Psychological Gossip

1856 ◽  
Vol 2 (17) ◽  
pp. 333-341
Author(s):  
J. H.

In Dr. Conolly's early treatise on the Indications of Insanity, there is a charming chapter, on the “Modifications of intellectual power and activity, by various stimuli.” It abounds in anecdote, is very suggestive and full of instruction. If any reader of the Asylum Journal is unacquainted with the volume, he will obtain a rich treat by the perusal of its classic pages. Its facts will instruct him, even if he may demur to the theory which is based upon them. It has suggested to one mind, an hypothesis transient, it may be, as an April sunbeam, but which nevertheless seeks a written utterance in the Asylum Journal; and if meriting no better name, let it pass under the title of psychological gossip—for the writer has a strong suspicion, that this is its correct definition, more especially as in its elucidation some facts -will be reiterated, and some statements made, which have been used for other, if not for higher purposes elsewhere. The hypothesis consists in the supposition that the science of Phrenology, if not the art of Craniology is based upon truth, but that the special faculties of the mind are not produced simply and exclusively by an inherent power or impulse, but require for their education some appeal from the external senses; that Locke was not right in regarding the mind as a ‘tabula rasa’ until written upon by the senses; or Cabanis, Gall, and their successors, in supposing that the manifestation of special genius in individuals was dependent solely upon a particular cerebral organization, and altogether independent for its action of external incidents. In other words, that the faculties of the mind are evoked by an appeal from the senses, each mind responding to some peculiar excitement, as the highly toned instrument echoes back the note which is struck from without, provided it is in accordance with its own pitch or tensity. There is a dual action between the organs of sense and the brain, in the first awakening of the mind to a special pursuit; thus the genius of Ebenezer Elliott, the stern and powerful “Corn Law Rhymer,” appears ever to have required some such appeal from without, for in his autobiography he tells us, that “time has developed in me not genius, but powers which exist in all men, and lie dormant in most. I cannot, like Byron and Montgomery, pour poetry from my heart as from an unfailing fountain; and of my inability to indentify myself, like Shakespeare and Scott, with the characters of other men, my abortive ‘Kerhonah,’ ‘Taurepeds' and similar rejected failures are melancholy instances. My thoughts are all exterior. My mind is the mind of my own eyes. A primrose is to me a primrose and nothing more. I love it because it is nothing more. There is not in my writings one good idea that has not been suggested to me by some real occurrence, or by some object actually before my eyes, or by some remembered object or occurrence, or by the thoughts of other men heard or read. If I possess any power at all allied to genius, it is that of making other men's thoughts suggest thoughts to me, which, whether original or not, are to me new. Some years ago, my late excellent neighbour John Heppenstel, after showing me the plates of Audubon's “Birds of America,” requested me to address a few verses to the author. With this request I was anxious to comply, but I was unable to write a line, until a sentence in Rousseau suggested a whole poem, and coloured all its language. Now in this case I was not like a clergyman seeking a text, that he may write a sermon; for the text was not sought but found, or it would have been to me a lying and barren spirit.” This experience of Elliott would be regarded by some as an apt illustration of the sensational theory of mind, while the phrenologist might consider it as an example of the development of the perceptive faculties equalling if not dominating over the organ of ideality. It appears to the writer, generic and typical of all mental arousings to a specific pursuit; certain is it, that Byron is no exception, as the Corn Law Rhymer would have us believe, for the bright world around him with its ever varying incidents was the inspiration of his muse. It was on the lake of Geneva, that he composed the most beautiful portions of Childe Harold. The stillness and the loveliness of the place, seemed to imbue his mind with corresponding placidity, for in the eighty fifth verse of the third canto, he thus writes:—

2001 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-101
Author(s):  
J. P. MORELAND

In an important paper, Clifford Williams advanced a Lockean-style argument to justify the parity thesis, viz., that there is no intellectual advantage to Christian physicalism or Christian dualism. In an article in Religious Studies I offered a critique of Williams's parity thesis and he has published a rejoinder to me in the same journal centring on my rejection of topic neutrality as an appropriate way to set up the mind–body debate. In this surrejoinder to Williams, I present his three main arguments and respond to each: (1) The dualist rejection of topic neutrality is flawed because it expresses a conceptual approach to the mind–body problem instead of the preferable empirical approach. The latter favours physicalism and, in any case, clearly supports topic neutrality. (2) If the dualist rejects the first argument, then a second parity thesis can be advanced in which an essentialist view of soul and the brain are presented in which each is essentially a thinking and feeling entity. Thus, an essentialist parity thesis is preserved. (3) If the dualist rejects the second argument, a new topic neutrality emerges in the dialectic, so topic neutrality is unavoidable. Against the first argument, I claim that Williams makes two central confusions that undermine his case and that he fails to show how the mind–body debate can be settled empirically. Against the second argument, I claim that it leaves Williams vulnerable to a topic-neutral approach to God and it merely proffers a verbal shift with a new dualism between normal and ‘special’ matter. Against the third argument, I point out that it misrepresents the dualist viewpoint and leads to two counterintuitive features that follow from topic neutrality.


2013 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 14-19
Author(s):  
VIKAS K. SHARMA ◽  
PRAGYA SAHARE ◽  
MANASVI SHRIVASTAV

It is well known that human mind possess unbounded power. It has numerous extrasensory potentials like precognition, psychokinesis, extrasensory perception etc. According to Sriram Sharma Acharya, human mind is indeed a miracle of consciousness that can visualize and traverse anywhere in the infinite expansion of the cosmos in nanoseconds. It can acquire unlimited knowledge and is endowed with super natural potentials. In this study, it is theorized that supernatural powers of the mind can be attained by activating some extrasensory centers of human body with the help of some yogic exercises such as meditation and sadhanas. According to yogic texts, Agya Chakra referred as the ‘third eye’ or the ‘sixth sense’. The yoga shastras describe the position of the Agya Chakra in the inner core of the brain deep behind the bhru-madhya (center between the two eyebrows). The view of the expert of yoga, clairvoyance, telepathy, extra-terrestrial communication etc. can be bestowed by the activation of agya chakra. The exponents of dhyan-yoga regard Agya Chakra as the core of self-realization and the centre for the linkage of individual consciousness with the omnipresent supreme-consciousness. Indian rishi-munis who, by has deep contemplation of yogic sadhanas, they had awakened the supernormal powers of their mind and become the masters of many ridhi-siddhis. In this paper, researchers have made an effort to explore the techniques that one could attain the superhuman siddhis from the dedicated yoga sadhanas through activation of agya chakra, these sages of yore had done.


Sententiae ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 40 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-43
Author(s):  
Dmytro Sepetyi ◽  

The article analyses recent English publications in Cartesian studies that deal with two problems: (1) the problem of the intrinsic coherence of Descartes’s doctrine of the real distinction and interaction between mind and body and (2) the problem of the consistency of this doctrine with the causal principle formulated in the Third Meditation. The principle at issue is alternatively interpreted by different Cartesian scholars either as the Hierarchy Principle, that the cause should be at least as perfect as its effects, or the Containment Principle, that the cause should contain all there is in its effects. The author argues that Descartes’s claim (in his argument against the scholastic doctrine of substantial forms) that it is inconceivable how things of different natures can interact does not conflict with the acknowledgement of interaction between things of different natures in the case of soul and body. The case is made that Cartesian mind-body interaction can agree with both the Hierarchy Principle and the Containment Principle, because the Principle is about total and efficient cause, whereas in the interaction, mental and brain states are only partial (and plausibly, in the case of brains states, occasional) causes. In particular, in the case of the causality in the brain-to-mind direction, the mind is conditioned by brain states to form the corresponding specific ideas on the basis of its innate general ideas of movements, forms, colours, etc. Eventually, for Descartes, the most natural way to deal with worries about the possibility of mind-brain interaction is to rely on God’s omnipotence, which certainly enables Him to arrange for such interaction.


Author(s):  
Gary Hatfield

This chapter reviews the basic tenets of Descartes’s mind–body dualism and its context, including the epistemological role of mind in its capacity as a pure intellect and as part of a being with sensory perception. Then, putting aside the metaphysics of dualism, it focuses on the functional aspects of mind and its relation to body, and on the role of the bodily machine in Descartes’s psychology. Within this large territory, it examines mind and psychology as categories applicable to Descartes’s writings before turning to the active role of the brain in Descartes’s theory of mind and machine psychology, including his “natural geometry”, his theory of the passions, and the machine psychology of mindless non-human animals—and of human beings, when the body acts without direction from the mind.


2019 ◽  
pp. 21-48
Author(s):  
Stanley Finger

Gall built a successful practice after obtaining his medical degree in 1785. He lived in a fashionable part of Vienna and in 1790 married Katharina Leisler, who he knew from Strasbourg. He published his first book in 1791, a philosophical work on the mind and the art of healing, in which he dispensed with metaphysics and loosely presented some ideas (e.g., innate faculties, individual differences) but not others (e.g., localizing faculties) that he would develop in his later “organology.” Shortly after, he met a young musical prodigy named Bianchi, who was ordinary in other ways. Although this convinced him that music had to be an innate faculty of mind, he did not correlate this trait with a distinctive cranial bump at this time. Nonetheless, her case seemed to have reminded him of the good memorizers of his youth, who had bulging eyes, also leading him to his new theory of mind. By 1796, he was lecturing from his home about many independent faculties of mind, the parts of the brain associated with them, and skull markers as a means to correlate behavioral functions with underlying brain structures. Two years later, he published a letter to Joseph Friedrich Freiherr Retzer, the Viennese censor, laying out his doctrine and methods with humans and animals. In it, he presented himself as a physiognomist.


2020 ◽  
pp. 317-350
Author(s):  
Gualtiero Piccinini

This chapter discusses the connection between computation and consciousness. Three theses are sometimes conflated. Functionalism is the view that the mind is the functional organization of the brain. The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is the view that the whole mind—not only cognition but consciousness as well—has a computational explanation. When combined with the empirical discovery that the brain is the organ of the mind, CTM entails that the functional organization of the brain is computational. Computational functionalism is the conjunction of the two: the mind is the computational organization of the brain. Contrary to a common assumption, functionalism entails neither CTM nor computational functionalism. This finding makes room for an underexplored possibility: that consciousness be (at least partly) due to the functional organization of the brain without being computational in nature. This is a noncomputational version of functionalism about consciousness.


2004 ◽  
Vol 49 (6) ◽  
pp. 713-716
Author(s):  
Ellen S. Berscheid
Keyword(s):  
The Mind ◽  

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 61 (32) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher A. Was
Keyword(s):  
The Mind ◽  

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-171
Author(s):  
Nāṣir Al-Dīn Abū Khaḍīr

The ʿUthmānic way of writing (al-rasm al-ʿUthmānī) is a science that specialises in the writing of Qur'anic words in accordance with a specific ‘pattern’. It follows the writing style of the Companions at the time of the third caliph, ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān, and was attributed to ʿUthmān on the basis that he was the one who ordered the collection and copying of the Qur'an into the actual muṣḥaf. This article aims to expound on the two fundamental functions of al-rasm al-ʿUthmānī: that of paying regard to the ‘correct’ pronunciation of the words in the muṣḥaf, and the pursuit of the preclusion of ambiguity which may arise in the mind of the reader and his auditor. There is a further practical aim for this study: to show the connection between modern orthography and the ʿUthmānic rasm in order that we, nowadays, are thereby able to overcome the problems faced by calligraphers and writers of the past in their different ages and cultures.


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