scholarly journals Sources of Government Approval During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Threat or Electoral Predispositions?

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 400-418
Author(s):  
Adrián Pignataro

Rally-round-the-flag events are short-term boosts of government approval during crises, and the COVID-19 pandemic produced such an effect in many countries. But why did some people join the rally while others didn’t? Using public opinion data from Costa Rica, this paper tests two hypotheses: first, that threat increases government approval at the outbreak of the pandemic; second, that electoral predispositions shape approval. Results indicate that COVID-19 contagions, as a measure of the threat, are not associated with approval, while past voting patterns are. Positive assessments of the economy and the relief measures also predict higher support for the government. In brief, Costa Rica's rally-round-the-flag event did not overcome the partisan divisions or the ordinary drivers of approval.

2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 13-22
Author(s):  
Towaf Totok Irawan

Until now the government and private sector have not been able to address the backlog of 13.5 million housing units for ownership status and 7.6 million units for residential status. The high price of land has led to the high price of the house so that low-income communities (MBR) is not able to reach out to make a home purchase. In addition to the high price of land, tax factors also contribute to the high price of the house. The government plans to issue a policy for the provision of tax incentives, ie abolish VAT on home-forming material transaction. This policy is expected to house prices become cheaper, so the demand for housing increases, and encourage the relevant sectors to intensify its role in the construction of houses. It is expected to replace the lost tax potential and increase incomes. Analysis of the impact of tax incentives housing to potential state revenue and an increase in people's income, especially in Papua province is using the table IO because in addition to looking at the role each sector can also see the impact on taxes (income tax 21 Pph 25 Pph, VAT), and incomes (wage). Although in the short-term impact is still small, but very rewarding in the long run. Keywords: Backlog, Gross Input, Primary Input, Intermediate Input


Author(s):  
V. I. Denysenko

The failure to sign the Association Agreement with the EU in autumn 2013 has been investigated. The role of the Russian factor, which became decisive in the foreign policy reversal of the Yanukovych regime, has been revealed. The importance of Viktor Yanukovych’s meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 27, 2013, in the dramatic change of Ukraine’s international vector has been emphasized. On the basis of diplomats’ memoirs, the assumption about intimidation of the Ukrainian President by the Russian side has been substantiated. The timeline of the preparation of the 2013 Vilnius Summit, the position of EU structures and the attempts of the fourth President of Ukraine to win time to trade with the Russians have been reproduced. The thesis about the Donetsk clan’s attempts to prepare public opinion for a 180 degree turn in late October - early November 2013 has been presented. For this purpose, demonstration meetings were organized with representatives of Ukrainian business and trade unions, who called for revision of plans for European integration on their own initiative. The main role in manipulating public opinion rested on the government of Mykola Azarov and the Verkhovna Rada, which had a majority coalition led by the Party of Regions. Instead, Viktor Yanukovych continued his European integration rhetoric and reiterated to Western partners his own willingness to sign the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. On November 21, the real position of the ruling elite was made available to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. According to it, the process of preparation for the signing of the Association Agreement was suspended, the proposal was made for the trilateral Ukraine-EU-Russia negotiations, and the ministries were tasked with developing measures to maintain economic ties with the CIS countries. The decision was rejected by European partners and led to Yanukovych’s attempts to find other ways to thwart the signing of the Agreement. It has been proved that this role was played by Yanukovych’s requirements for financial assistance from the EU amounting to about 160 billion euros, which aimed to prevent the signing of the Association Agreement. Key words: Viktor Yanukovych, association of Ukraine with the EU, эYulia Tymoshenko, European integration, Pat Cox, Alexander Kwasniewski, Vladimir Putin.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (16) ◽  
pp. 6333
Author(s):  
Chan Liu ◽  
Raymond K. H. Chan ◽  
Maofu Wang ◽  
Zhe Yang

Harnessing the rapid development of mobile internet technology, the sharing economy has experienced unprecedented growth in the global economy, especially in China. Likely due to its increasing popularity, more and more businesses have adopted this label in China. There is a concern as to the essential meaning of the sharing economy. As it is difficult to have a universally accepted definition, we aim to map the sharing economy and demystify the use of it in China in this paper. We propose seven organizing essential elements of the sharing economy: access use rights instead of ownership, idle capacity, short term, peer-to-peer, Internet platforms mediated, for monetary profit, and shared value orientation. By satisfying all or only parts of these elements, we propose one typology of sharing economy, and to differentiate bona fide sharing economy from quasi- and pseudo-sharing economy. Finally, there are still many problems that need to be solved urgently in the real sharing economy from the perspective of the government, companies and individuals.


Modern Italy ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 135-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raffaella A. Del Sarto ◽  
Nathalie Tocci

Focusing on Italy's Middle East policies under the second Berlusconi (2001–2006) and the second Prodi (2006–2008) governments, this article assesses the manner and extent to which the observed foreign policy shifts between the two governments can be explained in terms of the rebalancing between a ‘Europeanist’ and a transatlantic orientation. Arguing that Rome's policy towards the Middle East hinges less on Italy's specific interests and objectives in the region and more on whether the preference of the government in power is to foster closer ties to the United States or concentrate on the European Union, the analysis highlights how these swings of the pendulum along the EU–US axis are inextricably linked to a number of underlying structural weaknesses of Rome's foreign policy. In particular, the oscillations can be explained by the prevalence of short-term political (and domestic) considerations and the absence of long-term, substantive political strategies, or, in short, by the phenomenon of ‘politics without policy’ that often characterises Italy's foreign policy.


1996 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcia Olander

The years following World War Two produced a strong resurgence of U.S. intervention in Central America and the Caribbean couched in Cold War terms. Although the U.S. intervention in Guatemala to overthrow the government of Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 has generally been seen as the first case of Cold War covert anti-Communist intervention in Latin America, several scholars have raised questions about U.S. involvement in a 1948 Costa Rican civil war in which Communism played a critical role. In a 1993 article in The Americas, Kyle Longley argued that “the U.S. response to the Costa Rican Revolution of 1948, not the Guatemalan affair, marked the origins of the Cold War in Latin America.” The U.S. “actively interfered,” and achieved “comparable results in Costa Rica as in Guatemala: the removal of a perceived Communist threat.” Other authors have argued, even, that the U.S. had prepared an invasion force in the Panama Canal Zone to pacify the country. The fifty years of Cold War anti-Communism entitles one to be skeptical of U.S. non-intervention in a Central American conflict involving Communism. Costa Ricans, aware of a long tradition of U.S. intervention in the region, also assumed that the U.S. would intervene. Most, if not all, were expecting intervention and one key government figure described U.S. pressure as like “the air, which is felt, even if it cannot be seen.” Yet, historians must do more than just “feel” intervention. Subsequent Cold War intervention may make it difficult to appraise the 1948 events in Costa Rica objectively. Statements like Longley's that “it is hard to believe that in early 1948 … Washington would not favor policies that ensured the removal of the [Communist Party] Vanguard,” although logical, do not coincide with the facts of the U.S. role in the conflict.


Significance Many areas of the Caribbean have trade, investment and family connections with communities in Florida. As the state now plays a pivotal role in US electoral politics, crises in the region can take on added political importance for parts of Florida’s electorate. Impacts Forecasts of short-term economic recovery for Florida remain highly uncertain given the continuing impact of the pandemic. Clashing interests across the Caribbean may demand greater coordination of US policy than the government can currently offer. Healthcare and disaster relief capabilities within the state are severely overstretched and could be overwhelmed by a new crisis.


2021 ◽  
pp. 001041402110602
Author(s):  
David A. Steinberg

A burgeoning literature shows that international trade and migration shocks influence individuals’ political attitudes, but relatively little is known about how international financial shocks impact public opinion. This study examines how one prevalent type of international financial shock—currency crises—shapes mass political attitudes. I argue that currency crises reduce average citizens’ support for incumbent governments. I also expect voters’ concerns about their own pocketbooks to influence their response to currency crises. Original survey data from Turkey support these arguments. Exploiting exogenous variation in the currency’s value during the survey window, I show that currency depreciations strongly reduce support for the government. This effect is stronger among individuals that are more negatively affected by depreciation, and it is moderated by individuals’ perceptions of their personal economic situation. This evidence suggests that international financial shocks can strongly influence the opinions of average voters, and it provides further support for pocketbook theories.


1980 ◽  
Vol 10 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 32-41
Author(s):  
Tony Kirk

In most countries ordinary people do not appreciate the sheer guile of their political leaders. Rhodesia is no exception. The dealings between the government and the African National Council confirm it. The government interrupted its dialogue with the ANC by detaining thirty-three senior ANC officials without trial, effectively destroying the cohesion of the only black political organization in the country. To the white voter, who sees no further than the surface of events, the detentions represented a simple exercise of executive power. In fact the government could not act in as sudden and arbitrary a fashion as that. It had to choose the time for its action with care, and to some extent it had to prepare the white electorate to accept what happened without question. The government also had to conceal its true intentions from the ANC without resorting to outright falsehood. Finally, it had to leave itself free to make a flexible response to the sort of unpredictable events which inevitably occur in political life and which often wreck the most carefully drafted plans. Formulating a policy to meet these contradictory objectives without giving the appearance of bad faith required much guile. The outcome, in the short term at least, was success.


Significance The government hopes greater domestic and foreign investment can help turn around the pandemic-hit economy. The governor of Bank Indonesia (BI), the central bank, last week said GDP should grow by 4.6% in 2021, compared with last year’s 2.1% contraction. Impacts Indonesia will count on private vaccination, whereby companies buy state-procured jabs for their staff, to help speed up its roll-out. The Indonesia Investment Authority, a new sovereign wealth fund, will prioritise attracting more investment into the infrastructure sector. Singapore will continue to be Indonesia’s largest source of FDI in the short term.


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