The United States Role in the Malvinas Crisis, 1982: Misguidance and Misperception in Argentina's Decision to Go to War

1985 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Lewis Feldman

The Malvinas (Falklands) war of April-June 1982 has generated little attention among international scholars largely because neither its causes or consequences are. assumed to have great power significance.The thesis of this article is that the timing of the Malvinas invasion, and the subsequent miscalculation that the United States would tacitly assist Argentina, were partly shaped by U. S. policies. Although the principal motive for the invasion was to vindicate a claim stretching back to the early 19th century (U.S. House 1982c: 50-51; Etchepareborda, 1983:48-58), the abruptness of Argentina's actions was conditioned by Reagan administration overtures towards a grand “anti-Communist” alliance (Maechling, 1982:75-82; Sunday Times, 1982: 63); an increase in the frequency and prestige of high-level contacts between the U.S. and Argentina between 1980-1982; the cultivation of official links between Galtieri and high-ranking U.S. national security officials (U.S. House, 1982d: 67; Hastings and Jenkins, 1983:46); the intense, personal diplomacy of former Secretary of State Haig during the conflict (Hastings and Jenkins, 1983: 104-113); and by covert efforts by Argentina to extend and strengthen U.S.-Argentine ties (Cardoso et al., 1983: 60-61).

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Schafer

The 2018 U.S. pivot in information and cyberspace degraded Russian operations in the 2018 election. Following pervasive Russian information power operations during the U.S. 2016 elections, the United States progressed from a policy of preparations and defense in information and cyberspace to a policy of forward engagement. U.S recognition of renewed great power competition coupled with Russia’s inability to compete diplomatically, militarily (conventionally), or economically, inspires Russia to continues to concentrate on information power operations. This great game in cyberspace was virtually uncontested by the U.S. prior to 2017. Widespread awareness of Russian aggression in 2016 served as a catalyst which highlighted the enormity of Russian campaigns and the crippling constraints on U.S. information power. This catalyst pivoted the U.S. from a passive policy of preparations and defense in information and cyberspace to a policy of forward engagement that successfully attenuated Russian efforts in 2018. By examining information power from theory development and Russian practice to recent reports and primary sources we find that the U.S. demonstrated the capability and willingness to defend forward successfully during the 2018 elections. Going forward, the U.S. must continue and expand efforts to contest cyberspace and counter disinformation to secure our democracy and the U.S. 2020 presidential election.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1068-1107
Author(s):  
Kevin S. Robb ◽  
Shan Patel

Abstract In September 2018, then U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered a speech that ushered in a new, more aggressive era of U.S. foreign policy vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court (icc). Washington’s disapprobation over the icc’s interest in the alleged crimes of U.S. personnel in Afghanistan has been seen as the cause for this change. While this is certainly partly true, little attention has been paid to Fatou Bensouda’s prosecutorial behaviour as an explanatory factor. Using the framework from David Bosco’s Rough Justice, this article demonstrates that a distinct shift in prosecutorial behaviour occurred when Fatou Bensouda took over as Chief Prosecutor. In contrast to Luis Moreno Ocampo’s strategic approach, avoidant of U.S. interests, Bensouda’s apolitical approach directly challenged the U.S. This shift in prosecutorial behaviour ruptured the ‘mutual accommodation’ that previously characterised the icc-U.S. relationship and, in turn, produced the shift in U.S. policy that now marginalises the Court.


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (02) ◽  
pp. 105-117
Author(s):  
Jason Jacobs

AbstractWeaponization of state-backed, foreign investments by China is an emerging national security threat in the United States and the European Union. The U.S. and E.U. have espoused similar policy goals—to address the threat without closing their markets to foreign direct investment—while fostering increased cooperation between allied partners in screening transactions.On the surface, the recent, China-specific measures taken by the U.S. and the investment screening framework adopted by the E.U. appear reflective of an alignment of those policy goals. Indeed, many commentators have suggested that is exactly what is happening. However, closer examination reveals a stark divergence. The U.S. has a robust screening mechanism that has evolved into a weapon of economic warfare. The E.U. meanwhile, remains a patchwork of conflicting—or nonexistent—national regulations overlaid by a comparatively toothless investment screening framework.There is a tendency to attribute this divergence to structural differences between the United States and European Union. This in-depth comparison of U.S. and E.U. investment screening mechanisms exposes a split that goes beyond application and into actual policy. This revelation should temper expectations that the E.U. is equipping itself to block transactions that are of concern to the U.S.


2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (7) ◽  
pp. 736-745 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik P. Duhaime ◽  
Evan P. Apfelbaum

Scholars, politicians, and laypeople alike bemoan the high level of political polarization in the United States, but little is known about how to bring the views of liberals and conservatives closer together. Previous research finds that providing people with information regarding a contentious issue is ineffective for reducing polarization because people process such information in a biased manner. Here, we show that information can reduce political polarization below baseline levels and also that its capacity to do so is sensitive to contextual factors that make one’s relevant preferences salient. Specifically, in a nationally representative sample (Study 1) and a preregistered replication (Study 2), we find that providing a taxpayer receipt—an impartial, objective breakdown of how one’s taxes are spent that is published annually by the White House—reduces polarization regarding taxes, but not when participants are also asked to indicate how they would prefer their taxes be spent.


Author(s):  
Olexandr Koval ́kov

The article examines the documents of Jimmy Carter Administration (1977-1981) published in «Foreign Relations of the United States» series that represent the U.S. position on the Soviet intervention in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in December 1979. The author argues that the growing Soviet presence and finally a military intervention in Afghanistan was taken seriously in the United States and made Washington watch the developments in this country closely. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan became one of the major themes in the U.S. foreign policy. It was presented in a large array of documents of various origins, such as the Department of State correspondence with the U.S. Embassies in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union; analytical reports of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and Bureau of Intelligence and Research; exchanges of memorandums between National Security Council officers and other officials; memos from National Security Adviser Z. Brzezinski to J. Carter, and others. They represented the preconditions, preparations and implementation of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The authors of the documents discussed in details the possible motives of the Soviet leaders, and predicted the short-term consequences of the USSR’s intervention for the region and the whole world. Due to the clear understanding of the developments in Afghanistan in December 1979 by the J. Carter administration, it completely rejected the Soviet official version of them that adversely affected the bilateral Soviet-U.S. relations and international relations in general. Due to the lack of accessible Soviet sources on the USSR’s intervention in Afghanistan, the documents of Jimmy Carter’s administration fill this gap and constitute a valuable source for a researcher.


1982 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 129-146
Author(s):  
P.M. Kamath

In the post-World War II period “national security” has become the most important concept commanding respect among policy-makers and demanding crippling-silence on the part of the national community. It is not necessary here to examine the reasons1, for this commandeering position given to the concept of national security, but in an objective sense, foreign affairs of any nation in the ultimate analysis is conducted to secure national security. In this sense national security essentially denotes a nation's determination to preserve at any cost some of its interests. Foremost are : territorial integrity, political independence and fundamental governmental institutions.2 In the contemporary world it is also a well established fact that the military, diplomatic and economic aspects of a nation's foreign affairs are inseperably interlinked with one another. While foreign policy aims at serving national interest through peaceful diplomatic means, military policy aims at preparedness to protect national interest in case foreign policy fails. The foreign policy of a nation has also to take into consideration economic states involved in a particular policy consideration. This is particularly true for a super power like the United States. Hence, in a sense, it is appropriate to term the combination of foreign and military policies of a nation as national security policy. Who makes national security policy in the United States? What are the special features of national security policy-making process? It is proposed to answer these questions in this paper with special reference to the Reagan Administration.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 159-178
Author(s):  
Giandi Kartasasmita

This paper aims to explain the securitization process of China’s technology companies by the U.S Government. Whilethe U.S has been aware of the cyber threat since 1998, before Trump's presidency, the U.S. Government had nevertaken drastic measures against foreign technology companies based on national security pretext. This paper revealedthat the U.S. Executive has succeeded in securitizing the Chinese hardware and software companies, proved by theincreasing number of U.S. Citizens, see China as a major threat to the U.S.


Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

The United States of America has been the most powerful country in the world for the past seventy years, but will Washington’s reign as the world’s leading superpower continue? The U.S. National Security Strategy declares that the return of great power competition with Russia and China is the greatest threat to U.S. national security and economic well-being. Perhaps surprisingly, international relations scholarship does not have much to say about who wins great power rivalries, and many contemporary analysts argue that America’s autocratic rivals will succeed in disrupting or displacing U.S. global leadership. In sharp contrast, this book makes the novel argument that democracies enjoy built-in advantages in international geopolitics. Drawing on the writings of political philosophers—such as Herodotus, Machiavelli, and Montesquieu—and cutting-edge social science research, this book explains the unique economic, diplomatic, and military advantages that democracies bring to the international arena. It then carefully considers the advantages and disadvantages possessed by autocratic great powers. These ideas are then examined in a series of seven case studies of democratic-versus-autocratic rivalries throughout history, from ancient Greece to the Cold War. The book then unpacks the implications of this analysis for the United States, Russia, and China today. It concludes that, despite its many problems, America’s fundamentals are still much better than Russia’s and China’s. By making the “hard-power” argument for democracy, this book provides an innovative way of thinking about power in international politics and provides an optimistic assessment about the future of American global leadership.


Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

This chapter examines the future of American global leadership through the lens of its domestic political institutions. It finds that the United States faces growing troubles at home. At the same time, its vibrant economy, strong alliances relationships, and its unmatched military, all reflections of the U.S. domestic political system, will continue to provide a significant source of strategic advantage for the United States over its autocratic competitors in the years to come. The international security environment is becoming more competitive, and the United States does not exercise the unchallenged primacy it enjoyed in the 1990s. We have returned to an era of great power rivalry. But, there is no doubt that the United States remains the world’s leading power.


Author(s):  
Matthew Kroenig

This chapter analyzes the Russian Federation through the lens of its domestic political system. Russia may pose the greatest near-term national security threat to the United States and its allies, but it has a key vulnerability: its domestic political institutions. Its autocratic system is undermining its international effectiveness. Its economy is smaller than Italy’s. It lacks effective alliances. And its military is overly focused on domestic threats and is ill-equipped for the strategic-technological competitions of the 21st century. It is dangerous and it can disrupt the U.S.-led order. But it will not be in a position to be a true peer competitor to the United States any time soon. So long as it continues to be ruled by President Vladimir Putin, or another similar dictator, Russia will not be able to mount a serious challenge to U.S. global leadership.


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