Can Information Decrease Political Polarization? Evidence From the U.S. Taxpayer Receipt

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
pp. 736-745 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik P. Duhaime ◽  
Evan P. Apfelbaum

Scholars, politicians, and laypeople alike bemoan the high level of political polarization in the United States, but little is known about how to bring the views of liberals and conservatives closer together. Previous research finds that providing people with information regarding a contentious issue is ineffective for reducing polarization because people process such information in a biased manner. Here, we show that information can reduce political polarization below baseline levels and also that its capacity to do so is sensitive to contextual factors that make one’s relevant preferences salient. Specifically, in a nationally representative sample (Study 1) and a preregistered replication (Study 2), we find that providing a taxpayer receipt—an impartial, objective breakdown of how one’s taxes are spent that is published annually by the White House—reduces polarization regarding taxes, but not when participants are also asked to indicate how they would prefer their taxes be spent.

2021 ◽  
pp. 1532673X2110135
Author(s):  
Jordan Gans-Morse ◽  
Simeon Nichter

Prominent scholars in recent years have expressed alarm about political polarization, weakened civil liberties, and growing support for authoritarianism in the United States. But discussions of democratic backsliding pay short shrift to the value citizens place on one of the most fundamental democratic institutions: the act of voting. Drawing on nationally representative survey data, we show that despite traditional portrayals of the U.S. as the embodiment of a democratic “civic culture,” a substantial share of Americans express readiness to sell their votes for cash: 12% of respondents would do so for just $25, as would nearly 20% for $100. Citizens who place low importance on living in a democracy are significantly more willing to sell their votes. We argue that heightened attention to US voters’ attitudes toward clientelism would provide an additional barometer of democratic skepticism, help to integrate the study of American and comparative politics, and stimulate novel research agendas about the historic decline of vote buying in the United States.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (2) ◽  
pp. 392-409 ◽  
Author(s):  
MATTHEW H. GRAHAM ◽  
MILAN W. SVOLIK

Is support for democracy in the United States robust enough to deter undemocratic behavior by elected politicians? We develop a model of the public as a democratic check and evaluate it using two empirical strategies: an original, nationally representative candidate-choice experiment in which some politicians take positions that violate key democratic principles, and a natural experiment that occurred during Montana’s 2017 special election for the U.S. House. Our research design allows us to infer Americans’ willingness to trade-off democratic principles for other valid but potentially conflicting considerations such as political ideology, partisan loyalty, and policy preferences. We find the U.S. public’s viability as a democratic check to be strikingly limited: only a small fraction of Americans prioritize democratic principles in their electoral choices, and their tendency to do so is decreasing in several measures of polarization, including the strength of partisanship, policy extremism, and candidate platform divergence. Our findings echo classic arguments about the importance of political moderation and cross-cutting cleavages for democratic stability and highlight the dangers that polarization represents for democracy.


2013 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 185-191
Author(s):  
Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

Abstract:While Africans are generally satisfied that a person of African descent was reelected to the White House following a campaign in which vicious and racist attacks were made against him, the U.S. Africa policy under President Barack Obama will continue to be guided by the strategic interests of the United States, which are not necessarily compatible with the popular aspirations for democracy, peace, and prosperity in Africa. Obama’s policy in the Great Lakes region provides an excellent illustration of this point. Since Rwanda and Uganda are Washington’s allies in the “war against terror” in Darfur and Somalia, respectively, the Obama administration has done little to stop Kigali and Kampala from destabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and looting its natural resources, either directly or through proxies. Rwanda and Uganda have even been included in an international oversight mechanism that is supposed to guide governance and security sector reforms in the DRC, but whose real objective is to facilitate Western access to the enormous natural wealth of the Congo and the Great Lakes region.


Author(s):  
Alfred W. McCoy

The current war on drugs being waged by the United States and United Nations rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the global nar­cotics traffic. In 1998, for example, the White House issued a National Drug Con­trol Strategy, proclaiming a 10-year program “to reduce illegal drug use and avail­ability 50 percent by the year 2007,” thereby achieving “the lowest recorded drug-use rate in American history.” To this end, the U.S. program plans to reduce foreign drug cultivation, shipments from source countries like Colombia, and smuggling in key transit zones. Although this strategy promises a balanced attack on both supply and demand, its ultimate success hinges upon the complete eradi­cation of the international supply of illicit drugs. “Eliminating the cultivation of il­licit coca and opium,” the document says in a revealing passage, “is the best ap­proach to combating cocaine and heroin availability in the U.S.” (U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy 1998: 1, 23, 28). Similarly, in 1997 the new head of the United Nations Drug Control Program, Dr. Pino Arlacchi, announced a 10-year program to eradicate all illicit opium and coca cultivation, starting in Afghanistan. Three years later, in the United Nation’s World Drug Report 2000, he defended prohibition’s feasibility by citing China as a case where “comprehensive narcotics control strategies . . . succeeded in eradicat­ing opium between 1949 and 1954”— ignoring the communist coercion that al­lowed such success. Arlacchi also called for an “end to the psychology of despair” that questions drug prohibition, and insisted that this policy can indeed produce “the eradication of coca and opium poppy production.” Turning the page, however, the reader will find a chart showing a sharp rise in world opium production from 500 tons in 1981 to 6,000 tons in 2000— a juxtaposition that seems to challenge Ar-lacchi’s faith in prohibition (Bonner 1997; Wren 1998a, 1998b; United Nations 2000d, 1–2, 24). Examined closely, the United States and United Nations are pur­suing a drug control strategy whose success requires not just the reduction but also the total eradication of illicit narcotics cultivation from the face of the globe. Like the White House, the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) re­mains deeply, almost theologically committed to the untested proposition that the prohibition of cultivation is an effective response to the problem of illicit drugs.


Worldview ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-10
Author(s):  
Denis Goulet

Mexico's two thousand-mile border with the United States is unarmed, but it remains the locus of sharp conflicts. Last October, House Speaker "Tip" O'Neill, bowing to pressure from the Hispanic Caucus, withdrew the Simpson- Mazzoli bill on immigration reform over White House objections that "it is in the best interests of all Americans to have the nation regain control of its borders." Jorge Bustamante, director of Mexico's Center for Border Studies, argues, however, that such a bill would "leave all migrant workers, whether documented or not, in a state of virtual slavery, since they will have no access to the courts to plead for justice."


Author(s):  
Yasuhiko Saito ◽  
Shieva Davarian ◽  
Atsuhiko Takahashi ◽  
Edward Schneider ◽  
Eileen M. Crimmins

The Japanese have the highest life expectancy in the world while the United States (U.S.) has relatively low life expectancy. Furthermore, the Americans have relatively poorer health compared to the Japanese. Examination of the treatment of specific conditions such as hypertension in these two countries may provide insights into how the health care system con-tributes to the relative health in these two countries. In this study, we focus on the treatment of hypertension, as this is the most common condition requiring therapeutic interventions in se-niors. This study examines hypertension diagnoses and controls in nationally representative samples of the older populations (68 years old or older) of Japan and the U.S. Data come from two nationally representative samples: the Nihon University Japanese Longitudinal Study of Aging (NUJLSOA) (n = 2,309) and the U.S. Health and Retirement (HRS) Study (n = 3,517). The overall prevalence of hypertension is higher in Japan than the U.S. Undiagnosed hyperten-sion is about four times higher in Japan than in the U.S., while the control of blood pressure is more than four times higher in the U.S. than in Japan. Thus, the use of antihypertensive medi-cation is much more frequent and more effective in the U.S. The medical care system seems to be more effective in controlling hypertension in the U.S. than in Japan. This may be due to the more aggressive diagnosis and treatment of hypertension in the U.S.


1985 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lewis Feldman

The Malvinas (Falklands) war of April-June 1982 has generated little attention among international scholars largely because neither its causes or consequences are. assumed to have great power significance.The thesis of this article is that the timing of the Malvinas invasion, and the subsequent miscalculation that the United States would tacitly assist Argentina, were partly shaped by U. S. policies. Although the principal motive for the invasion was to vindicate a claim stretching back to the early 19th century (U.S. House 1982c: 50-51; Etchepareborda, 1983:48-58), the abruptness of Argentina's actions was conditioned by Reagan administration overtures towards a grand “anti-Communist” alliance (Maechling, 1982:75-82; Sunday Times, 1982: 63); an increase in the frequency and prestige of high-level contacts between the U.S. and Argentina between 1980-1982; the cultivation of official links between Galtieri and high-ranking U.S. national security officials (U.S. House, 1982d: 67; Hastings and Jenkins, 1983:46); the intense, personal diplomacy of former Secretary of State Haig during the conflict (Hastings and Jenkins, 1983: 104-113); and by covert efforts by Argentina to extend and strengthen U.S.-Argentine ties (Cardoso et al., 1983: 60-61).


2021 ◽  
pp. 106907272199569
Author(s):  
Micah J. White ◽  
Dylan R. Marsh ◽  
Bryan J. Dik ◽  
Cheryl L. Beseler

Within the last two decades, social science research on work as a calling has rapidly grown. To date, knowledge regarding prevalence and demographic differences of calling in the United States derives from data collected mainly from regionally limited and/or occupationally homogenous samples. The present study used data from the Portraits of American Life Study, a nationally stratified panel study of religion in the United States (U.S.), to estimate calling’s prevalence in the U.S. Our findings represent the first known population estimates of seeking, perceiving, and living a calling in the U.S. Results revealed that calling is a relevant concept for many U.S. adults, with 43% endorsing “mostly true” or “totally true” to the statement “I have a calling to a particular kind of work.” Small differences for presence of and search for a calling emerged across age groups, employment statuses, and levels of importance of God or spirituality. For living a calling, significant differences were identified only for importance of God or spirituality, contrasting with previous findings that suggested that living a calling varies as a function of income and social status. Implications for research and practice are explored.


2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 371-398
Author(s):  
Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol

In the spring of 2018, the White House and executive agencies issued a series of orders aimed at more aggressive enforcement against irregular entry of migrants at the southwest border. In analyzing the legal validity of the new U.S. immigration policy decisions, the Inter-American System questioned and strongly condemned the U.S. policy and practice of separating migrant families. On June 29, 2018, the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) issued a resolution that rejected any migration policy that resulted in the separation of families. Specifically, it urged the U.S. government to implement measures to avoid the separation of families, to seek unification of children and parents already separated, and to promote the identification of migrants and refugee seekers in accordance with international law. After the issuance of the resolution, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) granted Precautionary Measure No. 731–18, Regarding Migrant Children Affected by the “Zero Tolerance” Policy Regarding the United States of America (the children's measure), and Precautionary Measure No. 505–18, Concerning Vilma Aracely López Juc de Coc and Others Regarding the United States of America (the parents’ measure), both of which recognized that the rights to family life and personal integrity were at risk.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byungkyu Lee ◽  
James Chu

Vaccine hesitancy is a critical barrier to widespread vaccination uptake and containment of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the United States, vaccines have become politically polarized, with high rates of vaccine hesitancy observed among Republicans. In contrast to prior research focusing on partisan gaps, we investigate vaccination attitudes and uptake among a group overlooked in prior research: those who are eligible to vote but did not register in the presidential elections. Drawing on nationally representative and longitudinal survey data from April 2020 to October 2021, we show that this group – whom we call “political outsiders” – represents about 16% of the U.S. population. They had the lowest vaccination rate (47%) by 2021 October, significantly lower than Republican (65%), Independent (76%), and Democratic voters (88%). Further, we find that political outsiders are less likely to trust physicians compared to other partisan groups. Because the sources they trust differ from partisans, existing public health messaging may be less likely to reach them successfully. Finally, we find that political outsiders experience more socio-economic hardships and are less integrated into society. Hence, our results underscore the importance of targeted efforts to reach this highly vulnerable population.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document