scholarly journals The Duterte Administration's Foreign Policy: Unravelling the Aquino Administration's Balancing Agenda on an Emergent China

2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 139-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renato Cruz De Castro

From 2010 to 2016, then-President Benigno Aquino balanced China's expansive maritime claim in the South China Sea. President Aquino challenged China by shifting the AFP's focus from domestic security to territorial defence, bolstering closer Philippine–US security relations, acquiring American military equipment, seeking from Washington an explicit security guarantee under the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT), and promoting a strategic partnership with Japan. However, the Duterte administration is unravelling its predecessor's balancing agenda by distancing itself from the United States and gravitating closer to China, despite the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) July 12 2016 award to the Philippines. President Duterte's foreign policy is directed at reviving the equi-balancing policy on China, in contrast to then-President Aquino's balancing strategy. This is best exemplified by his efforts to harness China for several major infrastructure and investments projects in the Philippines and to resort to bilateral negotiations with Beijing. The present article argues that instead of relying on the US, President Duterte is fostering closer security partnership with Japan to equi-balance an emergent China.

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-173
Author(s):  
Md. Sayedur Rahman ◽  
Shakila Tul-Kubra

In the international framework India is finding a larger position for itself. This hope is focused on the belief that India is a prosperous democracy with substantial human and material resources; it is an increasingly strong economic power; it has a proven record as a responsible and law-abiding regime, and as a member of the non-aligned party it has consistently shared the interests of the developing nations. Indian foreign policy makers argue that India wants to re-invent itself at this point of 'take-off' as a great force. India needs new alliance for the proposed new position, including the dominant superpower, the United States of America (US). The US has said it would turn India into a great force. This essay attempts to examine the old pattern of relations with Russia that India had enjoyed. There's an Indo-US triangular alliance taking its place. How is this current type of strategic partnership distinct from that of the Indo Soviet/ Russian alliance? However, both countries' natural desire to strive towards multi polarity in world politics has helped restore the relationship, particularly over the past decade. Remarkably, ties with the US no longer stand in the way of stronger relations between India and Russia. The turbulent security climate marked by what is frequently assumed to be the state-sponsored insurgency invulnerable Asian areas, the war in Afghanistan, and the political turmoil in both Afghanistan and Central Asian countries has paved the way for a strategic alliance between India and Russia.


2020 ◽  
pp. 658-667
Author(s):  
Olha Kravchenko

The article describes and analyses the policy of the Trump administration towards Ukraine. Traditionally, the election of a new US President has some impact on the Washington’s position on Ukrainian issues, and the end of the presidential tenure serves as a reason to take stock of the results. Donald Trump’s presidency has not been marked by profound changes in the US foreign policy towards Ukraine, as it was inertially in line, for the most part, with the previous years. The American political establishment primarily views Ukraine through the prism of the security paradigm as a bulwark of deterring its global opponents, particularly Russia. Thus, the article deals with the challenges and prospects of the modern US policy towards Ukraine. The priorities of the US foreign policy towards Ukraine traditionally consist of the issues enshrined in the 2008 U.S.-Ukraine Charter on Strategic Partnership. The article focuses on defence, security, and energy cooperation. In this regard, the United States remains the major guarantor of the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine. In deterring the Russian aggression, the Trump administration generally follows the approach of the imposition of economic sanctions, launched during the presidency of Barack Obama. It is important to stress that the United States focuses not only on the problem of the armed conflict in Donbas but also on the attempted illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia. At the same time, the focus on security issues has its negative repercussions, as it leads to certain limitations in bilateral relations, as evidenced by the lack of large-scale joint projects and weak trade and economic cooperation that impacts Ukraine’s position in the US foreign policy priorities. In the meantime, regardless of the name of the future US President, Washington’s support for Ukraine will be maintained. The close involvement of the United States in the negotiation process for the settlement of the conflict in Donbas and de-occupation of Crimea would significantly influence the course of events, but it is difficult to predict whether this prospect will become a reality. Keywords: US foreign policy towards Ukraine, Trump administration, strategic partnership, U.S.-Ukraine bilateral relations, process of impeachment.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elaine Tolentino ◽  
Myungsik Ham

This paper aims to analyze the asymmetric dilemma facing the Philippines and China in the South China Sea tensions. Among American East Asian allies, the Philippines seems to stand on the frontline between two rival powers, the United States and China. Since the US declared its Pivot to Asia policy, the Philippines’ foreign policy towards China has become assertive and sometimes appears reckless with some military adventures against Chinese maritime patrols and naval ships, which also further forced China to take a tougher foreign policy against the Philippines. Considering the distinctive asymmetric indicators between China and the Philippines based on military forces, economic capacity, territorial size, and population, the aggressive policy behaviors that the Philippines and China have been displaying against each other cast an inquiry on what drives the two countries into head-to-head collision. While China as the larger power vis-à-vis the Philippines as the smaller power in the relationship has aimed for control and domination of their disputed territory, the Philippines’ drastic defiance has also led to China’s irritation and possible frustration. Furthermore, the US’ renewed attention to Asia has caused shifts of asymmetric bilateral dilemma to triangular entanglement between the US–China–Philippines. It is vital therefore to pay attention to the asymmetric interaction of states and their varying views in order to find possible solutions to the SCS tensions.


TEME ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1141
Author(s):  
Veljko Blagojevic

When considering the military power of the United States, it is necessary to distinguish military force and military power. Military force represents an organization that is equipped and trained to use force. America is clearly the largest military power in the world, and that is a fact. However, the term military power is significantly wider than that of the military force. It also includes elements related to the threat of using force and many other activities related to the involvement of military force in contemporary international relations, including international defense cooperation, military-technical cooperation, the purchase and sale of weapons and military equipment, and more. The paper focuses on this exact segment of military power, understood as a willingness to engage the US military force outside their national territory. The aim of the paper is to describe the evolution of the United States’ strategic thought regarding military power as a foreign policy instrument by analyzing the key processes in specific historical conditions from their independence to modern times. The results of this analysis will represent valuable indicators for a future role of military power in the US foreign policy in terms of potential conflicts for the preservation of global hegemony.


PMLA ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 133 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-377
Author(s):  
Sylvia Shin Huey Chong

“They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented” (nguyen, sympathizer 179). and so viet thanh nguyen's The Sympathizer invokes Karl Marx's “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” although the reference is just as likely to be Edward Said's Orientalism, since Marx was concerned with political representation (608), whereas Said was concerned with discursive representation (21). These words frame the important middle act of The Sympathizer, one that focuses on the filming of The Hamlet, a mash-up of Hollywood's sins against not only Vietnamese but also Asians and Asian Americans at large. Reading like a morality play crossed with a backstage musical, this section draws on thinly veiled references to Francis Ford Coppola (the Auteur), Marlon Brando (the hespian), and Martin Sheen (the Idol), who drag the narrator from his newly formed Southern Californian refuge and round up a bunch of stray boat people milling around in the Philippines to put on a movie about the Vietnam War. From the recycling of American military equipment originally sold to Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines to the reuse of Vietnamese bodies recently shot at and now en route to the United States as refugees, every aspect of the making of The Hamlet illustrates the dangers of allowing oneself to be represented by others. More subtly, The Sympathizer shows how difficult it is to intervene in this regime of representation, especially in the name of authenticity, as it is often deployed by protestors against stereotypes in the media. But if we situate the section on The Hamlet within the overall narrative of The Sympathizer and also in Nguyen's larger critique of memory industries as war industries, we must also understand that the content of the ilm is less important than the dynamics of spectatorship. By linking the narrator's quixotic quest to subvert this film with his repression of his complicity in the rape and torture of a communist agent during the narrator's days as a mole in the South Vietnamese police, Nguyen suggests that watching the Vietnam War is potentially as dangerous as ighting in (or misrepresenting) the war.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Lermie Shayne Garcia

This study examines the Japan-China rivalry and independent foreign policy (IFP) rhetoric of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte. Using both AntConc (concordance program) and conventional reading, this study identifies the themes and aspects as to how he used words related to China and Japan in his speeches. Data analysis reveals that his rhetoric centered on several themes, such as historical relations, brotherly and friendly relations, strategic partnership, China as an economic and military superpower, development assistance, and as point of reference, among others. Contrary to what Duterte portrays as IFP, the study shows that even after two years into his presidency, nothing has really changed in the Philippines. His promise of pursuing an IFP policy has neither taken the form of a concrete plan nor materialized as a policy. This paper argues that the ambivalence in Duterte’s foreign policy rhetoric is just a strategy to accommodate China’s influence while maintaining his nationalist narrative. His IFP rhetoric is just a manifestation of continuing dependency to outside powers. No matter how different it initially seemed to be from previous administrations in the way that it entertains other powers such as China and Japan apart from the US, it still cannot be considered as IFP.Keywords: Independent foreign policy, Japan-China rivalry, Philippine foreign policy under Duterte, presidential speech analysis, Rodrigo DuterteCite as: Garcia, L.S.S. (2018). The Philippine president’s rhetoric on Japan-China rivalry and independent foreign policy. Journal of Nusantara Studies, 3(2),1-16.http://dx.doi.org/10.24200/jonus.vol3iss2pp1-16


2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-170
Author(s):  
Gerardo Gurza-Lavalle

This work analyses the diplomatic conflicts that slavery and the problem of runaway slaves provoked in relations between Mexico and the United States from 1821 to 1857. Slavery became a source of conflict after the colonization of Texas. Later, after the US-Mexico War, slaves ran away into Mexican territory, and therefore slaveholders and politicians in Texas wanted a treaty of extradition that included a stipulation for the return of fugitives. This article contests recent historiography that considers the South (as a region) and southern politicians as strongly influential in the design of foreign policy, putting into question the actual power not only of the South but also of the United States as a whole. The problem of slavery divided the United States and rendered the pursuit of a proslavery foreign policy increasingly difficult. In addition, the South never acted as a unified bloc; there were considerable differences between the upper South and the lower South. These differences are noticeable in the fact that southerners in Congress never sought with enough energy a treaty of extradition with Mexico. The article also argues that Mexico found the necessary leeway to defend its own interests, even with the stark differential of wealth and resources existing between the two countries. El presente trabajo analiza los conflictos diplomáticos entre México y Estados Unidos que fueron provocados por la esclavitud y el problema de los esclavos fugitivos entre 1821 y 1857. La esclavitud se convirtió en fuente de conflicto tras la colonización de Texas. Más tarde, después de la guerra Mexico-Estados Unidos, algunos esclavos se fugaron al territorio mexicano y por lo tanto dueños y políticos solicitaron un tratado de extradición que incluyera una estipulación para el retorno de los fugitivos. Este artículo disputa la idea de la historiografía reciente que considera al Sur (en cuanto región), así como a los políticos sureños, como grandes influencias en el diseño de la política exterior, y pone en tela de juicio el verdadero poder no sólo del Sur sino de Estados Unidos en su conjunto. El problema de la esclavitud dividió a Estados Unidos y dificultó cada vez más el impulso de una política exterior que favoreciera la esclavitud. Además, el Sur jamás operó como unidad: había diferencias marcadas entre el Alto Sur y el Bajo Sur. Estas diferencias se observan en el hecho de que los sureños en el Congreso jamás se esforzaron en buscar con suficiente energía un tratado de extradición con México. El artículo también sostiene que México halló el margen de maniobra necesario para defender sus propios intereses, pese a los fuertes contrastes de riqueza y recursos entre los dos países.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gremil Alessandro Naz

<p>This paper examines the changes in Filipino immigrants’ perceptions about themselves and of Americans before and after coming to the United States. Filipinos have a general perception of themselves as an ethnic group. They also have perceptions about Americans whose media products regularly reach the Philippines. Eleven Filipinos who have permanently migrated to the US were interviewed about their perceptions of Filipinos and Americans. Before coming to the US, they saw themselves as hardworking, family-oriented, poor, shy, corrupt, proud, adaptable, fatalistic, humble, adventurous, persevering, gossipmonger, and happy. They described Americans as rich, arrogant, educated, workaholic, proud, powerful, spoiled, helpful, boastful, materialistic, individualistic, talented, domineering, friendly, accommodating, helpful, clean, and kind. Most of the respondents changed their perceptions of Filipinos and of Americans after coming to the US. They now view Filipinos as having acquired American values or “Americanized.” On the other hand, they stopped perceiving Americans as a homogenous group possessing the same values after they got into direct contact with them. The findings validate social perception and appraisal theory, and symbolic interaction theory.</p>


1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (5) ◽  
pp. 271-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
BRUCE CUMINGS

At the inception of the twenty-first century—not to mention the next millennium—books on ‘the American Century’ proliferate monthly, if not daily. We now have The American Century Dictionary, The American Century Thesaurus, and even The American Century Cookbook; perhaps the American Century baseball cap or cologne is not far behind. With one or two exceptions, the authors celebrate the unipolar pre-eminence and comprehensive economic advantage that the United States now enjoys. Surveys of public opinion show that most people agree: the American wave appears to be surging just as the year 2000 beckons. Unemployment and inflation are both at twenty-year lows, sending economists (who say you can't get lows for both at the same time) back to the drawing board. The stock market roars past the magic 10,000 mark, and the monster federal budget deficit of a decade ago miraculously metamorphoses into a surplus that may soon reach upwards of $1 trillion. Meanwhile President William Jefferson Clinton, not long after a humiliating impeachment, is rated in 1999 as the best of all postwar presidents in conducting foreign policy (a dizzying ascent from eighth place in 1994), according to a nationwide poll by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. This surprising result might also, of course, bespeak inattention: when asked to name the two or three most important foreign policy issues facing the US, fully 21 per cent of the public couldn't think of one (they answered ‘don't know’), and a mere seven per cent thought foreign policy issues were important to the nation. But who cares, when all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds?


2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Winger

Abstract In 2016, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte pledged to radically reorient Philippine foreign policy by separating from Manila's longtime ally the United States. Yet, this vaunted break with America has failed to manifest. Joint US–Philippine military activities have continued with President Duterte even singing the praises of his American partners. To understand how this about-face in Manila occurred, I conducted a detailed analysis of the first eighteen months of the Duterte administration. Drawing on primary sources and interviews with government officials from both countries, I argue that the continued vitality of the US–Philippine alliance stems not from disenchantment with China nor personal relationship between Duterte and Trump, but rather from an underlying institutional affinity engendered over decades of defense cooperation. Specifically, institutionalized cooperation within the alliance has cultivated a strong reservoir of support for the alliance within key institutions inside the Philippine government. This case not only highlights the development of the Duterte administration but also illustrates the wider ability of alliances to weather political discord by cultivating support within national bureaucracies.


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