scholarly journals The Ricardian Approach to Budget Deficits

1989 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J Barro

In recent years there has been a lot of discussion about U.S. budget deficits. Many economists and other observers have viewed these deficits as harmful to the U.S. and world economies. The supposed harmful effects include high real interest rates, low saving, low rates of economic growth, large current-account deficits in the United States and other countries with large budget deficits, and either a high or low dollar (depending apparently on the time period). This crisis scenario has been hard to maintain along with the robust performance of the U.S. economy since late 1982. Persistent budget deficits have increased economists' interest in theories and evidence about fiscal policy. At the same time, the conflict between standard predictions and actual outcomes in the U.S. economy has, I think, increased economists' willingness to consider approaches that depart from the standard paradigm. In this paper, I will focus on the alternative theory that is associated with the name of David Ricardo.

2000 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 3-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Alesina

Current surpluses in the U.S. have been achieved by a combination of a strong economy, low interest rates, and sharp cuts in defense spending. These surpluses follow a period (the 1980s) of rather exceptional budget deficit. This paper investigates the origin, size, and expected future patterns of the U.S. budget balance. It discusses how different political forces may generate alternative fiscal scenarios for the U.S. in the next decade.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (210) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kamiar Mohaddes ◽  
M. Pesaran

The recent plunge in oil prices has brought into question the generally accepted view that lower oil prices are good for the United States and the global economy. In this paper, using a quarterly multi-country econometric model, we first show that a fall in oil prices tends relatively quickly to lower interest rates and inflation in most countries, and increase global real equity prices. The effects on real output are positive, although they take longer to materialize (around four quarters after the shock). We then re-examine the effects of low oil prices on the U.S. economy over different sub-periods using monthly observations on real oil prices, real equity prices and real dividends. We confirm the perverse positive relationship between oil and equity prices over the period since the 2008 financial crisis highlighted in the recent literature, but show that this relationship has been unstable when considered over the longer time period of 1946–2016. In contrast, we find a stable negative relationship between oil prices and real dividends which we argue is a better proxy for economic activity (as compared to equity prices). On the supply side, the effects of lower oil prices differ widely across the different oil producers, and could be perverse initially, as some of the major oil producers try to compensate their loss of revenues by raising production. Taking demand and supply adjustments to oil price changes as a whole, we conclude that oil markets equilibrate but rather slowly, with large episodic swings between low and high oil prices.


Author(s):  
Josh Ederington ◽  
Arik Levinson ◽  
Jenny Minier

Abstract U.S. Presidential Executive Order 13141 commits the United States to a careful assessment and consideration of the environmental impacts of trade agreements. The most direct mechanism through which trade liberalization would affect environmental quality in the U.S. is through the composition of industries. Freer trade means greater specialization, increasing the concentration of polluting industries in some countries and decreasing it in others. We begin by documenting the substantial shift in U.S. manufacturing toward cleaner industries from 1972 to 1994. We then use annual industry-level data on imports to the U.S. to examine whether this compositional shift can be traced to the significant trade liberalization that occurred over the same time period, and we conclude that no such connection exists. A shift toward cleaner industries has also occurred among U.S. imports, and we find no evidence that pollution-intensive industries have been disproportionately affected by the tariff changes.


Author(s):  
Dianna Preece

The United States had a combined $47 trillion of public and private sector debt outstanding in the third quarter of 2016. This staggering figure is larger than many countries’ gross domestic products (GDPs) combined. Borrowers include the U.S. government, businesses, and households. The debt is held by both domestic and foreign investors. The amount of debt affects everything from a country’s ability to grow to an individual’s ability to get married or buy a home when saddled with crushing student loans. In early 2018, the most notable trends in debt markets include increased borrowing across all sectors and rising interest rates that will affect the ability of some borrowers to repay their debts. These trends are not just domestic, but global, as the U.S. Federal Reserve begins to roll back a decade-long period of quantitative easing and other central banks are likely to soon follow. This chapter considers trends in debt markets and their implications for the future.


2009 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 146-170 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barry Bosworth ◽  
Aaron Flaaen

This paper reviews some of the research on the causes of the financial crisis of 2008–09, highlights the key events that triggered a financial panic in September 2008, and summarizes the key policy actions that the United States has taken to ameliorate the crisis. We document the characteristics and growth of the sub-prime mortgage market, and the distorted incentives and flawed regulatory structure surrounding the secondary market for mortgage-backed securities. We also assess the role for macroeconomic determinants of the crisis that serve to explain the bubble in U.S. asset prices, most notably low global interest rates attributed to either loose monetary policy or excess global saving. Although low global interest rates may have contributed to the boom in housing markets and speculative excesses, we believe that the financial innovations and microeconomic distortions played a more fundamental role. Finally, a recovery marked by higher private saving, weak domestic investment, and a large public deficit appears to be unsustainable. Ultimately, the U.S. economy will need to shift about 3 percent of GDP from domestic consumption to the export sector. This will pose some serious challenges to Asian economies that have come to rely on exports to the U.S. market.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 90
Author(s):  
Sarkis Joseph Khoury ◽  
Poorna C. Pal

Negative interest rates are an invention of monetary authorities to show that monetary activism does not have boundaries, i.e., as if there is no such thing as a liquidity trap. Their presence in the financial landscape has redefined the benefits to savers and to investors. Governments can now borrow at will without visibly adding to budget deficits. This makes negative interest borrowing an alternative to raising taxes. Banks can now achieve regulatory compliance partially at the expense of depositors. Commercial banks pay to keep money at the central bank instead of earning interest on it. This paper shows the true nature of negative interest rates and their consequences on various economic agents and performance measures, specifically on economic growth and exchange rates. In addition, this paper demonstrates that the arguments in favor of negative interest rates have been largely exaggerated based on the weight of the evidence that shows the United States, which never issued negative interest rates debt, is a leader among developed countries in terms of economic growth in a non-inflationary environment.


2021 ◽  
Vol 255 ◽  
pp. 79-84
Author(s):  
William A. Allen

This paper describes how the large budget deficits of 2020 in the United States and the United Kingdom were financed, how central banks are in practice managed not just short-term interest rates but also yields on government bonds, and how their ability to resist a post-coronavirus surge in inflation has been compromised.


2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 114-125 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivo Pezzuto

In the fall of 2008, the U.S. subprime mortgage loans defaults have turned into Wall Street’s biggest crisis since the Great Depression. As hundreds of billions in mortgage-related investments went bad, banks became suspicious of one another’s potential undisclosed credit losses and preferred to reduce their exposure in the interbank markets, thus causing interbank interest rates and credit default swaps increases, a liquidity shortage problem and a worsened credit crunch condition to consumers and businesses. Massive cash injections into money markets and interest rates reductions have been assured by central banks in an attempt to shore up banks and to restore confidence within the financial system. Even Governments have promoted bail-out deal agreements, protections from bankruptcies, recapitalizations and bank nationalizations in order to rescue banks from disastrous bankruptcies. The credit crisis originated in the previous years when the Federal Reserve sharply lowered interest rates (Fed Funds at 1%) to limit the economic damage of the stock market decline due to the 2000 dot.com companies’ crisis. Lower interest rates made mortgage payments cheaper, and the demand for homes began to rise, sending prices up. In addition, millions of homeowners took advantage of the rate drop to refinance their existing mortgages. As the industry ramped up, the quality of the mortgages went down due to poor credit origination and credit risk assessment. Delinquency and default rates began to rise in 2006 as interest rates rose (Fed Funds at 5,25%) and poor households across the US struggled to pay off their mortgages. Many of them went bankrupt and lost their homes but the pace of lending did not slow. Banks have transformed much of the high-risk mortgage debt (securitizations) into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and collateralised debt obligations (CDO), and have sold these assets on the financial markets to investment firms and insurance companies around the world, transferring to these investors the rights to the mortgage payments and the related credit risk. With the collapse of the first banks and hedge funds in 2007 the rising number of foreclosures helped speed the fall of housing prices, and the number of prime mortgages in default began to increase. As many CDO products were held on a “mark to market” basis, the paralysis in the credit markets and the collapse of liquidity in these products let to the dramatic write-downs in 2007. When stock markets in the United States, Europe and Asia continued to plunge, leading central banks took the drastic step of a coordinated cut in interest rates and Governments coordinated actions that included taking equity stakes in major banks. This paper written by the Author (on October 7th, 2008) at the rise of these dramatic events, aims to demonstrate, through solid and fact-based assumptions, that this dramatic global financial crisis could have been addressed and managed earlier and better by many of the stakeholders involved in the subprime mortgage lending process such as, banks’ and investment funds management, rating agencies, banking and financial markets supervisory authorities. It also unfortunately demonstrates the corporate social responsibility failure and the moral hazard of many key players involved in this crisis, since a lot of them probably knew quite well what was happening but have preferred not to do anything or to do little and late in order to change the dramatic course of the events.


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