scholarly journals “We Are All Part of the Same Family”: China's Ethnic Propaganda

2012 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 159-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Brady

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government works hard to promote an image of ethnic harmony in China and downplays ethnic conflict by carefully controlling public information and debate about ethnic affairs. Despite such efforts, the recent clashes in Tibetan areas in 2008 and violent riots in Urumqi in 2009 reveal the weaknesses of this approach. This paper surveys the broad themes of ethnic propaganda ([Formula: see text], minzu xuanchuan) in present-day China, looking at the organisations involved, the systems of information management they utilise, and the current “go” and “no-go” zones for debate. The paper forms part of a larger study of the politics of ethnicity in China. It is based on primary-and secondary-source research in Chinese, secondary sources in English, and extensive interviews with Chinese bureaucrats and scholars regarding China's ethnic affairs conducted during fieldwork in China in 2002, 2004, 2005–2006, 2007, 2009, 2010 and 2012. Ethnic issues in China concern not only the minority peoples there, but also the majority Han – hence, my definition of ethnic propaganda incorporates materials relating to all of China's ethnic groups. The paper uses the events in Tibetan areas in 2008 and in Urumqi as case studies to demonstrate how these policies play out in periods of crisis. It concludes with a discussion of the role that ethnic propaganda plays in maintaining China's long-term political stability and its international affairs.

Author(s):  
N. HRYNCHAK

Information and analytical database for the market support is required to prevent communications of contradictory information to higher levels of management, with adverse effects for the process of taking rational management decisions. The article’s objective is to substantiate the information and analytical support for studies of the logistics services market, with constructing a system of statistical indicators for this market assessment, to be laid as the solid basis for elaborating medium-term and long-term strategies and policies of the logistics services market in Ukraine.  A definition of information and analytical support for studies of the logistics services market is given; a review of secondary sources of data for this market studies is made. A conceptual model for information and analytical studies of the logistics services market is proposed. The key statistical indicators for studies of this market are identified, with substantiating the feasibility of their use in computing multivariate indicators for the assessment of performance and capacities of the logistics services market in Ukraine. The core criteria to be met by the abovementioned system of statistical indicators are highlighted. A system of statistical indicators for the assessment of the logistics services market is proposed, containing four modules. It allows for diagnosis of this market performance and tendencies, with accounting for the impact of other related markets and activities, and for forecasting. This system, constructed with consideration to the global practice, is designed for comprehensive studies of the logistics services market.


Author(s):  
Christian P. Sorace

This chapter examines how the Chinese Communist Party engineered “glory” in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake by mobilizing the discourse of “Party spirit” (dangxing). In addition to being responsible for state administration and economic growth, the cadre is also an embodiment and conduit of Party legitimacy. Antithetical to Max Weber's definition of institutions as that which remove embodiment from governance, in China, cadres are Party legitimacy made flesh. As flesh, they must be prepared to suffer. This chapter argues that the Party revitalizes its legitimacy by showing benevolence and glory, which depend on the willingness of cadres to suffer and sacrifice themselves on behalf of the people. In the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake, these norms and expectations were implemented in concrete policy directives and work pressures.


Author(s):  
David SG Goodman

The decision by the Chinese Communist Party in 2012 to move to open direct national elections was taken in order to ensure political stability and continued economic growth, and to enhance its position of leadership. The first national general election in 2015 followed in the wake of the landmark Constituent Assembly. Victory in 2015 by the Chinese Communist Party has been accompanied by political stability and sustained economic growth. Though there is likely to be greater competition in the General Election of 2020 the principle change in politics has been the emergence of significant public policy debate. Issues of corruption, housing, and regional development are likely to be major considerations during the election, alongside debate on the simultaneous referenda that have been called on Tibet and federalism.


1981 ◽  
Vol 87 ◽  
pp. 407-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart R. Schram

On 1 July 1981 the Chinese Communist Party celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of its foundation. To mark this occasion, the Party itself issued a statement summing up the experience of recent decades. It seems an appropriate time for outsiders as well to look back over the history of the past 60 years, in the hope of grasping long-term tendencies which may continue to influence events in the future.


Author(s):  
Masaharu Hishida

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5564/mjia.v0i17.85 Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, No.17 2012: 85-96


Author(s):  
Daniel C. O'Neill

This chapter first surveys the close historical ties between the governments of China and Cambodia, as well as between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). It then presents data on Cambodia’s dependence on Chinese “aid” and other forms of capital, including foreign direct investment (FDI). It argues that both the relatively high levels of Chinese funding as well as the “no strings attached” nature of that funding, which lacks the conditions for political and economic reforms often attached to foreign aid by other governments and multilateral institutions, provide additional leverage for China over Hun Sen’s government. The chapter shows how China uses this leverage both to help its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) overcome the high risk in Cambodia’s investment environment for their very specific (immobile) assets and to gain the support of the Cambodian government on issues vital to the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, including its territorial claims in the South China Sea. The chapter specifically analyses cases of Chinese investments in Cambodian hydropower projects and shows how Chinese influence over the Cambodian government helps overcome domestic opposition to these projects and secures long-term guarantees for the profitability of investments in this sector.


1964 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 55-66 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stuart R. Schram

The second half of 1927 is one of the most obscure periods in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. From a large and well-organised force openly playing a major role in the political and military affairs of the country, the Chinese Communist Party rapidly found itself reduced to a few small remnants fighting for their existence. As a result, the printed sources available for future historians were drastically reduced. The Communists cut their output of publications both for lack of the means to produce them, and because it was no longer prudent to reveal even as much about their plans as they had done before. The Nationalist authorities further decimated this scanty output by confiscation and repression. So much of what has been written about this period is based on verbal testimony or secondary sources, and cannot be regarded as altogether reliable.


This chapter presents a definition of strategy and explains the purpose of a strategy. Strategy design and structure are treated as critical success factors. The chapter also explains that the two most important elements of any information management strategy are a clear vision of the long-term future of information and an honest and accurate assessment of the current information management situation.


1987 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen C. Averill

AbstractIn August 1927 the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Jiangxi seemed moribund, yet by the end of 1930 the movement was larger and more active than ever before. How did this occur? Past studies have especially emphasized Mao Zedong's famous rural guerrilla strategy, but this was only part of the story. Equally significant was the little-studied success of members of the Jiangxi hill-country elite who were also in the CCP in using established schools and educational societies, time-honored traditions of local strongman behavior, and existing bandit–secret society gangs to build many localized base areas. Such techniques were congenial to CCP leaders and essential to the movement's survival in the early days when its prestige and material resources were at a very low ebb, and when radical reforms would almost certainly have failed. Nevertheless, this strategy also fostered parochial attitudes and organizational weaknesses that clashed with the later efforts of Mao and his allies to carry out mass mobilization and fundamental land reform. Only after a prolonged and violent crisis within the base areas did the “Maoist” policies vital for the revolution's long-term growth begin to overcome the policies of elite coalition building that had been necessary for the movement to obtain its initial foothold in the Jiangxi hill country.


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