An Emerging Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 21-48
Author(s):  
Stanley Finger

Gall built a successful practice after obtaining his medical degree in 1785. He lived in a fashionable part of Vienna and in 1790 married Katharina Leisler, who he knew from Strasbourg. He published his first book in 1791, a philosophical work on the mind and the art of healing, in which he dispensed with metaphysics and loosely presented some ideas (e.g., innate faculties, individual differences) but not others (e.g., localizing faculties) that he would develop in his later “organology.” Shortly after, he met a young musical prodigy named Bianchi, who was ordinary in other ways. Although this convinced him that music had to be an innate faculty of mind, he did not correlate this trait with a distinctive cranial bump at this time. Nonetheless, her case seemed to have reminded him of the good memorizers of his youth, who had bulging eyes, also leading him to his new theory of mind. By 1796, he was lecturing from his home about many independent faculties of mind, the parts of the brain associated with them, and skull markers as a means to correlate behavioral functions with underlying brain structures. Two years later, he published a letter to Joseph Friedrich Freiherr Retzer, the Viennese censor, laying out his doctrine and methods with humans and animals. In it, he presented himself as a physiognomist.

We know that the brain is the seat of the mind. Constructing the reductive model of the conscious mind requires an indication of the laws according to which the mind emerges from biophysical processes occurring in natural brains. Because in Part I, the authors presented the theoretical model referring to the ideal structures of the imagined neural network, we now have easier task, because we need to indicate in the brains of the living beings those processes that functionally correspond to our postulates. Such suitability is not guaranteed by known processes occurring in specialized parts of the brain. The role of the primary sensory areas is a detailed analysis of sensory stimuli with specific modality. They result in analysis of the meaning of all useful stimuli and their interpretation used in various parts of the cortex. The high specialization of individual cortex areas is striking and are the result of evolutionary development of the brain. New brain structures, such as the new cortex, were added on the outskirts of existing structures, improving their performance in the ever more demanding environments, where other intelligent beings ravened. But even as we know the brain organization, we struggle to understand how it works. How neurons that make the brain work together to create the conscious mind. To discover functionally effective processes in the brain, one need to reach for the biophysical properties of the astrocyt-neural network. In this chapter, the authors suggest that some concepts of neuro-electro-dynamics and the phenomena of neuro- and synapto-genesis as well as synaptic couplings may explain the processes of categorization, generalization and association leading to the formation of extensive, semihierarchical brain structures constituting neural representations of perceptions, objects and phenomena. Natural brains meet the embodiment condition. They are products of evolution, so they have intentionality, their own goals and needs. So they can naturally show emotions, drives and instincts that motivate to act. This determines the nature of constructed mental representations. They are the subject of psychological research, which shows the motivation of pain and pleasure in the field of intelligent activities, as well as the motivation of curiosity and the need for understanding in the domain of propositional and phenomenal consciousness. They describe the way pain is felt in organisms as basic quale. The role of other qualia for “how-it-is-like to feel something” and their subjective character was explained, as well as their interspecies specificity was characterized. In this chapter, the authors present an elementary biophysical phenomenon, that is a flash of consciousness. This phenomenon is synaptic coupling formed in the course of learning. They justify that the stream of such phenomena is the foundation of consciousness. They also point out that the astrocytic-neural network meets all the conditions required to generate conscious sensations.


2021 ◽  
pp. 096777201985823
Author(s):  
Charles T Ambrose

In 1940 during the early phase of the Nazi aerial assault on Britain, the English neurophysiologist, C.S. Sherrington, age 83 years, had just published a philosophical work, Man on His Nature, and was researching the writings of Jean Fernel, a 16th century French physician . Sherrington’s study of Fernel stemmed from a common interest they shared in the association between the mind and the brain. This essay was prompted by a short letter penned by Sherrington in December 1940 and bound years later in his biography, The Endeavour of Jean Fernel, published in 1946. The letter requested information about a particular medical work by Fernel but also mentioned in passing Sherrington’s recent forced evacuation from his home in Ipswich, threatened by German bombing and invasion. The letter in the book invited a reprise of his remarkable career and a study of his last neurological concern – the mind–brain mystery.


Author(s):  
Karrie E. Elpers ◽  
Thomas R. Coyle

Abstract. Previous research suggests that theory of mind tasks such as the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) are correlated with general intelligence ( g). The present study replicated and extended this research by testing correlations between g, the RMET, and two related measures, the empathy quotient (EQ) and systematizing quotient (SQ). The RMET, EQ, and SQ were all significantly correlated with g (r = .27 with RMET; r = −.15 with EQ; r = .27 with SQ). To determine if the RMET, EQ, and SQ derive their predictive power from g, a hierarchical regression examined whether the RMET, EQ, and SQ predicted feelings toward STEM and humanities after controlling for g. The EQ and SQ continued to significantly predict feelings toward STEM (β = −.20 for EQ; β = .42 for SQ) after controlling for g, and the RMET and EQ continued to significantly predict feelings toward humanities (β = .10 for RMET; β = .20 for EQ) after controlling for g, suggesting that these measures do not entirely derive their predictive power from g.


2014 ◽  
Vol 26 (8) ◽  
pp. 1685-1693 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masamichi J. Hayashi ◽  
Moona Kantele ◽  
Vincent Walsh ◽  
Synnöve Carlson ◽  
Ryota Kanai

The ability to estimate durations varies across individuals. Although previous studies have reported that individual differences in perceptual skills and cognitive capacities are reflected in brain structures, it remains unknown whether timing abilities are also reflected in the brain anatomy. Here, we show that individual differences in the ability to estimate subsecond and suprasecond durations correlate with gray matter (GM) volume in different parts of cortical and subcortical areas. Better ability to discriminate subsecond durations was associated with a larger GM volume in the bilateral anterior cerebellum, whereas better performance in estimating the suprasecond range was associated with a smaller GM volume in the inferior parietal lobule. These results indicate that regional GM volume is predictive of an individual's timing abilities. These morphological results support the notion that subsecond durations are processed in the motor system, whereas suprasecond durations are processed in the parietal cortex by utilizing the capacity of attention and working memory to keep track of time.


Author(s):  
Gary Hatfield

This chapter reviews the basic tenets of Descartes’s mind–body dualism and its context, including the epistemological role of mind in its capacity as a pure intellect and as part of a being with sensory perception. Then, putting aside the metaphysics of dualism, it focuses on the functional aspects of mind and its relation to body, and on the role of the bodily machine in Descartes’s psychology. Within this large territory, it examines mind and psychology as categories applicable to Descartes’s writings before turning to the active role of the brain in Descartes’s theory of mind and machine psychology, including his “natural geometry”, his theory of the passions, and the machine psychology of mindless non-human animals—and of human beings, when the body acts without direction from the mind.


2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 157-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjaana Lindeman ◽  
Tapani Riekki ◽  
Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen

We examined how people see the role of the brain, the mind, and the soul in biological, psychobiological, and mental states. Three clusters of participants were identified. The monists attributed biological, psychobiological, and mental processes only to the brain, the emergentists attributed the processes to the brain and to the mind, and the spiritualists attributed the processes to the brain, the mind, and the soul. Most participants attributed all states more to the brain than to the mind or soul. Beliefs, desires, and emotions were thought of as more likely to continue after death than other states, but belief in immortal souls was rare and only found among those who also held religious and paranormal beliefs. The results indicate that laypeople may see beliefs, desires, and emotions as both states of the mind, of the soul, and of the brain; that there are large individual differences in how the concept of the soul is understood, and that in lay conceptions, the idea that the processes of mind are processes of brain does not exclude supernatural brain-soul dualism.


2020 ◽  
pp. 317-350
Author(s):  
Gualtiero Piccinini

This chapter discusses the connection between computation and consciousness. Three theses are sometimes conflated. Functionalism is the view that the mind is the functional organization of the brain. The Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is the view that the whole mind—not only cognition but consciousness as well—has a computational explanation. When combined with the empirical discovery that the brain is the organ of the mind, CTM entails that the functional organization of the brain is computational. Computational functionalism is the conjunction of the two: the mind is the computational organization of the brain. Contrary to a common assumption, functionalism entails neither CTM nor computational functionalism. This finding makes room for an underexplored possibility: that consciousness be (at least partly) due to the functional organization of the brain without being computational in nature. This is a noncomputational version of functionalism about consciousness.


1856 ◽  
Vol 2 (17) ◽  
pp. 333-341
Author(s):  
J. H.

In Dr. Conolly's early treatise on the Indications of Insanity, there is a charming chapter, on the “Modifications of intellectual power and activity, by various stimuli.” It abounds in anecdote, is very suggestive and full of instruction. If any reader of the Asylum Journal is unacquainted with the volume, he will obtain a rich treat by the perusal of its classic pages. Its facts will instruct him, even if he may demur to the theory which is based upon them. It has suggested to one mind, an hypothesis transient, it may be, as an April sunbeam, but which nevertheless seeks a written utterance in the Asylum Journal; and if meriting no better name, let it pass under the title of psychological gossip—for the writer has a strong suspicion, that this is its correct definition, more especially as in its elucidation some facts -will be reiterated, and some statements made, which have been used for other, if not for higher purposes elsewhere. The hypothesis consists in the supposition that the science of Phrenology, if not the art of Craniology is based upon truth, but that the special faculties of the mind are not produced simply and exclusively by an inherent power or impulse, but require for their education some appeal from the external senses; that Locke was not right in regarding the mind as a ‘tabula rasa’ until written upon by the senses; or Cabanis, Gall, and their successors, in supposing that the manifestation of special genius in individuals was dependent solely upon a particular cerebral organization, and altogether independent for its action of external incidents. In other words, that the faculties of the mind are evoked by an appeal from the senses, each mind responding to some peculiar excitement, as the highly toned instrument echoes back the note which is struck from without, provided it is in accordance with its own pitch or tensity. There is a dual action between the organs of sense and the brain, in the first awakening of the mind to a special pursuit; thus the genius of Ebenezer Elliott, the stern and powerful “Corn Law Rhymer,” appears ever to have required some such appeal from without, for in his autobiography he tells us, that “time has developed in me not genius, but powers which exist in all men, and lie dormant in most. I cannot, like Byron and Montgomery, pour poetry from my heart as from an unfailing fountain; and of my inability to indentify myself, like Shakespeare and Scott, with the characters of other men, my abortive ‘Kerhonah,’ ‘Taurepeds' and similar rejected failures are melancholy instances. My thoughts are all exterior. My mind is the mind of my own eyes. A primrose is to me a primrose and nothing more. I love it because it is nothing more. There is not in my writings one good idea that has not been suggested to me by some real occurrence, or by some object actually before my eyes, or by some remembered object or occurrence, or by the thoughts of other men heard or read. If I possess any power at all allied to genius, it is that of making other men's thoughts suggest thoughts to me, which, whether original or not, are to me new. Some years ago, my late excellent neighbour John Heppenstel, after showing me the plates of Audubon's “Birds of America,” requested me to address a few verses to the author. With this request I was anxious to comply, but I was unable to write a line, until a sentence in Rousseau suggested a whole poem, and coloured all its language. Now in this case I was not like a clergyman seeking a text, that he may write a sermon; for the text was not sought but found, or it would have been to me a lying and barren spirit.” This experience of Elliott would be regarded by some as an apt illustration of the sensational theory of mind, while the phrenologist might consider it as an example of the development of the perceptive faculties equalling if not dominating over the organ of ideality. It appears to the writer, generic and typical of all mental arousings to a specific pursuit; certain is it, that Byron is no exception, as the Corn Law Rhymer would have us believe, for the bright world around him with its ever varying incidents was the inspiration of his muse. It was on the lake of Geneva, that he composed the most beautiful portions of Childe Harold. The stillness and the loveliness of the place, seemed to imbue his mind with corresponding placidity, for in the eighty fifth verse of the third canto, he thus writes:—


Author(s):  
Jacquelyn L. Schreck ◽  
Olivia B. Newton ◽  
Jihye Song ◽  
Stephen M. Fiore

This study examined how human-robot interaction is influenced by individual differences in theory of mind ability. Participants engaged in a hallway navigation task with a robot over a number of trials. The display on the robot and its proxemics behavior was manipulated, and participants made mental state attributions across trials. Participant ability in theory of mind was also assessed. Results show that proxemics behavior and robotic display characteristics differentially influence the degree to which individuals perceive the robot when making mental state attributions about self or other. Additionally, theory of mind ability interacted with proxemics and display characteristics. The findings illustrate the importance of understanding individual differences in higher level cognition. As robots become more social, the need to understand social cognitive processes in human-robot interactions increases. Results are discussed in the context of how individual differences and social signals theory inform research in human-robot interaction.


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