Persuading Voters
2016 ◽
Vol 106
(11)
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pp. 3590-3605
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Keyword(s):
In a symmetric information voting model, an individual (politician) can influence voters' choices by strategically designing a policy experiment (public signal). We characterize the politician's optimal experiment. With a nonunanimous voting rule, she exploits voters' heterogeneity by designing an experiment with realizations targeting different winning coalitions. Consequently, under a simple-majority rule, a majority of voters might be strictly worse off due to the politician's influence. We characterize voters' preferences over electoral rules and provide conditions for a majority of voters to prefer a supermajority (or unanimity) voting rule, in order to induce the politician to supply a more informative experiment. (JEL D72, D83)
2015 ◽
Vol 2
(2)
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pp. 139-151
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Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2019 ◽
pp. 84-102
1973 ◽
Vol 6
(3)
◽
pp. 243-264
◽
1983 ◽
pp. 101-125
2003 ◽
Vol 35
(4)
◽
pp. 941-960
◽
Keyword(s):
1983 ◽
Vol 13
(2)
◽
pp. 181-208
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