scholarly journals Is There a Bias Toward Excess in U.S. Government Budgets or Deficits?

1992 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles L Schultze

Do the political institutions of a majoritarian representative democracy, and in particular those of the United States, systematically produce either levels of public spending or budget deficits that are excessive? Should U.S. political institutions be altered by constitutional amendment to deal with these problems? I will start by examining the issue of public spending, and then turn to the question of budget deficits.

This edited volume compares the political systems of the United States and Canada, focusing on the effects of political institutions, and their interaction with political values and other factors, in policymaking. It explores the differences between the American presidential (or separation-of-powers) system and the Canadian parliamentary system. It also considers institutional differences such as federalism, bureaucratic leadership, and judicial definitions of citizens’ rights. It deals mainly with the period from the mid-20th century to the present but also discusses recent developments—especially the Trump presidency. The first section addresses political culture and institutions and considers political values, party and electoral systems, executive leadership and the legislative process, bureaucracy and civil service influence, and federalism. The second section addresses policymaking and outcomes, including economic policy, environmental policy, morality issues, social policy, managing diversity, and selected societal outcomes. The conclusion discusses prospects and challenges for both political systems and finds that policy differences between the two countries have diverse causes—from geography and demography, to political values, to institutional structures. The effects of institutions are often crucial, but they depend heavily on interactions with other political circumstances. Even modest, incremental change in the electoral strength or ideological tendencies of the political parties can transform institutional performance. Thus, Canada’s historic center-left moderation may be on the brink of giving way to wider ideological fluctuation and the U.S. political system was increasingly dysfunctional, even before the election of Donald Trump as president led to chaos in policymaking and the threat of severe constitutional crisis.


2014 ◽  
Vol 31 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 43-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabell Lorey

The Occupy movements in 2011 – this essay focuses mainly on Spain and the United States – have been more than moments of grassroots or direct democracy: they have been collective political practices testing forms of non-representationist democracy in the Europe of representative democracy to an unusually great extent. The precarious subjects of post-Fordism rejected political representation, and at the same time they struggled for a ‘real’ democracy. This oxymoron between representation and democracy structures the political philosophy of Jacques Rancière and corresponds with his well-known distinction between police and politics. This is one of the reasons why his thinking is helpful to understand them as decidedly political ones. However, the assembly as one of the central topoi of theories of democracy plays no prominent role in Rancière’s political philosophy. In contrast to this, I focus on the central practice of the assemblies in the Occupy movements and develop a concept of presentist democracy.


1989 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 23-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward M Gramlich

After years of relative abstinence, the United States has experimented with persistent budget deficits on a rather massive scale in the 1980s. Economists have generally been quite critical of this fiscal policy, though there are respectable minority views arguing that federal deficits are not so bad and quite possibly better than likely corrective measures. In this paper, I examine the evidence that the great deficit experiment is generating. I first look at the deficits themselves to see how high they really are, dealing with a number of measurement criticisms that have been raised from various quarters. I then discuss two critical responses to the deficits—that of private saving and that of public spending—to determine the impact of the deficits on national saving. A key issue that recurs throughout the discussion is whether the political behavior that leads to the deficits can be taken as exogenous: Are private households better viewed as responding to exogenous public sector deficits, or is something in the air causing both public deficits and a decline in private saving?


1986 ◽  
Vol 49 ◽  
pp. 16-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter Dellinger

The first part of the seminar examined a mystery that reverberates through two centuries: how does a constitutional system of government, itself born of revolution, properly provide for its own revision — provide literally for its own reconstitution? We first considered the political and intellectual assumptions against which Article V of the United States Constitution — the amendment article — was drafted, and then looked briskly at the historical context in which the Constitution's twenty-six amendments have been adopted. With this as background, we addressed a range of issues concerning the law and policy of constitutional change that are currently the subject of lively dispute in America.


2003 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodolfo O. de la Garza ◽  
Muserref Yetim

This paper argues that Mexican American views of democracy differ significantly from those of Mexicans because of their exposure to the political institutions and culture of the United States. Our results vindicate Diamond's claim that there is no better way of developing the values, skills, and commitments of democratic citizenship than through direct experience with democracy (Diamond 1999). Equally significant is that the study demonstrates that ethnic ties do not determine political attitudes. That is, despite a shared historical background and contemporary cultural commonalities, Mexican views of democracy differ from those of Mexican Americans. Este artíículo arguye que las visiones de la democracia de los mexicano-americanos difieren significativamente de las de los mexicanos debido a su exposicióón a las instituciones de políítica y cultura de los Estados Unidos. Nuestros resultados justifican la idea de Diamond de que no hay mejor manera de desarrollar los valores, habilidades y el compromiso con una ciudadaníía democráática qua a travéés de la experiencia directa con la democracia (Diamond 1999). De igual importancia, el estudio demuestra que los lazos éétnicos no determinan las actitudes polííticas. Esto es, a pesar de compartir un trasfondo históórico y de las concordancias culturales contemporááneas, las visiones de la democracia de los mexicanos difieren de las de los mexicano-americanos.


2004 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 845-853
Author(s):  
Crisca Bierwert

Twenty years ago a work entitled The Nations Within examined the political structures that keep Native polities embedded within the United States, and the legal armature that sovereignty principles might provide for future activism (Deloria and Lytle 1984). The Native nations are still “within,” in the political sense, but they are “out” in public discourses; activism has given sovereignty claims more standing that all but dreamers would have imagined in 1984. During the same period, however, federal Indian policies have alternatively buttressed and undercut the power of tribal leadership, just as they have on other continents where imperial powers have cultivated “Native authorities.” Such destabilizing shifts impel scholars of Native political, economic, and cultural histories to examine less visible violence and inequalities that underlie political institutions, particularly those that remain as evident constructions of power change.


Author(s):  
Adam Slez

The conclusion considers the legacy and lessons of the Populist moment, with an eye toward contemporary movements on both the left and right. While the Populist movement collapsed in 1896, the experience had a clear impact on economic and political institutions in the United States. In particular, the potential for third-party mobilization has been limited by the introduction anti-fusion laws designed to combat the People’s Party, restricting the organizational vehicles available to would-be reformers. Examining the rise of Populist mobilization provides important theoretical insights into the nature of populism today. By way of comparison, this chapter revisits the argument that populism is a form of political practice bound up with the configuration of competing elites within the political field. To the extent that political identities are anchored in the physical environment, the resulting patterns of contention tend to persist over long periods of time.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 205630511987543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Jungherr ◽  
Ralph Schroeder ◽  
Sebastian Stier

There has been a recent surge of political actors and groups challenging the legitimacy of established political institutions and mass media. We argue that this wave is no accident; rather, it is driven by digital media. Digital media allow outside challengers to route around social institutions that structure political discourse, such as parties and legacy media, which have previously held a monopoly on political coordination and information distribution. Digital media have weakened the power of these institutions, allowing outsiders to maintain extreme positions that formerly would have been filtered out or suppressed by institutions structuring political discourse. In this article, we explicate mechanisms linking digital media to the rise of outsiders by discussing the successes of a diverse set of challengers fighting for attention and representation in the different political contexts of the United States, Germany, and China. We thus provide a novel explanation that systematically accounts for the political consequences of digital media.


2004 ◽  
Vol 46 (03) ◽  
pp. 83-114 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Mariscal

Abstract This paper examines the process of reform in the Mexican telecommunications sector and makes comparisons with similar processes in the United States, New Zealand, and Brazil. Differences in policy responses are explained by the structure of the political institutions and the policy context in any given country. The policy lessons to be drawn from the regulatory experiences examined are that the sequence and the pace of reform influence policy outcomes. The speed with which the Mexican reform was carried out led to a lack of the institutional and legal support necessary to create a level competitive playing field. The permanence of a vertically integrated firm in the Mexican market, moreover, introduced consequential costs to the regulation of the industry. The results of this paper support the theoretical argument that privatization, in itself, does not guarantee the development of the sector and point to the need to attain a more effective regulation of competition in telecommunications.


1981 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Valerie Fifer

The political status of the District of Columbia is once again the subject of debate in the United States. The District, which forms Washington's central city enclave, an area of some 69 square miles, is closer now than ever before to achieving its oldest political ambition, that of full representation in Congress. A bill to allow such representation by Constitutional amendment was passed for the first time by both the House and the Senate in 1978. Since then, State legislatures have begun to consider ratification of the Amendment with the result that this long-standing issue has entered a new phase.Throughout its existence, Washington, D.C. has had a more distinctive and more complex political geography than is commonly supposed. Until the recent decision to support the measure, Congress had consistently opposed the idea of giving full voting rights to the District of Columbia. When the city of Washington was created at the end of the eighteenth century, the legal detachment of a Federal District from the States by means of cession was regarded as crucial to its future role as the permanent seat of government, and to the exclusive legislative control Congress was to exercise over such a district. As a result, the lack of Congressional representation became an early source of discontent, and for nearly two hundred years, D.C. has been trying to escape this particular consequence of its unique position within the federal structure.Washington, D.C. has been called “both the most American and the least American city in the United States,” and this paradox is apparent in the States' often ambivalent views of the nation's capital.


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