scholarly journals Liquidity Sentiments

2019 ◽  
Vol 109 (11) ◽  
pp. 3813-3848 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vladimir Asriyan ◽  
William Fuchs ◽  
Brett Green

We develop a rational theory of liquidity sentiments in which the market outcome in any given period depends on agents’ expectations about market conditions in future periods. Our theory is based on the interaction between adverse selection and resale considerations giving rise to an intertemporal coordination problem that yields multiple self-fulfilling equilibria. We construct “sentiment” equilibria in which sunspots generate fluctuations in prices, volume, and welfare, all of which are positively correlated. The intertemporal nature of the coordination problem disciplines the set of possible sentiment dynamics. In particular, sentiments must be sufficiently persistent and transitions must be stochastic. We consider an extension with production in which asset quality is endogenously determined and provide conditions under which sentiments are a necessary feature of any equilibrium. A testable implication is that assets produced in good times are of lower average quality than those produced in bad times. (JEL D84, D82, E32, E44, G12)

2014 ◽  
Vol 17 (03) ◽  
pp. 1450020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Min Maung

Overwhelming evidence indicates that firms time market conditions to issue equity. I investigate the motivations for security issuances in hot and cold markets. While it is commonly believed that firms tend to exploit overvaluations to issue equity and overinvest in so-called 'hot' markets, which often results in lower future returns, I show that security issuances in certain periods with lower adverse selection costs are motivated by fundamentals such as capital expenditures and financial constraints, and that these issuances can create shareholder wealth. In contrast, firms that issue equity during periods of high sentiment experience a decline in future returns.


2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerry Back ◽  
Ruomeng Liu ◽  
Alberto Teguia

We provide a theoretical rationale for dealer objections to ex post transparency in over-the-counter markets. Disclosure of the terms of a transaction conveys information possessed by the dealer about the asset quality and reduces the dealer’s rents when she disposes of the inventory in a second transaction. We show that costly signaling in a transparent market benefits investors through lower spreads and higher volume. Dealers may also gain from transparency despite lower spreads when potential gains from trade are small or adverse selection is high, because in those circumstances higher volume offsets smaller spreads for dealer profits.


2014 ◽  
Vol 644-650 ◽  
pp. 5477-5480
Author(s):  
Na Na Zhang ◽  
Qing Tian Deng

“Adverse selection” has abundant meanings in economic, one of its meanings is the phenomenon that the average quality of trading products in market is declining as well as quality goods are expelled by inferior goods for information asymmetry of both parties and the declining prices.In recent years, a new place of virtual goods, Internet market, is rapidly expanding. It has incomparable advantages in the transmission, acquisition and communication of information than traditional media in internet market. It will bring high efficiency to commercial activities definitely. However, the adverse selection and moral hazard, especially the adverse selection, raised by information asymmetry, will have the consequence-the market for lemon. And it will affect the market efficiency further. As a new transaction means, electronic commerce should solve kinds of problems by information asymmetry. In this way, it may help in promoting and facilitating of economic development.


ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 17-27
Author(s):  
Yunita Sari

Pulmonary tuberculosis (TB) is a chronic disease that can bring about the sufferer's self-stigma and also affect his quality of life. A number of studies report that living with TB has a negative influence on the quality of life of sufferers even with or without self-stigma. The purpose of this study was to identify the quality of life of TB patients who experienced self-stigma. This research is a descriptive study, sample were 31 pulmonary TB patients. Data was collected using a questionnaire. Data analyzed by using frequency distribution and percentage. The researcher first screened TB patients who experienced self-stigma. The results showed that 25 people (80.64%) respondents experienced mild self-stigma. A total of 9 respondents (36%) had a quality of life score in the good category and as many as 16 respondents (64%) had enough category with an average quality of life score is 56.57. While respondents who had moderate self-stigma were 6 people (19.36%) with a good quality of life score was 1 person (16.67%) and enough category quality of life score were 5 people (83.33%) with an average quality of life score is 49.92.


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