de John Rawls no cenário filosófico atual no ano em que sua obra mais conhecida, A Theory of Justice (TJ), completa quarenta anos. Esta data comemorativa é apenas um pretexto para uma avaliação integral do projeto de Rawls, o que inclui obras posteriores, como, por exemplo, Political Liberalism (PL) e The Law of Peoples (LP). Os artigos aqui reunidos procuram tematizar tanto a estrutura quanto o conteúdo da teoria da justiça como equidade (justice as fairness), avaliando atentamente as suas virtudes e, também, as suas fraquezas

POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND TRUTH

Legal Theory ◽  
1999 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jody S. Kraus
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Political Conception ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Every theory of justice requires a first-order theory specifying principles of justice, and a second-order view explaining why those principles constitute the correct principles of justice. According to John Rawls, political liberalism is committed to the two principles of justice specified in its first-order theory, “justice as fairness.” Justice as fairness, according to Rawls, in turn presupposes the second-order view that justice is a political conception. A political conception of justice treats the principles derived from the fundamental ideas in the public political culture as the correct principles of justice. Political liberalism, however, nowhere offers a defense of the view that justice is a political conception. Indeed, it even strives to avoid the admission that it presupposes that justice is a political conception by stating only that it uses a political conception of justice, while allowing that justice might not actually be a political conception. As to the truth of its second-order presupposition, political liberalism chooses to remain agnostic. Rawls claims that political liberalism has no choice at all. To do otherwise, he argues, would lead to an internal contradiction.

The Reasonable in Justice as Fairness

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Mandle
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Weak Sense ◽  
Strong Sense ◽  
Close Attention ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Secondary Literature ◽  
The Senses

The publication of Political Liberalismhas allowed John Rawls to bring to the fore issues that remained in the background of A Theory of Justice. His explicit attention to the concept of ‘the reasonable’ is a welcome development. In a more recent publication, he affirms the importance of this concept, ‘while [granting] that the idea of the reasonable needs a more thorough examination than Political Liberalism offers.’ In this paper, I will present a critical exposition of the senses of the reasonable on which justice as fairness relies. Rawls employs the term in four main contexts. I will outline these various senses and argue that in each case, a controversy in the secondary literature can be resolved by close attention to the concept of the reasonable. In three of these contexts, Rawls relies on what I will call a ‘strong’ sense of the reasonable, while in one he sometimes seems to rely on a ‘weak’ sense. I argue that justice as fairness is best served by relying on a strong sense throughout.

scholarly journals EPISTEMOLOGIA MORAL COERENTISTA EM RAWLS

2011 ◽  
Vol 34 ◽  
pp. 161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denis Coitinho Silveira
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Decision Procedure ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Law Of Peoples ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Law

Meu principal objetivo neste artigo é analisar o problema da justificação moral para John Rawls a partir dos textos A Theory of Justice (TJ, IX, § 87), Political Liberalism (PL III, § 2), Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (JF I, § 9), The Law of Peoples (LoP I, § 1), “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics” (ODPE), “The Independence of Moral Theory” (IMT), “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical” (JFPnM). Minha intenção é a de caracterizar a teoria da justiça como equidade como um sistema coerentista de justificação que conta com uma epistemologia coerentista holística, uma teoria do contrato social que introduz uma ontologia social e uma estratégia pragmatista na teoria contratualista. No escopo deste trabalho, analisarei as características da epistemologia coerentista holística pressuposta e de como ela resolve os problemas de regresso epistêmico, dogmatismo, dualismo, assimetria e circularidade.

What political liberalism and the welfare state left behind: chance and gratitude

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reiko Gotoh
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Welfare State ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Political Liberalism ◽  
Public Welfare ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Left Behind ◽  
Sen’S Capability Approach ◽  
The Welfare State

This chapter examines what has been left behind by political liberalism and the welfare state by connecting John Rawls' theory of justice with Amartya Sen's capability approach. It considers how Japan adopted a pacifist constitution after World War II and developed a system to secure basic wellbeing for all. That system, underpinned by individual rights, has sparked arguments regarding the relation between rights and public welfare, freedom and democracy. The constitutional idea of Japan's social security and welfare system embodies the concept of ‘liberal equality’, but also steps in the realm of ‘democratic equality’. The chapter also discusses the ideas of tolerance and non-discrimination in political liberalism as well as the concept of social cooperation. Finally, it reviews the core assumptions of Rawls' theory of justice, ‘justice as reciprocity’ and ‘justice as fairness’, and introduces two ways of restructuring the theory.

The State’s Role in Ensuring Fair Income Distribution in Vietnam Today: Some Issues from the Theory of Justice as Fairness by John Rawls

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-195
Keyword(s):  
Income Distribution ◽  
Economic Efficiency ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Social Stability ◽  
Social Equality ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Analysis And Synthesis ◽  
Economic Philosophy ◽  
The Relationship

Fairness in income distribution is a factor that both motivates employees and contributes to maintaining social stability. In Vietnam, fair income distribution has been studied from various perspectives. In this article, through the analysis and synthesis of related documents and evidence, and from the perspective of economic philosophy, the author applies John Rawls’s Theory of Justice as Fairness to analyze some issues arising from the implementation of the state’s role in ensuring fair income distribution from 1986 to present. These are unifying the perception of fairness in income distribution; solving the relationship between economic efficiency and social equality; ensuring benefits for the least-privileged people in society; and controlling income. On that basis, the author makes some recommendations to enhance the state’s role in ensuring fair income distribution in Vietnam. Received 11thNovember 2019; Revised 10thApril 2020; Accepted 20th April 2020

Justice as Fairness: For Groups?

1975 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 607-614 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vernon Van Dyke
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Homogeneous State ◽  
Dominant Form ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Indigenous Groups ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Almost All

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls assumes that the principles of justice are for individuals in a society, and in general he assumes that the society is an ethnically homogeneous state. He thus follows the tradition associated with the dominant form of the social contract theory, which focuses on the individual and the state. His assumptions neglect the fact that almost all states are ethnically plural or heterogeneous, and that many of them confer special status and rights on ethnic groups as collective entities; for example, many of them confer special status and rights on indigenous groups, on groups disadvantaged by prior discrimination, and on minorities and other groups conceded a right to survive as distinct cultural entities. Status and rights for groups necessarily mean differentiation among individuals depending on their membership; and this in turn means that a theory of justice that focuses on the individual and neglects the group both fails to account for existing practices and fails to give guidance where the practices are at issue.

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